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What Is Federalism in Healthcare For? 
Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld* 
Abstract. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) offers a window into modern American 
federalism—and modern American nationalism—in action. The ACA’s federalism is 
defined not by separation between state and federal, but rather by a national structure that 
invites state-led implementation. As it turns out, that structure was only a starting point 
for a remarkably dynamic and adaptive implementation process that has generated new 
state-federal arrangements. States move back and forth between different structural 
models vis-à-vis the federal government; internal state politics produce different state 
choices; states copy, compete, and cooperate with each other; and negotiation with federal 
counterparts is a near constant. These characteristics have endured through the change in 
presidential administration.  
This Article presents the results of a study that tracked the details of the ACA’s federalism-
related implementation from 2012 to 2017. Among the questions that motivated the 
project: Does the ACA actually effectuate “federalism,” and what are federalism’s key 
attributes when entwined with national statutory implementation? A federal law on the 
scale of the ACA presented a rare opportunity to investigate implementation from a 
statute’s very beginning and to provide the concrete detail often wanting in federalism 
scholarship. 
The findings deconstruct assumptions about federalism made by theorists of all stripes, 
from formalist to modern. Federalism’s commonly invoked attributes—including 
autonomy, cooperation, experimentation, and variation—have not been dependent on any 
particular architecture of either state-federal separation or entanglement, even though 
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theorists typically call on “federalism” to produce them. Instead, these attributes have been 
generated in ACA implementation across virtually every kind of governance model—that 
is, regardless whether states expand Medicaid; get waivers; or operate their own insurance 
exchanges or let the federal government do it for them. This makes it extraordinarily 
challenging to measure which structural arrangements are most “federalist,” especially 
because the various federalism attributes are not always present together. 
The study also uncovers major theoretical difficulties when it comes to healthcare: 
Without a clear conception of the U.S. healthcare system’s goals, how can we know which 
structural arrangements serve it best, much less whether they are working? If healthcare 
federalism is a mechanism to produce particular policy outcomes, we should determine 
whether locating a particular facet of healthcare design in the states versus the federal 
government positively affects, for example, healthcare cost, access, or quality. If, instead, 
healthcare federalism serves structural aims regardless of policy ends—for instance, 
reserving power to states in the interest of sovereignty or checks and balances—we should 
examine whether it does in fact accomplish those goals, and we should justify why those 
goals outweigh the moral concerns that animate health policy. The ACA did not cause this 
conceptual confusion, but it retained and built on a fragmented healthcare landscape that 
already was riddled with structural and moral compromises.  
This does not mean that federalism is an empty concept or that it does not exist in the 
ACA. Federalism scholars tend to argue for particular structural arrangements based on 
prior goals and values. The ACA’s architecture challenges whether any of these goals and 
values are unique to federalism or any particular expression of it. At the same time, the 
ACA’s implementation is clearly a story about state leverage, intrastate democracy, and 
state policy autonomy within, not apart from, a national statutory scheme. Its 
implementation illustrates how federalism is a proxy for many ideas and challenges us to 
ask what we are really fighting over, or seeking, when we invoke the concept in 
healthcare and beyond. 
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Federalism is all the rage in health policy again. For the past eight years, 
President Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which 
designated the states as its frontline implementers, has been cited as a 
particularly prominent example of modern federalism.1 Indeed, the ACA has 
been deemed a prototypical example of federalism in dozens of articles—many 
of them not only about healthcare.2 With the new Administration, federalism 
has stayed at the forefront of the healthcare policy conversation. The bills 
proposed to replace the ACA, as well as the executive branch’s administrative 
efforts, are heavy on state options and waiver opportunities.3 But every 
Republican proposal likewise has kept the federal government squarely in the 
picture, preserving many of the ACA’s distinctive national-level interventions 
while also preserving the ACA’s state-centricity.4 At the same time, and despite 
the laser focus on state-federal relations under the law, little detail has emerged 
on how the ACA’s federalism actually operates in practice and what, if 
anything, is noteworthy about it. 
This Article builds on a research effort we conducted with colleagues at the 
University of Pennsylvania that tracked the details of the ACA’s federalism-
related implementation from 2012 to 2017. The work was driven by many 
questions. Central among them were: Does the ACA actually effectuate 
“federalism,” and what are federalism’s key attributes when it is entwined with 
national statutory implementation? How did the ACA’s federalism take shape, 
 
 1. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Essay, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 539-40 
(2011) (describing some of the many modern federalism structures in the statute); see 
also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 2. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 
953, 969 (2016); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 118 (2015); Heather K. Gerken, Lecture, Windsor’s Mad 
Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 598 (2015); 
Michael S. Greve, Our Federalism Is Not Europe’s. It’s Becoming Argentina’s., 7 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 32 (2012); Orrin G. Hatch, King v. Burwell and the Rule of 
Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 10 (2015); Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Agencies, 
Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1772 (2015); Hannah J. Wiseman, 
Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1686-87 (2014); Josh Bendor & Miles Farmer, 
Note, Curing the Blind Spot in Administrative Law: A Federal Common Law Framework for 
State Agencies Implementing Cooperative Federalism Statutes, 122 YALE L.J. 1280, 1287 
(2013). 
 3. See, e.g., American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, 
May 4, 2017); 163 CONG. REC. S5682-95 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2017) (SA 1030)); see also 
Compare Proposals to Replace the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
https://perma.cc/S7GR-NBRW (archived Apr. 23, 2018). 
 4. See Compare Proposals to Replace the Affordable Care Act, supra note 3.  
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and what was its purpose? A federal law on the scale of the ACA presented a 
rare opportunity to investigate how modern federalism works from a statute’s 
very beginning. 
The deep description that we develop in this Article gives rise to an almost 
unmanageable number of questions about federalism theory. It deconstructs 
assumptions about federalism made by theorists of all stripes—not just 
constitutional law-oriented federalists, who focus on formal separation, but 
also those who call themselves the “new school” federalists, who acknowledge 
and celebrate the importance of states’ role in the administration of modern 
federal statutes.5 The findings also uncover a theoretical muddle when it comes 
to healthcare law and policymaking: Without a clear conception of the U.S. 
healthcare system’s goals, how can we know which structural arrangements 
serve it best, much less whether they are working? 
Our key descriptive findings are summarized in Part I. In brief, we find the 
ACA’s federalism to be exceedingly dynamic and adaptive. The statute’s 
framework has turned out to be only a starting point for a robust vertical and 
horizontal process of intergovernmental bargaining, through which states and 
the federal government implement the law through copying, negotiating, and 
adapting. The statute’s structural architecture is also decidedly nonessentialist 
from a federalism perspective6: That is, federalism’s commonly cited 
attributes—including autonomy, cooperation, variation, and experimenta-
tion—have been generated across virtually every kind of state-federal 
arrangement in the statute’s implementation. Those federalism benefits, in 
other words, have not been dependent on any architecture of either state-
federal separation or entanglement.  
As one example, take Medicaid, the public insurance program for low-
income individuals. Some states expanded Medicaid eligibility precisely as the 
 
 5. Compare, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All 
the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-13 (2010) (describing the classic sovereignty 
account of federalism) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down], with, e.g., 
Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
997, 1005 (2015) (arguing for a modern understanding of federalism that incorporates 
national power) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism], Erin Ryan, Response 
to Heather Gerken’s Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1147, 1152-53, 1159-60 (2015) (noting the importance of state-federal bargaining as the 
critical element of modern federalism), and Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two 
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 130-36 (2004) (noting that federalism in practice occurs 
through statutory doctrines such as preemption due to the Supreme Court’s broad 
interpretation of Congress’s enumerated powers). 
 6. See Judith Resnik, Accommodations, Discounts, and Displacement: The Variability of Rights 
as a Norm of Federalism(s), 17 JUS POLITICUM 208, 221, 225 (2017) (rejecting as an 
“essentialist claim” “the presumption of the naturalness of federal or of state 
exclusivity, as if certain kinds of activities were intrinsically only to be left to a 
particular level”). 
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ACA’s text laid out; others chose not to expand at all; still others negotiated 
(and renegotiated) waivers to tailor Medicaid to their liking, in ways less than 
ideal to the Obama Administration.7 All of these states experienced autonomy; 
all of their choices generated policy localism and experimentation. Waiver 
states arguably cooperated with the federal government and dissented 
simultaneously. Were the waiver states more or less cooperative than other 
expansion states? Were they more or less autonomous than states that did not 
expand at all? In the end, it proved impossible to assign weights to the different 
ways in which federalism attributes emerged and to the structural architec-
tures that produced them because they emerged from virtually every possible 
state-federal arrangement under the law. 
This does not mean that we conclude that federalism is an empty concept 
or that it does not exist in the ACA. Instead, we stake out a new place on 
federalism’s messy spectrum. On one end, some scholars insist on an all-or-
nothing conception, one in which state power is derived from separation from 
the federal government and the Constitution draws the critical lines.8 On 
another point on the spectrum are those who see arrangements like the ACA 
and say that federalism does not exist at all; they instead see mere decentraliza-
tion and use of states in a subservient and managerial way.9 Still others brand 
themselves modern federalists and see state activity within federal frameworks 
as nonsovereign activity that both serves nationalism and works as a safety 
valve for the expression of dissenting views.10 The details of the ACA’s 
implementation do not fully support any of those stories. 
To the contrary, our findings make clear that the ACA’s implementation is 
indeed a story about state leverage, intrastate governance, and state policy 
autonomy, even within a national statutory scheme. That these, and other 
common federalism values, were effectuated independently of any particular 
structural arrangement or formal separation may be difficult for some 
federalism aficionados to swallow, but it is a key conclusion of this Article and 
one we think offers a new perspective. It also complicates what it means to be 
an essential attribute of federalism. For instance, we found that policy 
variation and experimentation—two oft-referenced federalism attributes11—
were generated as much in the various nationally run insurance exchanges as 
 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 5, at 11-13. 
 9. Cf. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND 
TRAGIC COMPROMISE, at ix (2008) (suggesting, prior to the ACA, that some aspects of 
modern federalism are actually just “managerial decentralization”). 
 10. See Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism, supra note 5, at 1005. 
 11. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National 
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 923-24 (1994) (describing the variation produced by 
experimentation as an “instrumental argument for federalism”). 
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in the state-run exchanges. Those attributes thus do not seem unique to 
federalist arrangements, even though theorists typically call on federalism to 
produce them. Sovereignty does not seem absolutely necessary either, although 
it played a key role at times. And with respect to autonomy, full structural 
separation of states from the ACA (i.e., total nationalization) would have 
diminished state power far more than did giving states the lead implementa-
tion role that they had. More than anything else, we found that state 
participation and choice, rather than any particular structural allocation, gave 
states the most power under the statute.  
To be sure, aspects of the ACA’s implementation will not resonate with 
federalism scholars at all. For starters, we begin with the view that national 
intervention in healthcare is unavoidable and that the ACA was not a unique 
interloper in an otherwise exclusive sphere of state authority. That will be 
anathema to the constitutional law-tethered federalists. But as we illustrate, the 
ACA is only the latest instance in a long pattern of incremental, national 
healthcare interventions.12 That history renders mostly irrelevant 
constitutional arguments about federalism in healthcare and the views of 
classic federalists who slice the world into separate compartments of federal 
and state authority. Instead, state-federal allocation in healthcare has been, 
from the beginning, a feature of congressional design more than of any 
constitutional mandate requiring exclusive domains. One of us has called this 
“intrastatutory federalism”: federalism arrangements produced by federal 
statutes themselves.13  
Further, the ACA’s deployment of the states, even as it empowered them, 
has almost certainly helped enact and entrench the statute. That is a nationalist 
end, served by state-implementation means, and one that most would not 
associate with traditional federalism values. The existence of these vectors of 
state power and state service in the same story complicates it tremendously.  
In the end, however, these different expressions and aims of federalism 
matter only once we define what federalism is supposed to be and what it is for. 
Federalism is a term that today is difficult to pin down.14 The complications 
our study uncovers underscore how federalism has tended to stand in for so 
many different values, as well as for many different types of structural 
arrangements—whether separation, checks and balances, variation, autonomy, 
or experimentation. They also reveal that these attributes do not always line 
up coherently, even within the same statute.  
 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 538. 
 14. See generally The Federalist Soc’y, Is Everyone Now for Federalism?, YOUTUBE (Nov. 17, 
2017), https://perma.cc/2485-Z4MY. 
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Healthcare fits right into this modern federalism story. While state 
authority over areas of healthcare certainly remains, the major decisions about 
allocation of power in healthcare now typically come not as requirements of 
constitutional law but rather from political and policy decisions by Congress to 
incorporate states into federal schemes. The question we set out to answer was 
whether this modern brand of federalism succeeds in health law. We initially 
attempted to quantitatively measure the ACA’s federalism in implementation, 
evaluating where federalism delivered and where it failed. Our efforts, 
however, were stymied by conceptual barriers in federalism and healthcare 
theory alike. 
The first problem we encountered was a federalism-theory problem. It was 
impossible to weigh whether one type of structural arrangement was more 
autonomous, sovereign, experimental, or cooperative because, as noted, aspects 
of those attributes exist across all of the different state-federal allocations in the 
statute. Federalism scholars typically argue for structural decisions based on 
the ends they wish to produce; our findings question whether it is even possible 
to talk about ends as related to any particular kind of structure, as well as 
whether federalism has ever been properly defined by either side. 
The second problem we encountered was a problem of health policy 
theory: What is healthcare federalism even for? Most of the healthcare policy 
literature has failed to engage this threshold question why we are focused on 
state-federal allocation in healthcare in the first place.15 (This problem could be 
generalized to most any field, we suspect,16 but we confine our analysis to 
healthcare.) For instance, we might view healthcare federalism as about 
federalism for federalism’s sake—federalism for political or constitutional 
values—reserving some power over healthcare for states in the interest of state 
sovereignty and balance of power, regardless of the effect on healthcare 
coverage, cost, access, or quality. If so, we should examine whether it does in 
fact accomplish those goals. If, on the other hand, healthcare federalism is a 
mechanism for producing particular policy outcomes, we should examine 
instead whether locating a particular facet of healthcare design in the states 
versus the federal government positively affects, for example, healthcare 
coverage, cost, access, quality, innovation, or some other health policy aim. 
 
 15. The most extensive treatment comes in a terrific 2003 Urban Institute volume, which 
posits different reasons why federalism might be favored in healthcare. See John 
Holahan et al., Federalism and Health Policy: An Overview, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH 
POLICY 1, 5-7 (John Holahan et al. eds., 2003). The authors conclude: “U.S. health policy 
reflects a shared approach to federalism . . . . There is little agreement that either level 
of government would necessarily do better than the current arrangement.” Id. at 6. 
 16. Cf. Judith Resnik, What’s Federalism For?, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 269, 270 (Jack 
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (illustrating the variety of causes to which 
federalism has been turned in modern times). 
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Complicating matters further is the lack of theoretical foundation in the 
field of health law in general. The field remains caught in a centuries-old, 
unresolved tension between the so-called “social solidarity” model—which 
posits that every person should be guaranteed some minimal level of 
healthcare; and the “individual responsibility” model—which posits that a 
person should receive only the healthcare she can pay for.17 The ACA built on 
a fragmented system that compromised on both sets of values and, while the 
ACA itself pushed the needle toward solidarity by enacting policies aimed at 
universal coverage, it did not go all the way and still leaves the field without 
clear core principles.18 
As such, federalism becomes even more difficult to measure because the 
menu of potential health policy goals is not necessarily coherent. For instance, 
health policy that decreases costs for the federal government is not difficult to 
construct, and such a policy might also be deemed states’ rights- or federalism-
friendly if it pushes policy choices to the states. But such a policy could well 
reduce access to care, especially for the poor,19 and it would not be state-
friendly if it increased the financial or regulatory burdens on states beyond 
what they could meet. As another example, health policy that allows for 
interstate variation might be a benefit of federalism, but it also leads to 
significant inequality when it comes to healthcare access across the country.20 
For some, a moral belief in equality might trump whatever other benefit (like 
policy variation) a federalist structure could generate. This is why, without a 
clear goal, it is impossible to know whether federalism is simply a structural 
preference regardless of its effect on healthcare or a substantive choice whose 
success warrants verification. 
This Article unfolds as follows: Part I summarizes the key findings. The 
ACA’s implementation was marked by structural dynamism, negotiation, 
administrative pragmatism, complex intrastate politics, and interstate 
 
 17. See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 
14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 227 (2008) (“The peculiarly American mix of entitlement and 
personal responsibility in today’s health reform proposals may . . . mask deep divisions 
in beliefs about whether society or the individual ought to be responsible for health. 
Trying to have it both ways may make it impossible to agree on sustainable reform.”); 
see also Abbe Gluck, Opinion, America Needs to Decide: Is Heath Care Something We Owe 
Our Citizens?, VOX (updated Mar. 18, 2017, 9:36 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/763M 
-NAQM (describing current debates’ failures to engage with the tension Mariner 
identified). 
 18. See Gluck, supra note 17.  
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. See, e.g., Samantha Artiga et al., The Impact of the Coverage Gap for Adults in States Not 
Expanding Medicaid by Race and Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/J6VR-BNXH (documenting significant health disparities in states 
that chose not to expand Medicaid). 
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horizontal competition and learning. Part II provides an abbreviated history of 
federalism and nationalism in healthcare and situates that history in modern 
theories of federalism. Part III details the ACA’s federalism structure and 
provides background on our study of the implementation of two of the ACA’s 
key pillars, which were also its most state-centered components: the Medicaid 
expansion and the health insurance marketplaces (called exchanges).21 Parts IV 
and V offer a deep dive into the federalism features of the Medicaid and 
exchange implementations, respectively. Part VI circles back to the question 
what federalism in healthcare is for and extrapolates lessons that can be 
learned. 
We conclude that the ACA’s story substantiates the existence of some 
federalism attributes within federal administration under the right 
circumstances. For instance, state leverage and policy flexibility seem real—
even within a national law—when states have choices to make that are 
important to the statute’s success. Those characteristics in turn serve state 
sovereignty, as we discuss. But other federalism attributes may not be 
dependent on states being involved at all—including the famous Brandeisian 
federalism values of experimentation and variation.22 We saw those values 
emerge from nationally run aspects of the ACA, too, and did not see any 
evidence that state-run components did any better. Perhaps these no longer 
should be thought of as classic federalism values. 
We recognize that thus deconstructing federalism’s key attributes poses 
dizzying complexities not only for conceptualization but also for legal 
doctrine. As one of us has detailed elsewhere, federalism doctrine has barely 
moved past the separate-spheres conception.23 But it must if the various values 
we associate with federalism are worth protecting, because they now clearly 
emerge outside of separate-spheres design. Moreover, the values are many and 
are not always produced together by the same state-federal structural 
arrangement. Yet we continue to invoke federalism as a single placeholder for 
all of these different things. Recognizing these developments and concretizing 
what is essential to federalism is necessary to effectuate and evaluate it—not 
only in the ACA but also beyond. 
 
 21. Many of the dynamics we describe play out in other areas of state-federal relationships 
in health regulation, but those were not the focus of our study, nor has federalism been 
at the forefront of those areas in such stark exposition as in the case of the ACA. 
 22. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It 
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 23. See Abbe R. Gluck, Essay, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2022-43 (2014). 
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I. Summary of Key Findings 
Several of our findings should be of particular interest to federalism 
experts, health-oriented or not. First, we found the ACA’s federalism to be 
dynamic, negotiated, adaptive, and horizontal. It was marked by robust 
intergovernmental activity. States copied other states and leveraged the success 
of forerunners for more gains in later negotiations.24 The federal government 
adapted each time, setting the stage for the next round of activity. This 
federalism was multidirectional, not an on-off switch: States have changed 
structural architecture in both directions, moving between state-led and 
federally led models and vice versa.25 State choices have moved in waves.26  
Second, the ACA’s federalism generated some fascinatingly pragmatic and 
creative hybrids of national and state-level solutions that we have not seen 
theorized elsewhere in the federalism literature and that emerged only in 
implementation. The ACA’s initial framework, it turned out, was a mere 
starting point for the ultimate allocation of authority. The hybrids that 
emerged were notable in striking a middle ground between one and fifty 
options—those two extremes being the typical way that state-federal allocation 
of power questions are considered, and the typical kind of choice Congress 
makes in designing statutes in areas that implicate the states. The ACA’s story 
reveals instead that some lower number of structural options—say, four or 
eight—might be the sweet spot between variety and efficiency. 
We also found that many states were eager to accept the kind of federal 
help for which the federal government has particular economies of scale, 
including administrative and technical assistance, even as they wished to retain 
control over policy decisions.27 These hybrid solutions had negative 
byproducts too. Most importantly, they jeopardized transparency. Some states 
that took advantage of the hybrid approach did so because it allowed them to 
hide the fact they were getting federal help from their constituents and, in some 
cases, hide it even from parts of their own governments.28 The hybrids thus 
gave red-state officials cover to entrench the ACA but arguably came at a steep 
price when it comes to accountability. One official colorfully called it the 
“secret boyfriend model” of state-federal relations—a relationship coveted by 
 
 24. The account of the negotiations we offer substantiates much of Erin Ryan’s work. See 
generally Ryan, supra note 5, at 1159-60 (discussing the breadth and importance of 
bargaining between states and the federal government in the context of contemporary 
federalism).  
 25. See infra Parts IV-V. 
 26. See infra Parts IV-V. 
 27. See infra Part V.B. 
 28. See infra Part V.B.2. 
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the states, but one that states were unwilling to admit publicly for political 
reasons.29  
Third, the ACA’s federalism story highlights the importance of intrastate 
governance.30 Each state is an individual republic of its own, even as most 
federalism scholars still talk about “the states” as a monolithic bloc.31 But states 
had different laws going into the ACA, which shaped policymaking decisions 
under the law. For instance, some states had generous preexisting insurance 
requirements, which affected the design of their exchanges. Other states had 
laws about Medicaid policy, which influenced governors in their negotiations 
over whether and how to expand Medicaid in their own states under the ACA.  
State actors also have significant differences among them. State insurance 
commissioners (most of whom are elected) view health policy differently from 
governors, who themselves take a different position from legislators—even 
those within the same party. The ACA’s implementation saw many governors 
bucking legislators in their own party to take advantage of the ACA’s benefits 
to their states—often using preexisting features of state law to do so—
underscoring the different priorities of different members of state government 
and the different structures of the state governments themselves. These 
internal dynamics within states have a profound, and mostly unrecognized, 
influence on national policy.32  
Fourth, Parts IV and V take a deep dive into implementation that decon-
structs federalism’s commonly touted attributes and so reveals the complica-
tions for empirically measuring federalism in healthcare and beyond. We 
suggest that many of the most common “federalism” questions are unanswera-
ble or at least seriously oversimplified. Take for instance the popular question 
whether states are engaging in cooperative or uncooperative (disobedient) 
federalism, as well as the related question whether certain structural 
arrangements serve state autonomy.33 The ACA allowed states to choose 
whether to operate their own health insurance exchanges or to have the 
 
 29. Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4  
(Aug. 5, 2016) (on file with authors). Because many interviewees were sitting officials, 
or formerly sitting officials, we granted all of them confidentiality to allow for more 
candid discussion. 
 30. See infra Parts IV.B, V.D. 
 31. For an important exception, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of 
Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 1201, 1203 (1999). 
 32. Our account responds to Rick Hills’s longstanding call to “dissect” the states and 
develop a federalism story that recognizes the differences both among the states and 
among various governmental players within each state. See id. 
 33. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256, 1258-59 (2009). 
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federal government do so for them.34 Many believe that blue states cooperated 
by establishing their own state-run exchanges and that red states rebelled by 
defaulting to a federally run exchange. This binary is too simplistic. When 
Oregon, for example, switched from a state-run to a federally supported 
exchange,35 did it suddenly become uncooperative? Or was Oregon still 
cooperating by defaulting to the national exchange, even though the common 
wisdom is that red states that did the same thing were not cooperating and 
were more autonomous? 
As for rebellious states, were they more sovereign, autonomous, and 
uncooperative in the context of the exchanges—even though, as a result of 
their refusal to implement the exchanges themselves, they paradoxically 
welcomed the federal government takeover of their insurance markets?36 Or did 
other states instead better exert and increase their own sovereign power when 
they implemented the ACA themselves, typically making their own policy 
choices and passing state laws to do so? Regardless of the structural 
arrangement chosen, it is clear that states would have enacted far fewer 
healthcare-related laws—and been in control of far less health policy—had they 
been left out of the ACA entirely. In other words, constitutional federalism’s 
preference for formalist and exclusionary structural arrangements would not 
have served the values here that those arrangements are supposed to serve. 
States exerted power—leverage and checks on the federal government, in 
addition to control of policy—from within the statute, not from outside it. 
In exploring all these topics, we build upon the recent wave of new 
federalism scholarship—work that has been occupied with mapping and 
explicating federalism across all subjects in an age of national power.37 As we 
elaborate in Parts VI, our findings challenge areas of this research. Contrary to 
 
 34. See infra Part III.A. 
 35. See Louise Norris, Oregon Health Insurance Marketplace: History and News of the State’s 
Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Jan. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/776P-P9UP (“Oregon 
initially had a fully state-run exchange—Cover Oregon—but it was plagued with 
technological failures, and never worked as planned.”). 
 36. See infra Part V. 
 37. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 461 (2012) (arguing that states increasingly use cooperative 
federalism to challenge federal executive power and enforce federal statutes); Gluck, 
supra note 23, at 1998 (arguing that modern federalism is a “National Federalism” 
created by federal statutory design); Greve, supra note 2, at 34-35 (highlighting the 
United States and Argentina as examples of federal states increasingly using coopera-
tive federalism); see also Ryan, supra note 5, at 1151-55 (situating environmental law in a 
theory of federalism that collapses national and federal); Ernest Young, William 
Howard Taft Lecture, Federalism as a Constitutional Principle, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1057, 
1067, 1076-77 (2015) (describing the enumerated powers strategy of protecting 
federalism through constitutional law and advocating for the importance of political 
and sociological forces in supporting modern federalism). 
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what some new federalism scholars would argue, the ACA’s federalism does 
more than serve nationalist ends. It also gives the states more power than the 
new federalism account allows. At the same time, the ACA’s story demolishes 
the utility of the concept of cooperation in federalism, beloved by modern 
federalism scholars, because that concept illuminates nothing in this context. 
Indeed, it challenges even more broadly the very notion that any particular 
structural arrangement is required to produce most of the values we associate 
with federalism at all.  
Finally, this Article also responds to a particular weakness of federalism 
scholarship in general by pausing to examine the deep details of the ACA’s 
federalism in operation. As one of us has chronicled, federalism theory tends to 
be high on abstraction and low on concreteness.38 Detailed exposition situated 
in both history and theory is wanting, and we hope to provide that here. 
II. Healthcare Federalism, Old and New 
From the time the ACA was introduced, debates about the law’s desirabil-
ity have been entangled with debates about American federalism. Politicians, 
commentators, and scholars alike have portrayed the ACA as a federal 
takeover, a uniquely nationalist intervention in the terrain of state health 
policy.39 Others have incorrectly theorized about the ACA’s structural 
arrangements as a new and unique violation of constitutional lines of division 
between states and the federal government in healthcare.40  
In fact, the ACA follows on a long history of national interventions into 
state health regulation, many with similar structural features to the ACA itself. 
And it is not the case that any of the recent proposals to repeal or replace the 
ACA would restore some erased constitutional dividing lines between state and 
federal. Indeed, each Republican proposal has kept intact the major federal 
 
 38. See Gluck, supra note 23, at 1998 (arguing that when it comes to federalism theory and 
doctrine, “[w]e are still muddling through”); see also Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a 
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 285 (2005) (arguing that modern 
federalism lacks “rules of engagement”). 
 39. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: Federal 
Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 199 
(2011) (arguing that the ACA “extend[s] and deepen[s] federal regulation of health 
insurance”); Richard A. Epstein, Bleak Prospects: How Health Care Reform Has Failed in the 
United States, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 10-11 (2010) (describing the ACA’s approach as “a 
profound transformation of how we think about the role of government”); Melinda 
Henneberger, “Frankly, It’s Bull----”: Kathleen Sebelius Is Fighting Mad About Obamacare 
Attacks, KAN. CITY STAR (updated Oct. 13, 2017, 7:49 PM), https://perma.cc/QA4N-J86U 
(“‘It’s just nonsense’ the way it’s been portrayed as a government takeover of health 
care, [Sebelius] said . . . .” (quoting Kathleen Sebelius, former U.S. Secretary of Health and 
Human Services)). 
 40. See infra Part II.C. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270 
What Is Federalism in Healthcare For? 
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018) 
1704 
 
programs and laws (for example, Medicaid and Medicare) and massive federal 
subsidies (the most important example being the employer tax deduction for 
healthcare that helps to insure half of all Americans).41 
Understanding this historical and legal context makes clear why we need 
to move past arguments about formal constitutional federalism to arguments 
about the policy and political choices—as well as concerns for states’ rights—
that go into allocation in modern federalism-based federal statutes. It also 
explains why this is an Article about federalism that does not begin with the 
possibility of a world in which the national government has no role in 
healthcare but rather takes the ACA’s joint state-federal framework as given 
for the kind of structure we are likely to see going forward, regardless what 
happens to the specifics of the ACA itself. 
Interestingly, and consistent with the story we tell about the ACA, neither 
federalism nor nationalism has ever been fully embraced in healthcare policy. 
When it comes to federalism, it was the case long before the ACA that classic 
federalism values such as states as “laborator[ies]” of “experiment[ation]”42 had 
often been effectuated in health policy not by traditional federalism (the 
preservation of separate spheres of state authority) but by nationalism (federal 
laws setting a baseline and inviting state participation with funding nudges).43 
States have been limited in what they can accomplish alone in healthcare 
experimentation.44 Disincentives, such as industry exit, prevent a single state 
from bearing all of the costs of innovation risk that would arise if it were one 
of the few making costly regulatory demands.45 Federal laws that allow for 
state experimentation within federal law often provide a steadier path toward 
 
 41. See infra Part II.C; see also JESSICA C. BARNETT & EDWARD R. BERCHICK, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2016, at 3, 4 tbl.1 (2017), https://perma.cc/98XQ-JFZW; Jonathan Gruber, The 
Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance 3-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 15,766, 2010), https://perma.cc/54XP-DA7K. 
 42. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 43. See Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-
Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1750 (2013). 
 44. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote 
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 610-11 (1980) (analyzing the economic impacts of 
and lack of incentives for risky state experimentation); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 11, 
at 925-26 (noting that federal financial and organizational assistance aids states in 
overcoming the free-rider problem); David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: 
Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 582-
83 (2008) (describing states’ hesitation to experiment with welfare policies due to 
population mobility); see also Gluck, supra note 43, at 1764 (describing the ACA as a 
federal law incentivizing states to increase experimentation). 
 45. See Super, supra note 44, at 557. 
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experimentation.46 The ACA offers a striking example: It was modeled on a 
major Massachusetts experiment, which the state undertook not alone but 
rather with federal permission and funds (largely from the Medicaid 
program).47  
On the other side, healthcare nationalism often is characterized as an 
oppressive interloper in state domains, and has been so characterized with 
respect to the ACA.48 But history shows not only that states sometimes need 
federal intervention to make their own healthcare systems work—federal 
intervention typically comes in response to some state regulatory or market 
failure—but also that federal intervention, when it comes, tends to be focused 
and incremental. Although Congress has debated fuller-scale national 
programs49 and has occasionally enacted laws that are sweeping (still never 
universal), it typically enacts compromise legislation that instills piecemeal or 
targeted federal reform.50  
This strategy in turn has prevented a complete vision of healthcare 
nationalism from being realized. Uniformity and equality of access to 
healthcare are still wanting, and fragmentation of the U.S. healthcare system 
remains a salient problem.51 Federal intervention has tended to be highly 
incremental and therefore incomplete. Take the ACA again as an example: 
Despite being a major federal intervention in health policy, the ACA 
perpetuated and entrenched the fragmentation of U.S. healthcare by expanding 
the various and very differently structured healthcare programs already in 
existence—some state-led, some federal, some mixed—rather than starting 
fresh with a single, integrated approach.52  
 
 46. See Gluck, supra note 43, at 1764; Rubin & Feeley, supra note 11, at 925-26. 
 47. See Ryan Lizza, Romney’s Dilemma, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2011), https://perma.cc 
/3WXQ-T9WK (detailing how Massachusetts’s health reform was made possible by a 
Bush Administration Medicaid waiver). 
 48. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE L.J.F. 1, 4 (2017) 
(“[T]he ACA . . . wrests more regulatory authority from states than necessary.”). 
 49. See generally, e.g., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., National Health Insurance—A 
Brief History of Reform Efforts in the U.S. (2009), https://perma.cc/2H68-4ZWB 
(summarizing the healthcare reform movements and failures of the twentieth century 
in anticipation of the then-nascent Obama Administration’s effort). 
 50. See, e.g., Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-178, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code) (adding prescription drug coverage to Medicare only); Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121(b), 100 Stat. 82, 164-67 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2016)) (requiring only emergency medical 
treatment in hospitals). 
 51. See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation and How to Fix 
It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 1, 9-15 (Einer 
R. Elhauge ed., 2010). 
 52. See infra Part III.A. 
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The pattern is a recurring one of call and response between the states and 
the federal government. We present here some highlights of this long story. 
A. An Abbreviated History of Federal Interventions in Healthcare 
During the colonial era and beyond the Revolutionary War, medical care 
was the domain of state and local governments when not being addressed by 
private charities. But even in the early days of the republic, the federal 
government established payments for veterans’ war injuries and, later, 
hospitals for veterans’ care (as well as for merchant seamen).53 A series of 
federal laws offered increasing responses to states’ inability to provide for 
veterans, whose medical needs became even more pressing after the Civil 
War.54 Ultimately, veterans’ healthcare was fully federalized; Congress created 
the U.S. Veterans Bureau in 1921 to provide medical care for battle-injured 
World War I veterans; later, the Veterans Administration covered all medical 
care for veterans.55 The same year, Congress passed the Sheppard-Towner 
Maternity and Infancy Act of 1921, which for the first time put the federal 
government into the area of health and the family by providing states with 
funds for prenatal and newborn care.56  
The turn-of-the-century industrialization, and later the Great Depression, 
World Wars I and II, and an influx of the war-wounded illuminated the states’ 
inability to handle the relatively new phenomenon of medical policy or 
payment alone.57 Although wealthier states were able to increase spending to 
 
 53. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREAT FACING OUR PUBLIC 
HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 77 (2003) (tracing various 
early federal payments for healthcare, including those for veterans and merchant 
seamen); BARBARA MCCLURE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 83-99 EPW, MEDICAL CARE 
PROGRAMS OF THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION 1-4 (1983) (tracing the history of 
healthcare programs for veterans); JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING 
JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC 
COURTROOMS 140-43 (2011) (noting that federal hospitals were among the few existing 
federal buildings prior to 1850). In 1811, Congress deducted a portion of naval sailors’ 
pay to care for war veterans’ injuries; in 1833, Congress opened a home for disabled 
naval officers, seamen, and marines; and in 1851, Congress established a home for 
disabled soldiers. See MCCLURE, supra, at 1-2. 
 54. See H. COMM. ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 90TH CONG., MEDICAL CARE OF VETERANS 30, 59-
62 (Comm. Print 1967).  
 55. See MCCLURE, supra note 53, at 2-3. 
 56. See Pub. L. No. 67-97, 42 Stat. 224 (repealed 1929); Historical Highlights: The Sheppard-
Towner Maternity and Infancy Act, HIST. ART & ARCHIVES, https://perma.cc/PG4L 
-MFDG (archived Apr. 25, 2018). Thanks to Rick Hills for this insight. 
 57. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE 
STUDY OF MEDICAID 5-36 (1974) (detailing various federal interventions throughout the 
early twentieth century to assist states with their traditional role of providing both 
welfare and medical assistance). 
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pay for their swelling medically needy populations, most other states had no 
means to add healthcare to the list of welfare programs they already supported, 
so states sought federal funding to care for the indigent.58 President Roosevelt 
considered but did not include healthcare in the Social Security Act of 1935, and 
an attempt to include it again during World War II failed but was followed 
closely by Senator Wagner’s proposed National Health Act of 1939, which 
would have directed federal funds through state administration.59 President 
Truman likewise attempted to achieve national health coverage, but fears of 
“socialized medicine” proved then, as they have continued to be, an 
insurmountable obstacle to universal, nationalized reform.60 After Truman’s 
national health program was rejected, Congress took the smaller step of 
encouraging the construction of hospitals where medical needs were unmet 
through the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, commonly known 
as the Hill-Burton Act.61 In return for this federal funding, new Hill-Burton 
hospitals had to provide care to low-income individuals, formalizing so-called 
charity care.62 
During this period, developments in the courts confirmed that healthcare 
could largely be handled—as a matter of law—as a national, rather than a state 
or local, problem. In 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that insurance was 
national commerce and could be regulated by Congress as such.63 But Congress, 
 
 58. See id. at 7 (describing how the Federal Emergency Relief Administration took over 
states’ welfare responsibilities during the Depression); Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing 
Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 444 (2011) (describing states’ inability to pay for 
welfare medicine). 
 59. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 266-70, 275-77 
(1982); see also Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397mm (2016)); National Health Act of 1939, S. 1620, 76th 
Cong. One contemporaneous scholar described Senator Wagner’s bill as “merely 
another step, albeit a long step, in the orderly development of existing federal health 
work, while the federal grants for medical care, and the disability compensation 
program, cannot be thought of as radical innovations, for they, too, have a broad body 
of precedent.” Harold Maslow, The Background of the Wagner National Health Bill, 6 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 606, 618 (1939).  
 60. See Special Message to the Congress Recommending a Comprehensive Health Program, 
PUB. PAPERS 475, 477, 488 (Nov. 19, 1945). In addition, opposition to national health 
insurance and other national benefits was rooted in part in racism because southern 
states were fearful that the federal government would use national health programs as 
a mechanism for desegregation. See DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID 
POLITICS AND POLICY, 1965-2007, at 8-10 (2008). In addition, the American Medical 
Association fought national health programs as “socialized” medicine. See id. at 25. The 
Journal of the American Medical Association went so far as to call President Truman’s 
proposal an “attempt to enslave medicine.” Id. 
 61. See Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 209). 
 62. Id. sec. 2, § 622(f), 60 Stat. at 1043. 
 63. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944).  
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in a moment unappreciated by most federalism scholars (especially those 
unwilling to recognize the concept of federalism as a congressional option), 
voluntarily gave that power back to the states with the passage of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945.64 That statute created a presumption that 
regulation of insurance remains with the states unless Congress explicitly 
declares otherwise (as it did in the ACA).65 
Concomitantly, the National War Labor Board was formed in 1942 and 
later ruled that World War II-related wage controls did not apply to fringe 
benefits such as pensions and insurance within certain limits, and a few years 
later, the National Labor Relations Board upheld unions’ engagement in 
collective bargaining for benefits such as health insurance.66 Such federal 
policies helped employers offer greater benefits to much-needed war-effort 
employees, as did an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling in 1943 that 
employer-based healthcare would not be taxable income for the employee.67 
Labor unions used this valuable benefit as a bargaining tool throughout the late 
1940s and into the 1950s, and the IRS further pushed the trend by ruling in 
1954 that employer-sponsored health insurance was not taxable to employees 
or employers.68  
This significant series of interventions in private health insurance, as one 
of us has previously written, has turned out to be one of the most overlooked 
and underappreciated federal interventions in the typically state-based terrain 
of health insurance.69 Modern policy experts who oppose the “socialization” of 
medicine (especially when it comes to healthcare for the poor) rarely 
acknowledge the more than $200 billion each year that the federal government 
spent long before the ACA to subsidize the health insurance of working 
Americans.70 Employer-sponsored health insurance benefits are still the source 
 
 64. See Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2016)). 
 65. See id. §§ 1-2, 59 Stat. at 33-34. 
 66. See COMM. ON EMP’R-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS, INST. OF MED., EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH 
BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK 70-71 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 
1993); JOST, supra note 53, at 77-80; TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A 
CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 60 (2007) [hereinafter JOST, HEALTH 
CARE AT RISK]. 
 67. See JOST, supra note 53, at 77-79. 
 68. See id. at 79 (discussing the 1954 IRS ruling’s role); STARR, supra note 59, at 311-13 
(discussing unions’ role). For a thorough discussion of the role of labor unions in the 
growth of employer-sponsored health insurance, see JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra 
note 66, at 62-64. 
 69. See Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2016) (detailing the “hidden” subsidy of tax benefits for employer-
sponsored health insurance). 
 70. See id. at 18 (noting that the Congressional Budget Office valued these tax subsidies at 
$248 billion as of 2013 even though this form of spending is “rarely discussed as such”). 
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of health insurance coverage for about 56% of the U.S. population today,71 
rendering this tax subsidy—for the wealthier, non-Medicaid population, no 
less—a major ongoing federal intervention.  
Ongoing medical access failures led Congress to enact the Social Security 
Act Amendments of 1950, which provided federal grants-in-aid to states in the 
form of vendor payments—capped payments for specific services such as 
hospital, skilled nursing, and physician care.72 The legislation delegated 
payment delivery to states, allowing states and localities to vary widely in their 
use of the funding.73 Even though vendor payments offered cost-shifting to the 
federal government while reinforcing the state role in medical services, many 
states resisted participating, in part because vendor payments were available 
only for individuals receiving welfare benefits. But increased federal funding 
improved participation over time.74 With medical care tied to welfare 
administration, stigmatization of the medically needy population was virtually 
automatic.75  
Congress’s next notable intervention was the Kerr-Mills program included 
in the Social Security Amendments of 1960, which offered the states additional 
money and included funding for elderly people who were “medically indigent” 
at a matching rate rather than a capped allocation.76 Kerr-Mills continued the 
connection between welfare and medical payments for nonelderly indigent 
individuals, allowing states to determine eligibility and coverage.77 In sum, 
Kerr-Mills offered incremental reform with more federal money and some 
federal standard setting, staving off grander federal intervention while 
preserving states’ role in healthcare.78 States were in a slightly better economic 
position for the existence of Kerr-Mills, but wide variation in state 
implementation led to confusion, inconsistencies and disparities in coverage 
and care, and state cost-shifting to the federal government in ways unintended 
 
 71. BARNETT & BERCHICK, supra note 41, at 4 tbl.1. 
 72. See Pub. L. No. 81-734, tit. III, 64 Stat. 477, 548-58 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 23-24.  
 73. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 23-24 (describing state “variations” in 
implementing vendor payments). 
 74. See Judith D. Moore & David G. Smith, Legislating Medicaid: Considering Medicaid and Its 
Origins, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Winter 2005-2006, at 45, 45-46 (describing how 
vendor payments were augmented by the federal government throughout the 1950s, 
which increased state uptake). 
 75. See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 30. 
 76. See Moore & Smith, supra note 74, at 46 (“A most important innovation in the Kerr-
Mills Act was to extend medical benefits to a new category generally known as the 
medically indigent . . . .”); see also Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-
778, 74 Stat. 924 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 77. See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 30-31.  
 78. See Huberfeld, supra note 58, at 443-44. 
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by the law.79 Further, even though wealthier and heavily industrialized states 
were eager to take advantage of federal funds—California, Massachusetts, and 
New York accounted for more than half of enrollees in the program’s first 
year—many poorer states were reluctant to participate.80  
Poor states needed more funding for healthcare, but some did not have the 
necessary matching funds of their own to afford the federal assistance.81 Many 
of these states—especially in the South—also had particular anxieties about 
federal intervention in areas involving both the family and minority 
populations.82 This led those states to resist federal funding outright or to 
allow only limited participation83 and, as with later federal reforms, to insist 
 
 79. See SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH OF THE ELDERLY, S. SPEC. COMM. ON AGING, 88TH CONG., 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE AGED: THE KERR-MILLS PROGRAM, 1960-1963, at 1-2 
(Comm. Print 1963) (giving a harsh assessment shortly after Kerr-Mills’s enactment of 
the program’s failure to assist the elderly). 
 80. See Moore & Smith, supra note 74, at 46-47. 
 81. See id. (noting that poorer states were stingy with welfare, which carried over to 
medical welfare); see also STARR, supra note 59, at 368-70 (laying out historical develop-
ments before Medicaid and noting that the most industrialized states were most likely 
to participate in federal funding). 
 82. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Remarks at the Yale Law School Conference on the Law of 
Medicare and Medicaid at 50, at 6-7 (Nov. 7, 2014) (transcript on file with authors) 
(detailing racist motivations for southern states to resist Medicaid’s public health 
insurance for the poor at its inception and throughout Medicaid’s history). Opposition 
to national health insurance and other national benefits was rooted in part in racism 
and the southern drive for cheap agricultural labor; southern states feared that the 
federal government would use national health programs as a tool for desegregation. See 
SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 6-7. In fact, Medicaid’s devolution to states to 
determine eligibility and benefit levels can be directly traced to Senator Byrd’s efforts 
to defeat any possible federal interjection into “the Negro question.” See id. at 10 
(quoting EDWIN E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 144 (1962)). 
And part of the reason Medicaid contains the very specific Early and Periodic 
Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) requirement of “a comprehensive 
unclothed physical exam,” see 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(1)(B)(ii) (2016), is that southern 
doctors would not have touched black children without a federal rule telling them 
otherwise. When the Reagan Administration tried to remove this standard in 1981, the 
director of EPSDT from Mississippi’s Medicaid agency demanded that it remain for 
fear that “doctors [would] stop taking clothes off Black children to examine them.” See 
Attachment to Email from Sara Rosenbaum, Harold & Jane Hirsh Professor of Health 
Law & Policy, George Washington Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health, to Nicole Huberfeld, 
Professor of Health Law, Ethics & Human Rights, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health & Sch. 
of Law (Aug. 25, 2017, 2:08 PM EDT) (on file with authors); see also Medicaid Require-
ments for State Programs of Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment of 
Individuals Under 21, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,420 (May 18, 1979) (codified as amended at 42 
C.F.R. §§ 441.50-.62 (2017)) (formalizing EPSDT guidance into regulations). 
 83. See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 40 (noting that states in the South, the Southwest, 
and those with “rural or sparsely populated areas” were holdouts). After five years, ten 
states still had not implemented Kerr-Mills; three of those states had authorized use of 
federal funds but did not allocate state funds necessary to trigger the federal match. See 
Moore & Smith, supra note 74, at 47. 
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on structures that gave states control over their minority populations. This 
combination of distrust, conservative values, and racism also led states to 
demand a continued role for themselves in managing the federal distributions 
and preserving the political economy of the region.84 It further allowed for less 
aggressive implementation by some states less eager to assist minority 
populations,85 entrenching interstate coverage disparities. 
By the early 1960s, it was clear more help was needed beyond existing state 
assistance for needy populations. First introduced by President Kennedy, and 
enacted as part of the Johnson Administration’s War on Poverty in 1965, 
Medicare offered a radically different approach with a fully nationalized 
program for all elderly people designed to offer what was then comprehensive 
health insurance (hospital and physician care, not just one or the other).86 It 
was to be funded and administered entirely by the federal government with no 
role preserved for states.87 This shift to a totally federalized scheme resulted in 
part from successful lobbying by the elderly, who did not want their access to 
medical care to fluctuate depending on the economic whims and welfare biases 
of the states.88 But also, Medicare was enacted as a federal program because 
states did not want to be responsible for elderly people’s medical needs, 
evidenced in part by states’ slow uptake of prior programs.89  
The push for nationalization did not extend to the nonelderly poor.90 
Although Medicaid was enacted with the same pen stroke as Medicare, 
Medicaid was structured differently, offering federal funding and statutory 
baselines while continuing shared state financing and a state-driven, welfare-
based approach to healthcare that encoded a philosophy of aiding only the 
“deserving poor” (such as the blind, disabled, young children, and their 
 
 84. See SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL 
PUBLIC POLICY 61 (1998). 
 85. See id. at 75-77. 
 86. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 46-49. 
 87. See id. at 48-51. For the current codification of Medicare, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395lll. 
 88. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 45-46. 
 89. See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 41 (noting that “many states were too poor or 
unwilling . . . to put up the matching funds” for Old Age Assistance and other medical 
welfare programs that predated Medicare); STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 30-33 
(arguing that although Kerr-Mills was a way to “shift[] the burden of [aid to the elderly] 
from others to the federal government,” “the states responded slowly to the new 
program”).  
 90. Medicare and Medicaid have always been linked for poor elderly who cannot pay out-
of-pocket costs. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 49, 52. Thanks to Sara Rosenbaum 
for this insight.  
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parents)91—and keeping state control over those populations—that continued 
until the ACA.92 Thus, the distinction between social insurance and welfare 
that was encoded in the first Social Security Act was carried through into the 
statutory principles that underlie the differences between Medicare and 
Medicaid.93 
Medicare has been modified from time to time, for example to cover 
people with long-term disability in 197294 and to add a major drug benefit in 
2003,95 but it tends to avoid the same kind of frequent tinkering seen elsewhere 
in healthcare law. On the other hand, Medicaid has seen much more significant 
modification over time, often reflecting the larger pattern of federal 
incremental intervention where state governance is failing. For example, 
Medicaid has been amended to increase coverage categories and financial 
eligibility levels over time. In the 1980s, for instance, eligibility was expanded 
to cover all financially eligible children up to age eighteen and to increase the 
levels of financial eligibility for children younger than six.96 And in 1989, the 
singular Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) 
benefit (which ensures uniform, comprehensive medical benefits for children) 
was made mandatory for states.97 In each instance, the federal government was 
stepping in where states failed to serve certain populations’ medical needs. 
Medicaid was decoupled from welfare in the 1990s after President Clinton’s 
healthcare reform failed and the Gingrich plan for block grants was defeated—
a legislative change that unenrolled vulnerable people but that also set the stage 
 
 91. See Huberfeld, supra note 58, at 436-46; see also Social Security Amendments of 1965, 
Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 
U.S.C.) (enacting Medicare and Medicaid).  
 92. See Jost, supra note 82, at 1, 6-8 (discussing this progression and the link between state 
control of healthcare and continued limitations on serving all poor people). 
 93. See id. at 1, 5. For further discussion of the historically exclusionary approach to U.S. 
healthcare, see Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 67 (2015).  
 94. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 201(a)(3), 86 Stat. 1329, 
1371 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2016)); 42 C.F.R. § 406.5 (2017). 
 95. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, § 101(a)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2071-150 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 1395w-101 to -154). 
 96. See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 133-36 (2d ed. 2015); Nicole Huberfeld et al., 
Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 20-24 (2013) (detailing amendments 
to Medicaid that expanded eligibility, such as for pregnant women and children). 
 97. See S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 589-90 (5th Cir. 2004). The benefit had 
been optional since 1967. See id. at 589. Congress realized that states were bypassing the 
optional EPSDT benefit and created a highly detailed list of rules for screening children 
regularly. See id. at 589-90; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (defining the current EPSDT 
benefit).  
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for the ACA’s expansion to all of the nation’s poor in 2010.98 Further, Medicaid 
both laid a foundation and acted as a foil for the creation in 1997 of the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (then SCHIP, now CHIP), a federal block 
grant that allows states to subsidize coverage for children at higher financial 
eligibility levels than does Medicaid, after the Clinton health plan failed to 
create comprehensive coverage in 1994.99  
Every President from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Barack Obama tried to 
expand or improve healthcare access.100 After Medicare and Medicaid, in the 
early 1970s, President Nixon promoted a new format for private insurance that 
was modeled on organizations like Kaiser Permanente.101 Nixon’s Health 
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 preempted conflicting state laws and 
offered funding to support the creation of health maintenance organizations, 
commonly known as HMOs.102 The Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) of 1974 was also negotiated by the Nixon Administration.103 
Although primarily conceived as a federal floor of rules addressing the 
problem of failed pensions, ERISA effectively (and mostly accidentally) 
nationalized the rules for a wide swath of health plans—those provided by 
employers who self-insure employee health benefits—immunizing them from 
 
 98. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) 
(creating the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program). 
 99. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4901(a), 111 Stat. 251, 552-70 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397mm). See generally Sara Rosenbaum et 
al., The Children’s Hour: The State Children’s Health Insurance Program, HEALTH AFF., 
Jan./Feb. 1998, at 75 (discussing features of CHIP). 
 100. See DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER: HEALTH AND 
POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 1-20 (2010); cf. PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE 
PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER HEALTH CARE REFORM 4 (2011) [hereinafter 
STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION] (noting a century of effort in health reform, starting 
with Teddy Roosevelt’s failed social insurance plan). See generally STARR, supra note 59, 
at 235-449 (describing the history of efforts in U.S. healthcare reform). President 
Trump campaigned on a universal access platform, see, e.g., Aaron Blake, Trump’s 
Forbidden Love: Single-Payer Health Care, WASH. POST: THE FIX (May 5, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/E8B9-EWDR (“Everybody’s got to be covered.” (quoting Donald 
Trump’s statement on 60 Minutes: Trump (CBS television broadcast Sept. 27, 2015))), but 
quickly moved to undermine the ACA and repeal many of its most generous provi-
sions, see, e.g., Robert Pear et al., Trump to Scrap Critical Health Care Subsidies, Hitting 
Obamacare Again, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/U7QD-VQFC. 
 101. See STARR, supra note 59, at 394-405. President Obama embraced this format in the ACA. 
See Phil Galewitz, Nixon’s HMOs Hold Lessons for Obama’s ACOs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS 
(Oct. 21, 2011), https://perma.cc/N3TR-QB75. 
 102. See Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 
42 U.S.C.); Marjorie Smith Mueller, Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, SOC. 
SECURITY BULL., Mar. 1974, at 35, 35, 38. 
 103. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
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state regulations.104 ERISA has remained a major obstacle to state-based health 
policy reform.105 
In the 1980s, Congress further expanded the federal baseline by enacting 
two important budget laws that transformed, in an effort to increase 
uniformity, Medicare physician payments106 and the continuation of 
employer-sponsored health coverage at the termination of employment.107 
The second of these laws also contained a provision that prevents patient 
dumping and requires hospitals to treat patients who present with an 
emergency medical condition, commonly called the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA).108 President Reagan supported these 
federal interventions in traditionally state-based healthcare.109 
After the Clinton health reform effort of 1993 failed, prominent academics 
argued that states would have to take up the mantle of health reform.110 That 
largely did not occur. Instead, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 next addressed ongoing private insurance 
 
 104. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Alternative Models of Federalism: Health Insurance Regulation and 
Patient Protection Laws, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY, supra note 15, at 361, 365 
(describing ERISA’s increased preemptive sweep as more employers turned to self-
funded health benefits); Abbe R. Gluck et al., ERISA: A Bipartisan Problem for the ACA 
and the AHCA, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/WN67-HZHM 
(explaining that the Congress that passed ERISA did not foresee its major impact on 
healthcare and detailing impediments to state reform caused by the statute’s reach). 
 105. See Gluck et al., supra note 104; see also, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 
936, 940-41, 947 (2016) (holding that ERISA preempts Vermont’s state all-payer claims 
database). 
 106. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6104, 103 Stat. 
2106, 2208-09 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (2016)) (replacing the “reasona-
ble charge” method of reimbursing physicians in Medicare with a relative value scale 
method of payment). 
 107. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 10002(a), 100 
Stat. 82, 227-31 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (2016)).  
 108. See id. § 9121(b), 100 Stat. at 164-67 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd). 
 109. See, e.g., Henry Olsen, Reagan’s Real Legacy: A Reply to Donald Devine, NAT’L REV.  
(Nov. 10, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://perma.cc/4XR7-PAZD (noting that Reagan’s 
signature on the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) legisla-
tion that made EMTALA law was consistent with other views he held on healthcare). 
The finances of COBRA and EMTALA were consistent with President Reagan’s desire 
to prevent any additional taxing or spending by the federal government. To wit: 
COBRA’s cost was borne by a departed employee, who could be asked to pay up to 102% 
of the employer’s cost of providing health insurance. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act sec. 10002(a), § 602(3), 100 Stat. at 228 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 1162(3)). EMTALA’s cost was borne by hospitals accepting Medicare as 
reimbursement for services but was not separately or specifically funded. See id.  
§ 9121(b), 100 Stat. at 164-67. 
 110. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Commentary, The Case for Federalism and 
Health Reform, 28 CONN. L. REV. 115, 117 (1995). 
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market failures.111 HIPAA facilitated credit for insurance coverage when an 
employee moved from one job to another within a short period of time, offered 
incentives for creating medical savings accounts to try to address the 
continually growing problem of uninsurance, and facilitated the growth of 
high-risk pools in the states.112 HIPAA did not preempt state laws regarding 
health insurance so long as they met the federal baseline of facilitating 
continued coverage for preexisting conditions, thereby allowing states to 
continue in their historic role of regulating insurance but with federal 
statutory guiderails.113 A number of the ACA’s reforms are in fact amendments 
to these predecessor federal interventions, including ERISA and HIPAA, and in 
part respond to perceived failures in those statutes to improve healthcare 
markets and the difficulties for those with preexisting conditions.114 
In 2003, Congress enacted the most noteworthy benefit amendment to 
Medicare since its creation—a prescription drug benefit, supported by the 
second President Bush.115 A few years later, the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act implemented a 
part of HIPAA pertaining to electronic health records by setting federal 
standards and offering grants to states for improved electronic records.116 
 
 111. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 112. See id. sec. 101(a), § 701, 110 Stat. at 1939-45 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1181) 
(credit for coverage); id. sec. 102(a), § 2701, 110 Stat. at 1955-61 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3) (credit for coverage); id. sec. 111(a), § 2744, 110 Stat. at 1984-86 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-44) (high-risk pools); JOST, supra note 53, at 
188-89 (discussing some of HIPAA’s features, including its interaction with employer-
sponsored health insurance and attempts at regulating failing small-group markets). 
 113. See Bovbjerg, supra note 104, at 367 (describing HIPAA’s structure). 
 114. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1104, 124 Stat. 
119, 146-54 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d, 1320d-2, 1395y) (amending 
HIPAA); id. § 1562(e), 124 Stat. at 270 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185d) (amending ERISA); see 
also id. sec. 1561, § 3021 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-51) (amending the Public 
Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 201 to 300mm-61), to address health information technology). 
 115. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, § 101(a)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2071-150 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 1395w-101 to -154); Bush Signs Landmark Medicare Bill Into Law, CNN (Dec. 8, 2003, 
1:23 PM EST), https://perma.cc/JKF8-64FP. 
 116. See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L.  
No. 111-5, div. A, tit. XIII, sec. 13101, § 3001, 123 Stat. 115, 230-34 (2009) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11) (establishing the Office of the National Coordinator for 
Health Information Technology); id. sec. 13301, § 3013, 123 Stat. at 250-52 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 300jj-33) (establishing standards for grants to states); Nicolas P. Terry, 
Certification and Meaningful Use: Reframing Adoption of Electronic Health Records as a 
Quality Imperative, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 43, 46-49 (2011) [hereinafter Terry, Certification 
and Meaningful Use] (discussing the history of HITECH and its amendment of prior 
law); Nicolas P. Terry, To HIPAA, a Son: Assessing the Technical, Conceptual, and Legal 
footnote continued on next page 
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Promoting electronic records was long a priority of the second President Bush, 
and the HITECH Act was enacted as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 at the beginning of the Obama Administra-
tion.117 The ARRA also included increased federal funding for Medicaid to help 
states overcome increased enrollment related to the Great Recession.118 
This is a long history, and it does not even include the parallel develop-
ment of federal intervention in and regulation of the terrain of pharmaceutical 
innovation and approval.119 Notably, although certain healthcare reform ideas 
tend to be floated from the right or the left, this history is not nearly as 
politicized as common understanding would have it. To be sure, Democrats 
supported programs such as the Social Security Act, Medicare, Medicaid, and 
the ACA, but Republicans supported the Health Maintenance Organization 
Act, ERISA, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 
EMTALA, CHIP, and Medicare Part D. Pressure for healthcare intervention 
occurs on nearly every Congress’s watch. 
B. Patterns of National Intervention 
Some notable patterns appear. First, the states’ consistent need for federal 
support in times of economic stress underscores the importance of 
countercyclical spending in making some federal intervention almost 
inevitable.120 During a recession, unemployment increases and health 
insurance coverage decreases, but income taxes decline at the same time, 
leading states to lose funding at the moment their citizenry most needs 
governmental support.121 Most state constitutions require balanced budgets,122 
so states seek federal money to fill their gaps because the federal government 
can engage in deficit spending and respond to states’ needs.  
 
Frameworks for Patient Safety Information, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 133, 133 (2005) (discussing 
HIPAA’s provisions regarding electronic records). 
 117. See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act § 13001(a), 
123 Stat. at 226 (noting that the HITECH Act comprises two titles of the ARRA); Terry, 
Certification and Meaningful Use, supra note 116, at 48 (describing President Bush’s drive 
to improve electronic records). 
 118. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 5000(a), 123 
Stat. 115, 496 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a app. at 3571-72).  
 119. See generally Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://perma.cc/V6EW-ML9N (last updated Feb. 1, 2018) (detailing federal statutes 
regulating food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices since the nineteenth century). 
 120. Cf. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2641-42 (2005) 
(describing how states’ political and budgetary structures make them ill prepared to 
support social services in emergencies and times of economic distress). 
 121. See id. at 2629-39. 
 122. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, NCSL Fiscal Brief: State Balanced Budget 
Provisions 4 (2010), https://perma.cc/3X7C-MVHJ; id. app. at 11-12. 
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Second, the same states do the same things over and over again.123 South-
ern states and states with limited resources hold out; wealthier states like 
California, Massachusetts, and New York spend on social welfare program-
ming while maximizing available federal money.124 Discrimination based on 
race and class continues due to persistent echoes of welfare policy and 
stigmatization of the poor in healthcare reform efforts.125 Even today, for 
example, we hear echoes of this history in calls to remove the so-called “able 
bodied” from Medicaid eligibility or to add work requirements when they are 
enrolled—even though most Medicaid-eligible households do contain 
workers.126 The ACA rejected such castigatory thinking,127 but new proposals 
aim to introduce work requirements and are being approved as this Article 
goes to print.128 
Third, most federal interventions have been incremental and fragmented. 
This is a key place where federalism and health policy intersect. Political 
scientists have consistently demonstrated that Congress legislates across all 
areas (not just healthcare) in piecemeal fashion.129 Many reasons exist for 
policy incrementalism, including the numerous barriers to lawmaking of any 
sort in Congress and the difficulty of attaining consensus in a polity as diverse 
 
 123. See Huberfeld, supra note 58, at 436-49 (discussing path dependence in healthcare policy, 
especially in Medicaid). 
 124. For a fuller description of this phenomenon in the context of the Kerr-Mills regime, 
see notes 76-93 and accompanying text above. 
 125. See generally Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 69, at 41-59 (discussing how, under the 
ACA as implemented, people who need public health insurance are subjected to “self-
reliance scrutiny” while people who receive subsidies for purchasing private insurance 
are not). 
 126. See, e.g., Rachel Garfield et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Understanding the 
Intersection of Medicaid and Work 1-3 (2018), https://perma.cc/KPV7-Z28J; see also 
Phil Galewitz, Medicaid Chief Says Feds Are Willing to Approve Work Requirements, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (updated Nov. 7, 2017, 3:20 PM), https://perma.cc/8RRB-2CMM. 
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services issued guidance for states interested in 
adding work requirements shortly before this Article went to print. See Letter from 
Brian Neale, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
to State Medicaid Director (Jan. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/S246-FMN5.  
 127. See Huberfeld, supra note 93, at 67-68 (contrasting the universality principle of the ACA 
with exclusionary practices in healthcare laws that predated it).  
 128. See Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 69, at 5-6; Garfield et al., supra note 126, at 4 
(discussing proposed work requirements); see also, e.g., Letter from Demetrios L. 
Kouzoukas, Principal Deputy Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., to Stephen P. Miller, Comm’r, Ky. Cabinet for Health & 
Family Servs. 1-2 (Jan. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/X57W-NQMV (approving 
Kentucky’s application for a section 1115 waiver with work requirements for newly 
eligible beneficiaries). 
 129. For the classic statement of this point, see Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling 
Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959). 
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and populous as ours.130 But as one of us has argued, a link exists between 
Congress’s tendency toward policy incrementalism and the design of federal 
statutes that rely on state administration.131 The historical backdrop of state 
social policy regulation creates both political and pragmatic incentives for 
Congress to rely on, rather than to displace, the embedded state administrative 
apparatus.132 As a political matter, federalism-related concerns about big 
government and respect for traditional areas of state authority lead Congress 
to design federal schemes that give states large roles in administration.133 
Politically, it seems like less of a displacement, and like less of an expansion of 
government, to structure federal programs this way.134 Pragmatically, in 
addition to the lack of sufficient federal personnel, established state 
bureaucracies provide ready experts to implement new federal legislation.135  
The result in healthcare is a policy design that has been criticized for being 
structurally fragmented in multiple ways.136 All the federal interventions 
discussed above have different structures. The Veterans Health Administration 
is structured differently from Medicare, even though both are purely national 
programs;137 Medicaid’s state-federal partnership is uniquely structured in its 
open-ended match for state spending;138 and block grants to states in programs 
such as HITECH, CHIP, and the ACA’s exchanges are each differently 
designed.139 A huge chunk of the private insurance market rests on the 
 
 130. See id. at 84-85. 
 131. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 572-74. 
 132. See id. at 572-73.  
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 572. 
 136. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 51, at 1-10. 
 137. See About VHA, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://perma.cc/9JRN-TUG9 (archived  
May 15, 2018) (describing the kinds of medical providers and facilities run by the 
Veterans Health Administration). Medicare offers financing but not facilities or special 
providers. See Health Care Insurance, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://perma.cc/Q3ZG 
-F24F (archived May 15, 2018) (noting that Veterans Affairs benefits are not a form of 
health insurance but that Medicare is); see also The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., An 
Overview of Medicare 5 (2017), https://perma.cc/9QF4-MVBP (describing Medicare’s 
financing). 
 138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2016); see also Laura Snyder & Robin Rudowitz, The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Financing: How Does It Work and What Are the 
Implications? 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/AC9P-Z6PC (explaining Medicaid’s funding 
structure). 
 139. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-31 (providing HITECH funding for healthcare entities), with 
id. § 300jj-33 (offering grants to states to develop health information technology), and 
id. §§ 1397aa, 1397dd (establishing CHIP as a federal block grant offered annually to 
states). For discussion of the ACA’s exchanges, see Part V below. 
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employer tax deduction—yet another entirely different structure of federal 
financing.140  
This fragmented structure leads different populations in our system to 
access healthcare in different ways, variation that fosters disparities and 
inefficiencies. Likewise, rather than wiping the slate clean to build a new, 
unified system from the ground up, the ACA’s main components are drawn 
from these preexisting programs, each one the product of an incremental 
legislative moment. And because those earlier efforts also largely depended on 
state bureaucracies, the incremental way in which Congress has intervened in 
healthcare has reinforced the states’ role, even within a more robust national 
framework.141 
C. Theoretical Underpinnings of Healthcare Federalism 
Before the enactment of the ACA, the most important works in healthcare 
federalism dated to the late 1990s and early 2000s and were largely autopsies of 
the Clinton health reform effort. That scholarship was marked by a then-new 
recognition that federalism in health policy could no longer be understood 
through the classic constitutional model: an either-or separate spheres model 
that asks which government (state or federal) has control over a particular facet 
of health policy.142 With failed national reform in the rearview mirror, a 
consensus among federalism scholars emerged that some kind of joint state-
federal model would be necessary.143 Although proposals’ specifics varied, they 
coalesced around arguments for a system in which at least some minimum 
standards were set by the federal government and in which states could benefit 
from federal funds.144 Being relatively new theoretical and policy terrain, the 
earlier scholarship did not go much further than that. Specifically, little if 
anything was written on the kind of negotiating relationships that mark 
 
 140. See Matthew Rae et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Tax Subsidies for Private 
Health Insurance 1 (2014), https://perma.cc/2G32-DLVW (“The largest tax subsidy for 
private health insurance—the exclusion from income and payroll taxes of employer 
and employee contributions for employer-sponsored insurance . . . —was estimated to 
cost approximately $250 billion in lost federal tax revenue in 2013.”).  
 141. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 572-74. 
 142. See generally Bovbjerg, supra note 104 (describing states’ and the federal government’s 
roles in developing particular healthcare policies); Robert F. Rich & William D. White, 
The American States, Federalism, and the Future of Health Care Policy, in HEALTH POLICY, 
FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES 293, 293-96 (Robert F. Rich & William D. 
White eds., 1996) (arguing that “[c]hallenges to the . . . senior/junior paradigm of 
federalism in health care” point “toward a reduced federal role and an increased state 
role in setting [health] policy, as well as in administering and financing it”). 
 143. See, e.g., Holahan et al., supra note 15, at 6-7. 
 144. See Bovbjerg, supra note 104, at 380-83; Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 110, at 117-18; 
Rich & White, supra note 142, at 293-300. 
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collaborative federalism schemes or on other dynamics of implementation, 
including complications posed by intrastate politics or the salient role for 
Congress in any model in which the federalism is structured by an overarching 
national law.145 
Fast forward to the recent attempts at postmortems on the ACA and 
Republican proposals to replace it. Federalists critical of the ACA argue for a 
return to “states’ rights” in healthcare.146 Some depict the ACA as an 
unconstitutional invasion of state authority.147  
These characterizations are deeply mistaken as a matter of both basic 
constitutional law and federalism theory, and they distract from the main 
questions. Federalism scholars who criticize the ACA in the name of the 
Constitution do not propose in its stead a wholesale return of insurance market 
governance or oversight of low-income populations (Medicaid) to states, nor 
do they advance a theory of why the federal government is legally restricted in 
so regulating. Instead, each counterproposal, in the name of constitutional 
“states’ rights,” would retain a supervisory, preemptive role for the federal 
government. For example, the bill that passed the House in May 2017, the 
American Health Care Act, would have made cuts but still would have retained 
the Medicaid program and the basic requirement that insurers cover all 
Americans without discriminating based on health risk.148 The Graham-
Cassidy proposal in the Senate, in many ways the most radical proposal offered, 
would have given the states more choices about how to spend federal dollars to 
satisfy federal policy floors but would still have funded state health policy and 
retained federal requirements in the form of continuing the federal Medicaid 
program and imposing federal requirements on state insurance markets.149  
 
 145. This scholarship has only recently begun to emerge in other fields. See, e.g., Ryan, supra 
note 5, at 1152-55 (discussing intergovernmental bargaining in modern environmental 
federalism). 
 146. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 2-3 (describing the states’ rights federalism narrative). 
 147. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, President Obama’s Top Ten Constitutional Violations of 2015, NAT’L 
REV. (Dec. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/8RT6-YJYK (arguing that the ACA is a 
“constitutional abuse[]” and “a never-ending bonanza of lawlessness”). See generally 
Nathaniel Stewart, Brief Observations: A Review of Obamacare Briefs and the Original 
Meaning of the Constitution (2012), https://perma.cc/C4J5-QTLS. 
 148. See American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. §§ 111-117 (as passed by 
House, May 4, 2017); Compare Proposals to Replace the Affordable Care Act, supra note 3. 
The bill included more flexible waiver options with respect to what benefits must be 
covered. Anna Edgerton et al., House Passes Obamacare Repeal in Razor-Thin GOP Victory, 
BLOOMBERG POL. (updated May 4, 2017, 12:36 PM PDT), https://perma.cc/CKX4-AG2N. 
 149. See 163 CONG. REC. S5682-95 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2017) (SA 1030) (proposing Graham-
Cassidy); see also Sarah Kliff, Graham-Cassidy: The Last GOP Health Plan Left Standing, 
Explained, VOX (updated Sept. 13, 2017, 2:47 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/7HRG-LC6S.  
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This is not a different kind of federalism from the ACA. The difference lies 
only in the policy choices—whatever baseline Congress sets and how much 
discretion Congress gives states within the statutory framework—all made 
within a national superstructure with delegated state-led elements. That 
argument is not about constitutional federalism or any other fundamental 
structural difference.150 It is, rather, about policy choices within the same 
structural paradigm we currently have: a federal-statute-based, state-federal 
cooperative regime. 
In other words, the suggested models for federalism post-ACA are the same 
models as the ACA’s federalism. Every proposal involves a federal superstruc-
ture that allows for state variation within a prescribed framework.151 
Recognition of this point is key because it illustrates the irrelevance of classic 
dual sovereignty federalism theory in the healthcare sphere. Instead, we have a 
recognition dating to 1944 that Congress has the power, when it desires to use 
it, to regulate insurance markets.152 No constitutional barriers prevent 
Congress from so doing.153 (This is not to say that Congress will always choose 
the right means. But structured correctly and legally, Congress can surely 
regulate.) The substance of the current Republican proposals reveals a 
consensus on that point. It also reveals an apparent consensus that some federal 
intervention is in fact warranted—or that at a minimum, once it is given it is 
hard to take away. The question now is what that intervention should be, not 
which governments should be involved. 
This is where we see weaknesses in arguments of scholars like Nicholas 
Bagley, who argues in this vein that it would “spell[] the end of federalism” if a 
federal intervention in health policy such as the ACA were justified solely by 
virtue of unwise or unjust policymaking by the states.154 In direct tension with 
such statements, commentators like Bagley himself still argue for Congress to 
set some baselines—precisely because those scholars disagree with some aspects 
of state policy, want some policy decisions nationalized, and wish to have and 
 
 150. For one example of this misunderstanding, see Bagley, supra note 48, at 17 (arguing that 
states “have some reason to complain” that the ACA’s prohibition against charging 
older people more than three times more for insurance than younger people violates 
federalism because it represents a “value judgment” that should be left to the states). 
 151. See, e.g., H.R. 1628 (leaving federal requirements in place but giving states additional 
flexibility). 
 152. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (upholding 
Congress’s power to regulate the business of insurance under the Commerce Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3), superseded in other part by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act of 
1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2016)). 
 153. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.) (holding that Congress could pass the ACA’s individual insurance 
mandate as a tax rather than under its commerce power). 
 154. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 9. 
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eat the cake alike.155 The fact is that healthcare statutes today squarely align in 
their structure with other federal laws like the Clean Air Act and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which set national baselines in the 
face of state regulatory failures but still preserve key roles for states as thought 
leaders.156 That is modern federalism, and it is precisely how Congress now 
regulates in many areas once considered state domain. 
A few other points need to be made here because they tend to be over-
looked by formalist federalists writing about healthcare. One important reason 
healthcare reform tends to be driven from above, by federal law, is that state-
level reform by either legislatures or courts is not likely, even though such 
local reforms have driven national reforms in other areas, such as same-sex 
marriage.157 When it comes to legislative reform, it is very difficult for states 
to experiment in health policy without federal assistance both in funding and 
in standard setting. Experimenting is risky and expensive. In the case of 
demanding insurance standards, costs will rise and insurers may withdraw 
from state markets with such requirements.158 (Remember that Massachu-
setts’s experiment in universal coverage was funded and facilitated by a 
Medicaid demonstration waiver; it was not a solo state experiment.)159 Indeed, 
 
 155. See, e.g., id. at 3, 19-20; see also Health Reform Roundtable, Convergence Ctr. for Policy 
Resolution, A Bipartisan Answer to “What Now?” for Health Reform 1-2 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/Q4EM-WNLT (publicizing a bipartisan group advocating for state 
flexibility and federal “guardrails”). 
 156. See generally Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 
1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2016)); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 84-
159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2016)). 
 157. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 48, at 2-3 (suggesting that the same-sex marriage movement 
is an apt comparison). 
 158. Cf., e.g., Frank J. Thompson, New Federalism and Health Care Policy: States and the Old 
Questions, in HEALTH POLICY IN TRANSITION: A DECADE OF HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND 
LAW 79, 80-81 (Lawrence D. Brown ed., 1987) (discussing why states have been stingy 
rather than generous in experimenting with health policy). 
 159. See John Holahan & Linda Blumberg, Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A Look at the 
Issues, 25 HEALTH AFF. w432, w432, w436, w443 (2006) (discussing the technical and 
political elements that made Massachusetts’s universal coverage possible). In an amicus 
brief supporting the national regulatory scheme of the ACA, Massachusetts offered 
data on the external costs imposed on its unique universal healthcare system by the 
residents of neighboring states: 
During fiscal year 2009 alone, for example, Massachusetts hospitals provided inpatient care to 
more than 43,000 patients who were not residents of Massachusetts, at an estimated cost of 
$910,000,000. Of these non-Massachusetts residents, approximately 1,200 did not have any 
health insurance. The number of out-of-state patients without insurance coverage was even 
greater at Massachusetts emergency departments where more than 12,900 uninsured individ-
uals received care during fiscal year 2009. Massachusetts cannot regulate insurance coverage 
for non-Massachusetts residents, nor can it (or should it) restrict access to necessary and 
emergent care. 
footnote continued on next page 
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those very facts are frequently cited in policy literature as a reason why states 
do not experiment in health policy at the level traditional federalism theory 
would predict.160 State health policy is pushed, collectively, in a race to the 
bottom, not lifted to the top toward reform.161 
With respect to recourse to state courts for state-level reform, no state 
constitution or state law offers a positive right to healthcare.162 By contrast, 
every state constitution contains other positive rights, which have helped to 
drive such social policy change as marriage equality.163 Some state constitu-
tions even contain other special welfare rights the U.S. Constitution does not, 
including the right to basic education.164 Judicial remedy through state 
constitutional law therefore does not provide an alternative to federal 
statutory reform.165 
 
  Brief of Amicus Curiae, Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Supporting Petitioners and 
Addressing Whether Enacting Minimum Coverage Provision of ACA Authorized by 
Article I) at 15, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-
398), 2012 WL 160239 [hereinafter Massachusetts NFIB Amicus Brief] (footnotes 
omitted). 
 160. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 43, at 1764; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 44, at 610-11; Rubin & 
Feeley, supra note 11, at 925-26; cf. Super, supra note 44, at 563 (“[T]he process of 
establishing democratic experimentalism in the first place may be problematic.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 158, at 80-81 (noting the view that states do not have the 
commitment or the capacity to experiment effectively in healthcare); Jonathan Chait, 
The Health Care Regulatory Race to the Bottom, NEW REPUBLIC (May 25, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/X2UU-SB5H (arguing that insurers will flock to states with less 
stringent regulations and concluding that “[f]or a small population state, the attractions 
of a major industry setting up shop within state laws almost invariably outweigh the 
costs it would incur in poor regulation”); Massachusetts NFIB Amicus Brief, supra  
note 159, at 1-6, 15-17. Bagley overlooks this argument in concluding that no collective 
action problem exists that supports a need for national regulatory standards in 
healthcare. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 5. 
 162. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1328, 1347, 1391-92 (2010). 
 163. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948-49, 969 (Mass. 2003) 
(“The Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty 
and equality than the Federal Constitution; it may demand broader protection for 
fundamental rights; and it is less tolerant of government intrusion into the protected 
spheres of private life.”). 
 164. Compare, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“Public education is not a ‘right’ 
granted to individuals by the Constitution.”), with, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 
255 (N.C. 1997) (“We conclude that Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the 
North Carolina Constitution combine to guarantee every child of this state an 
opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.”). 
 165. Bagley also argues that racism is not a reason to consider national regulatory standards. 
See Bagley, supra note 48, at 8 (“The case [for federal reform based on racism concerns] is 
harder to sustain than it may at first appear.”). U.S. healthcare has a long, deep history 
of discrimination that has infiltrated and stymied many efforts at universalism in 
healthcare reform—so much so that groups like the NAACP were even leery of the 
Clinton Administration’s health reform effort. See, e.g., Beatrix Hoffman, Health Care 
footnote continued on next page 
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In short, we should be wary of arguments for federalism or states’ rights 
that are couched in constitutional arguments when they are really arguments 
about policy disagreements and statutory design. The ACA’s federalism is about 
how states react to and act within the framework of a national law that offers 
states options about how and whether to participate. Whether or not the ACA 
survives, the Republican proposals in 2017 largely would have strengthened 
this dynamic, keeping the federal superstructure and giving states choices 
within it—again in the name of that slippery concept called federalism. 
Although supporters of the bills being floated in Congress and some health 
policy wonks may wish that the ACA’s specific policy choices were different, 
none are advocating a truly different brand of federalism from the one that 
already exists in the ACA. Our observations about the ACA’s implementation—
its dynamism, its negotiated and horizontal character, its reliance on hybrid 
state-federal partnerships, and the role of internal state politics—will be even 
more relevant if the state options within national reform expand under the 
Trump Administration. 
III. Federalism Under the ACA 
Like other federal interventions before it, the ACA responded to regulato-
ry gaps and market failures in healthcare by focusing largely on weaknesses in 
(mostly state-run) insurance markets. Uninsurance had reached a record high 
of more than 16% during the first year of the Obama Administration, a trend 
exacerbated by the Great Recession, and the uninsured were concentrated 
among people earning less than 250% of the federal poverty level (FPL).166 
 
Reform and Social Movements in the United States, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 75, 75, 80 (2003) 
(exploring the complex relationship between segregation, other forms of racism, social 
movements, and healthcare reform in the United States). These historic patterns are 
still relevant. See Mark A. Hall, States’ Decisions Not to Expand Medicaid, 92 N.C. L. REV. 
1459, 1464-66 (2014) (suggesting that implicit racism may be a factor in the opposition 
to Medicaid expansion). Timothy Jost has documented the racism underlying 
resistance to Medicaid expansion, concluding that until Medicaid is federalized, “the 
original sin of racism will continue[] to infect” it. See Jost, supra note 82, at 6-8. Jost has 
explained: 
If you look at the map today, it is many of the same states today that are rejecting Medicaid 
expansion whose senators blocked federal standards for public assistance almost 80 years ago, 
and, I would argue, for the same reason. They still want to keep control of determining which 
of the poor are eligible for assistance, and not to help those who are not worthy. 
  Id. 
 166. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 22-28, 26 tbl.9 (2010), https://perma.cc 
/Q9AH-GUBL (reporting new Census Bureau data indicating a continued increase in 
the uninsurance rate and that the greatest number of uninsured individuals earned less 
than $25,000 at the time the ACA was enacted); 2009 HHS Poverty Guidelines, OFF. 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION (Dec. 1, 2009), https://perma.cc/P5U2 
footnote continued on next page 
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Fewer employers offered health insurance as an employment benefit, and those 
that did had increased employee cost sharing over time.167 Additionally, 
individual and small group health insurance markets were inaccessible for 
many (especially the lower- and middle-income uninsured) because of high 
prices and exclusionary policies designed to prevent coverage of subscribers 
who were not “healthy.”168 Though Medicaid had expanded since 1965 to 
include additional populations over time, it still offered an incomplete safety 
net, with many populations not covered in most states.169 As of 2006, only 
about 45% of the nation’s poor uninsured were eligible for Medicaid.170 Those 
excluded from insurance coverage often would seek care in emergency 
rooms171—a poor and increasingly expensive substitute for systematic care. 
 
-TF28 (noting that the FPL in 2009 for one person was $10,830); Andrew Villegas & 
Phil Galewitz, Uninsured Rate Soars, 50+ Million Americans Without Coverage, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 16, 2010), https://perma.cc/JN5U-2YZC (reporting that the 
number of people uninsured was at “an all time high”); see also ROBIN A. COHEN ET AL., 
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH 
INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY-MARCH 2016, at 1, 4, app. at A1 tbl.I, A7 tbl.IV (2016), 
https://perma.cc/ML7N-N8TA (reporting long-term trends in insurance coverage 
before and after the ACA); COMM. ON HEALTH INS. STATUS & ITS CONSEQUENCES, INST. OF 
MED., AMERICA’S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 25-
44 (2009) (detailing trends of declining insurance coverage); RACHEL GARFIELD ET AL., 
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER; KEY FACTS ABOUT 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE UNINSURED IN THE ERA OF HEALTH REFORM 3-4 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/6LQU-KSWN (discussing the landscape of uninsurance before the 
ACA). 
 167. See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 100, at 79-80, 155-56. 
 168. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1589 (2011) (describing ACA provisions 
designed to address pricing practices that made nongroup insurance too costly for most 
who did not fit in other insurance mechanisms). See generally Jessica L. Roberts & 
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (and Isn’t) Healthism?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 837-38, 842-
44 (2016) (considering which types of health-based distinctions are unjustifiable 
discrimination, deemed “healthism”). 
 169. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
 170. See STAN DORN, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., MILLIONS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS CAN’T 
GET MEDICAID: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 5 (2008), https://perma.cc/3UHF-SE7W. 
 171. The practice was so common that President George W. Bush said, “[P]eople have access 
to health care in America. After all, you just go to an emergency room.” Remarks to the 
Greater Cleveland Partnership and a Question-and-Answer Session in Cleveland, Ohio, 
43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 920, 922 (July 10, 2007); see also Rachel Weiner, Romney: 
Uninsured Have Emergency Rooms, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2012), https://perma.cc/2ZPL 
-2VCJ (recounting this statement and reporting that candidate Mitt Romney made a 
similar comment). 
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A. The ACA’s Federalism as Drafted 
The ACA responded to these gaps in coverage with an overarching 
philosophy one of us has called “universality”—universal access to healthcare 
through universal access to insurance coverage, even for most populations 
historically excluded due to health status or financial status.172 (Some 
populations were left out, notably millions of undocumented immigrants; legal 
immigrants were left out of Medicaid, too.)173 The statute’s two central 
mechanisms to accomplish this goal turned out to be its most federalism-
oriented. First, it expanded Medicaid coverage to populations long excluded 
from categorical eligibility (namely, nonelderly childless adults, including men, 
with income up to 138% of the FPL).174 Second, it facilitated individual access to 
insurance in the private market by subsidizing insurance purchases and 
creating individual insurance markets—the exchanges—to make options more 
transparent for consumers and to ensure that insurance so purchased met a 
minimum standard of coverage.175 
Universality under the ACA does not mean uniformity, however. Nation-
alizing the whole system under a single structure would probably be the easiest 
way to achieve universality, but it was not politically palatable in 2009 and was 
not consistent with Congress’s documented preference to legislate incremen-
tally. Instead, the ACA built on what came before, maintaining but buttressing 
both the private markets and Medicaid. 
From a federalism perspective, the two central mechanisms of the statute—
the Medicaid expansion and the exchanges—were not drafted to be structurally 
the same. The Medicaid expansion was intended to be more national; the 
private insurance reforms were envisioned to be largely state-led. However, as 
detailed below, politics and law intervened to make the ACA’s federalism in 
implementation almost the mirror image of its federalism as drafted.  
 
 172. See Huberfeld, supra note 93, at 67-69. 
 173. See id. at 68 n.7 (noting the exclusion of undocumented immigrants); see also Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1312(f)(3), 124 Stat. 119, 184 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (2016)) (limiting access to ACA exchanges to 
lawful residents); Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrants, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://perma.cc/Q58C-LXEG (archived Apr. 23, 2018) (explaining that lawfully 
present immigrants can get coverage through ACA exchanges but that many must wait 
five years prior to receiving Medicaid coverage). 
 174. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 271 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)) (creating a new Medicaid eligibility category). The 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 immediately amended the ACA 
and created a 5% income disregard, raising eligibility for the new category to 138% of 
the FPL. See Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1004(e)(2), 124 Stat. 1029, 1036 (codified at 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1396a(e)(14)(I)). 
 175. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(a), 124 Stat. at 186 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 18041(a)) (detailing exchange structure). 
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The Medicaid expansion that the ACA enacted did not take Medicaid away 
from the states but did nationalize the program in the important sense that it 
mandated eligibility expansion to populations that prior to the ACA had been 
covered only at a state’s option. The ACA ended Medicaid’s limitation to the 
“deserving poor” by requiring that states expand eligibility to all adults under 
age sixty-five (when Medicare kicks in) with income up to 138% of the FPL.176 
The ACA funded the eligibility expansion completely from 2014 through 2016, 
after which it decreases the federal match slightly, paying for 90% of the 
expansion population’s costs by 2020.177 Even at 90%, the supermatch is more 
generous than the matching rates states have received historically, which are 
tied to per capita income and range from 50% to about 80%.178 The ACA as 
enacted did not authorize partial expansion of eligibility, so states could not 
expand eligibility in a more limited fashion and still receive the supermatch.179 
The idea was to make more uniform and comprehensive the coverage that had 
become so distant for most of the nation’s poor by the time of the 2008 election. 
With respect to the insurance markets, the proposed bill originally 
considered in the House of Representatives would have created a nationally 
run ACA insurance market for the privately insured population. But the Senate 
insisted on a federalist structure.180 The ACA as enacted therefore gave states 
the right of first refusal to run their own insurance exchanges.181 The 
exchanges were new marketplaces, creatures of federal law introduced by the 
ACA (but pioneered in Massachusetts).182 They not only aimed to increase 
insurance coverage through a baseline of coverage and information that would 
be delivered to subscribers but also enabled federal tax credits that subsidized 
the purchase of private health insurance for individuals earning between 100% 
 
 176. See id. § 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 271; see also Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
§ 1004(e)(2), 124 Stat. at 1036. 
 177. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y). 
 178. See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND CHIP 
DATA BOOK 17 exhibit 6 (2017), https://perma.cc/D8X2-RWR8. 
 179. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1), (3), 124 Stat. at 271-74 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 1396d(b), (y)). Wisconsin has 
a Medicaid waiver for BadgerCare, which is equivalent to a partial expansion, but the 
waiver predated the ACA and has been renewed after the ACA, allowing coverage to 
continue despite noncompliance with the ACA. See Sara Rosenbaum, Wisconsin’s 1115 
Medicaid Demonstration: What Will Policymakers Learn?, COMMONWEALTH FUND: TO THE 
POINT (June 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/8346-M738. 
 180. Compare America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong.  
§ 201(a) (as reported to House, Oct. 14, 2009), with Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 1321 (as passed by Senate, Dec. 24, 2009).  
 181. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321, 124 Stat. at 186-87 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 18041). 
 182. See JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 113, 128 (2011). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270 
What Is Federalism in Healthcare For? 
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018) 
1728 
 
and 400% of the FPL.183 Unlike the ACA’s nationalized Medicaid eligibility 
provisions, the exchange provisions were written to put states in the driver’s 
seat, giving states priority to create their own exchanges and broad discretion 
in how exchanges could be structured for a given state’s existing insurance 
market.184 The federal government would provide a fallback should the states 
decline (or fail) to run their own exchanges.185  
Less relevant to the federalism narrative but important to understanding 
these reforms and their political context is the ACA’s minimum coverage 
requirement—the infamous individual mandate challenged in the Supreme 
Court in 2012.186 The individual mandate required all individuals (with a few 
exceptions) to obtain insurance coverage or pay a tax.187 The mandate was 
designed to bring more customers into the private insurance markets to sustain 
those markets in the face of the ACA’s dramatic new requirements on the 
insurance industry.188 The Republican tax bill of 2017 repealed the 
enforcement penalty.189 
B. The ACA’s Flipped Federalism as Implemented 
We will never know what the ACA’s intended federalism structure would 
have looked like after implementation. One high-level former federal official 
told us that state administrative officials of all political persuasions were 
moving steadily toward Medicaid expansion and exchange implementation, 
despite strong rhetoric from state politicians, immediately following the 
 
 183. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1401(a), 10105(a)-(c), 10108(h)(1), 124 
Stat. at 213-19, 906, 914 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 36B (2016)); King v. Burwell, 135 
S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (discussing the tax credits). 
 184. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321, 124 Stat. at 186-87. 
 185. See id. § 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186-87 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)). 
 186. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 530-32 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.) (addressing challenges to the constitutionality of the individual mandate). 
 187. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1501(a), 10106(a), 124 Stat. at 242-44, 
907-09 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091); id. §§ 1501(b), 10106(b)-(d), 125 Stat. at 244-49, 909-
10 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5000A). 
 188. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486-87; Sara Rosenbaum, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act: Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 130, 130-32 
(2011); see also MCDONOUGH, supra note 182, at 121-22. The ACA requires insurers to 
cover everyone, regardless of health risk, at essentially equal prices with variation 
allowed in limited categories (e.g., age, tobacco use, and geography), a 180-degree 
deviation from the way the industry has traditionally measured risk and reaped profits. 
See, e.g., BlueCross BlueShield of N.C., In the Spotlight: ACA Insurance Reforms (2011), 
https://perma.cc/8PC8-FZ43. 
 189. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 11081 (2017) (enacted) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A). 
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statute’s enactment.190 But the Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) was a game changer.191  
NFIB was largely framed as a constitutional challenge to the ACA’s 
insurance mandate.192 The Court, however, surprised many legal experts193 by 
sustaining the mandate as a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing power but 
declaring the Medicaid expansion an unconstitutionally coercive exercise of 
the spending power.194 The Court consequently interpreted the Medicaid 
expansion as optional for the states.195 The result was to introduce a powerful 
element of state leverage—and with it state-federal bargaining—into ACA 
implementation. 
Following NFIB, as we detail in Part IV below, many states—especially red 
states—stopped plans already in progress to expand Medicaid immediately. 
They later worked through both intrastate negotiations between governors 
and legislatures and through external negotiations with the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to create individualized deals for their 
expansions.196 This change of events also gave Medicaid section 1115 
demonstration waivers, which allow states to seek federal approval to deviate 
from statutory Medicaid requirements,197 heightened significance under the 
ACA, as section 1115 became the primary vehicle for such negotiating. 
Congress did not write new Medicaid waivers into the ACA, and it did not 
 
 190. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5 (Oct. 6, 
2016) (on file with authors). 
 191. See id.; see also NFIB, 567 U.S. 519. 
 192. See, e.g., Brief for Private Respondents on the Individual Mandate at 1, 7-12, NFIB, 567 
U.S. 519 (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 379586.  
 193. We each cautioned before oral argument that the government would be wise to pay 
attention to the Medicaid question. See Abbe R. Gluck, Opinion, The 10th Amendment 
Question, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Mar. 28, 2010, 7:00 PM), https://perma.cc 
/H5S4-MYCB; Nicole Huberfeld, Jumping Ahead to Coercion, CONCURRING OPINIONS 
(Dec. 9, 2011), https://perma.cc/22VT-YZRU. 
 194. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 574 (upholding the individual mandate); id. at 587-88 (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.) (striking down the provision conditioning preexisting Medicaid funding 
on accepting the expansion). 
 195. See id. at 587-88 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 196. See infra Part IV. 
 197. Section 1115 allows HHS to approve a state waiver proposal that furthers the 
“objectives” of Medicaid while maintaining federal budget neutrality. See 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1315 (2016). The provision was introduced as an amendment to the Social Security 
Act (in which Medicaid is codified) before Medicaid was created. See Public Welfare 
Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 122, 76 Stat. 172, 192 (enacting the first 
version of the waiver provision as a new section 1115 of the Social Security Act). 
Budget neutrality is not a statutory requirement but rather an informal policy that 
HHS applies. See MaryBeth Musumeci et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found.,  
Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: The Current Landscape of Approved 
and Pending Waivers 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/HVG9-KVY4. 
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need to: HHS has always had authority to allow deviation from Medicaid 
requirements by approving a section 1115 waiver.198 But NFIB, in giving states 
more choices, opened the door to section 1115 waivers’ becoming a central 
element of Medicaid expansion implementation and thus allowed states to 
negotiate for special programmatic features that embraced policies that 
deviated from the ACA’s principle of universality.  
NFIB also reinvigorated an atmosphere of state autonomy and sprouted 
acts of political resistance that bled outside Medicaid policy and into the realm 
of exchange implementation. Despite the fact that the states’ rights faction in 
Congress had insisted on the state-run exchanges in the first place, it became an 
act of political loyalty for states to refuse to implement the ACA, including 
refusing to run an exchange.199 The results of the 2010 state elections bolstered 
this effect, as Republicans scored a net gain of five governorships and eleven 
state legislatures.200 
This political positioning ironically extended the federal enterprise in 
insurance much further than the ACA’s drafters had envisioned because it 
required the federal government to run the exchanges in those states.201 What 
we call “federalism for federalism’s own sake” became the dominant approach 
as states paradoxically refused to run their own exchanges, even though state-
based exchanges would have been the natural choice for states acting in their 
“autonomous” or “sovereign” interests. 
This amplification of state resistance produced parallel state-federal 
negotiations in the exchange context. Unlike in the Medicaid context, no 
statutory provision facilitates an “exchange demonstration waiver,”202 but 
HHS still worked closely with states, informally when necessary, on 
modifications to the ACA’s envisioned exchange structure to bring as many 
 
 198. See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 332 (discussing the history of section 1115’s 
waiver authority). The language in 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) specifically refers to § 1396a, the 
provision delineating what a state’s Medicaid plan must include to participate in the 
program. 
 199. See Anna Yukhananov, U.S. State Officials in Stealth Mode on Health Exchanges, REUTERS 
(Sept. 16, 2012, 2:10 PM), https://perma.cc/EH2A-PVFP (describing political opposition 
faced by Republican insurance administrators tasked with implementing the ACA). 
 200. Compare Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 2010 State and Legislative Partisan 
Composition (2010), https://perma.cc/386J-UR9W (reporting that as of January 31, 
2010, Republicans held 24 governorships and controlled both chambers of 14 state 
legislatures), with Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 2011 State and Legislative 
Partisan Composition (2011), https://perma.cc/BU85-TX52 (reporting that as of 
January 31, 2011, Republicans held 29 governorships and controlled both chambers of 
25 state legislatures). 
 201. Cf. MCDONOUGH, supra note 182, at 128. 
 202. ACA section 1332, discussed in Part V below, is different. See Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1332, 124 Stat. 119, 203-06 (2010) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 18052); infra text accompanying note 436. 
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states successfully into ACA implementation as possible.203 Choices included 
matters of exchange operation (eligibility and enrollment, health plan 
management, and consumer assistance), the platform of the consumer web 
portal (federal or state), the choice of benchmark plan for determining the 
essential health benefits to be provided by health plans in the exchange, the 
number and location of geographic rating areas, the choice of methods for 
reinsurance and risk adjustment, and the responsibility for reviewing health 
plan rates and compliance with the medical loss ratio requirements.204 HHS 
even gave states choices not envisioned by the statute: For instance, as detailed 
in Part V below, HHS allowed states to retain authority over certain key 
components of the exchanges, even as HHS ran some components itself. These 
developments led to significant variation across states, not just across states 
that chose to operate their own exchanges—where variation might be 
expected—but also in states that had a nationally run exchange. National has 
not meant uniform. 
Thus, although states were always meant to play vital roles in both of the 
ACA’s core reforms, those elements of the statute were not implemented in the 
way Congress envisioned. Medicaid has always been structured under the use-
it-or-lose-it model of cooperative federalism, and the ACA continued that: If a 
state declined federal Medicaid funds, no Medicaid program would exist in that 
state. In contrast, the exchanges were to be a nationwide feature established by 
the ACA that could operate along two parallel tracks, state and federal. States 
that declined to exercise their right of first refusal to set up exchanges were to 
have them nonetheless, through federal operation.  
But after NFIB, the Medicaid expansion became optional, even though 
Congress had intended to nationalize it. And the exchanges became more 
national than federalist—at least in terms of formal structural arrangement—as 
political resistance led many states to reject the very power over the exchanges 
they had asked for. In short, the Court’s decision in NFIB turned the federalism 
architecture of the ACA on its head.  
C. Study Methodology 
The scale of the ACA and the fundamental changes it made in U.S. 
healthcare structure and finance are reasons enough to study it. The flipped 
 
 203. See infra Part V. 
 204. See Ctr. for Healthcare Research & Transformation, Guide to State Requirements and 
Policy Choices in the Affordable Care Act (2011), https://perma.cc/6DYY-RN8G; 
Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 29, 
2012), https://perma.cc/9VQZ-5Y34. For an overview of each state’s decisions, see 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES OR 
MARKETPLACES: STATE PROFILES AND ACTIONS (2017), https://perma.cc/25S4-299Z. 
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federalism of the ACA’s implementation makes it all the more interesting. The 
detail in the following two Parts is both empirical and theoretical. By 
grounding our inquiry in real-world detail, our project responds to the 
frequent criticism that federalism scholarship is too abstract.205 
Our data derive from three different research methods. First, beginning in 
July 2013, we collaborated with the HIX 2.0 Project at the University of 
Pennsylvania to systematically code and evaluate variations in states’ 
implementation of the exchange and Medicaid expansion aspects of the ACA. 
The HIX 2.0 Project, which is no longer active, aimed to construct quantita-
tively coded datasets to support research on the impact of variations in state 
health law and policy choices on outcome measures of significance, such as the 
rate of uninsurance, the number of insurers active in a state market, and health 
insurance prices.206 We identified for the investigators categories to track that 
would be relevant for federalism in both the Medicaid and exchange contexts.  
Second, we independently tracked state-federal activity in each state, using 
publicly available sources, including government materials. We tracked factors 
ranging from program design to political party in office to the legal means—
such as statutes and executive orders—by which the new programs were 
implemented in each state.  
Finally, we interviewed implementers themselves—current and former 
state and federal officials who ranged from state governors to insurance 
commissioners to high-ranking members of the Obama Administration. We 
also interviewed leaders in major healthcare nonprofit and trade groups that 
were known to be working closely with state and federal officials on 
implementation. The interviews are the subject of a separate article;207 for the 
purposes of this Article, their relevance is in corroborating the federalism story 
that emerged from the tracking data.  
The initial goal of all of these methods was to measure the traditional 
federalism attributes—state autonomy, sovereignty, cooperation, experimenta-
tion, and variation—in the statute as well as what impact those attributes may 
have on health policymaking.  
As noted, we ultimately were not able to quantitatively assess the federal-
ism attributes as we had intended. The richness and complexity of the data, as 
detailed in the next two Parts, revealed aspects of autonomy, sovereignty, 
cooperation, experimentation, and variation occurring within all of the 
 
 205. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 206. The project had a very long time horizon, so its dataset could not be put to use 
immediately. We built on the initial dataset with our own data collection and 
confirmation efforts. 
 207. For a more comprehensive account of the interviews, see Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole 
Huberfeld, The New Health Care Federalism on the Ground, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1 
(2018). 
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different structural arrangements in the ACA—even structural arrangements 
perceived to be in opposition to one another. Assigning weights to measure 
these attributes relative to one another (for instance, whether an early 
Medicaid-expanding state was more or less autonomous than a late Medicaid 
waiver state) proved impossible, at least in this initial foray. Those 
observations changed our focus and gave rise to the theoretical analysis in this 
Article. 
IV. The Medicaid Expansion 
The Medicaid expansion is a story of dynamic, adaptive, horizontal, 
negotiated, and small-r republican federalism. Even though the Medicaid 
expansion became an option for the states after NFIB, it has not operated like 
an on-off switch. It has been in constant motion. Some opt-out states—even 
those that initially proclaimed resistance—have moved gradually to expansion, 
and many opt-in states have renegotiated deals with HHS even after flicking 
the on switch years before.208 Leaders among states emerged organically, 
creating horizontal state dynamics that changed implementation.209 For 
instance, states like Arkansas and Indiana became red-state thought leaders by 
pushing unconventional waiver elements and, in the process, taught other 
states how to negotiate and what could be gained.210 A clear learn-and-response 
pattern materialized, resulting from these negotiations within states, among 
states, and between states and the federal government. Intrastate features 
pervaded the process, with governors and legislators of the same (typically 
Republican) party at odds on whether and how to expand.211 
Classic federalism accounts, including the way in which the Court often 
describes federalism, tend to make zero-sum assumptions about federalism’s 
sovereignty tradeoffs. The federal government’s gain is portrayed as the states’ 
loss, and vice versa.212 Our research illustrates that this has not been the case 
with the Medicaid expansion. Our interviews with high-level current and 
former state and former federal officials confirmed that largely because the 
Obama Administration adopted a very long time horizon—the administration’s 
basic goal was to get the ACA entrenched and fix it later—states (often with 
 
 208. See infra Parts IV.A.3-.4. 
 209. See infra Parts IV.A.3-.4. 
 210. See infra Parts IV.A.3-.4. 
 211. See infra Part IV.B. 
 212. See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 
812-14 (1994) (exploring exclusivity through the lens of preemption); Theodore W. 
Ruger, Preempting the People: The Judicial Role in Regulatory Concurrency and Its Implica-
tions for Popular Lawmaking, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1029, 1038-46 (2006) (tracing the 
history of exclusive spheres of power in Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
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shorter-term goals) achieved significant victories in their federalism 
negotiations.213 With the Obama Administration eager to get as many states to 
expand Medicaid as possible, states were able to negotiate special deals that 
enabled them to do so. Both sides viewed themselves victorious. 
A. Four Waves of Dynamic, Negotiated, and Horizontal Medicaid 
Expansion 
We found that the Medicaid expansion occurred in four discernible waves. 
1. Early, generous implementers: the first wave 
The first wave began in 2012, before the ACA’s Medicaid implementation 
date of January 1, 2014. The ACA permitted early expansion, although at a 
state’s usual federal funding match, rather than at the ACA’s post-2014 
supermatch.214 The draw of early expansion was that it offered federal funds 
for the new expansion population, an economic boon for a handful of states 
that had already covered childless adults with no federal funds before the 
ACA.215 Led by Minnesota, states including California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, and Washington, as well as the District of Columbia, expanded to 
childless adults by April 2012.216 These early adopters largely aligned with the 
 
 213. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1 (June 21, 
2016) (on file with authors); Interview with Former Governor (Aug. 4, 2016) (on file 
with authors); Interview with State Policy Organization Officers 1, 2, 3, and 4 (June 6, 
2016) (on file with authors).  
 214. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 2001(a)(4)(A), 
10201(b), 124 Stat. 119, 274, 918 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(2)-(3) (2016)) 
(permitting states to expand via state plan amendments (SPAs) before 2014, when the 
supermatch kicked in). 
 215. Cf. Larisa Antonisse et al., Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The Effects of Medicaid 
Expansion Under the ACA: Updated Findings from a Literature Review 1-2 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/X8C6-QQV8 (reviewing literature “using data from 2014 or later” 
and concluding that “[a]nalyses find positive effects of [Medicaid] expansion on 
numerous economic outcomes”). 
 216. See States Getting a Jump Start on Health Reform’s Medicaid Expansion, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(Apr. 2, 2012), https://perma.cc/8JRJ-VTVM; see also Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, 
Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., to Suzanne Brennan, State Medicaid Dir., Colo. Dep’t of Health Care Policy & 
Fin. (Mar. 30, 2012), https://perma.cc/5TMZ-URJM (granting Colorado a section 1115 
waiver allowing it to expand Medicaid to certain adults without dependent children 
beginning in April 2012). Some states implemented expansion through SPAs, and some 
amended existing demonstration waivers. See States Getting a Jump Start on Health 
Reform’s Medicaid Expansion, supra. Some states sought section 1115 waivers to enroll 
individuals earning more than the ACA’s baseline of 138% of the FPL. See id. 
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ACA’s universal coverage goal, yet some first-wave states obtained section 1115 
demonstration waivers to expand more generously beyond the ACA.217 
2. NFIB and the second wave 
The NFIB decision, which came down on June 28, 2012,218 initiated the 
second wave. Some states that had been waiting to see whether the ACA would 
be declared unconstitutional expanded almost as soon as the decision upheld 
the law. Due to the timing of the state budget cycle and a desire for consultant 
studies to prove the potential benefits of opting in, many others did not 
formally opt in until 2013. The second-wave states largely relied on state plan 
amendments (SPAs)—amendments to their existing Medicaid programs—for 
expansion and did not negotiate or seek special concessions from HHS, at least 
not at first.219  
Notably, during the second wave, governors were likely to take the lead, 
often at odds with their own legislatures or their states’ national representa-
tives in Congress. For example, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer,220 Kentucky 
 
 217. See, e.g., Letter from Donald M. Berwick, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to John McCarthy, Medicaid Dir., D.C. Dep’t of 
Health Care Fin. 1 (Oct. 28, 2010), https://perma.cc/E96U-2TK9 (approving the District 
of Columbia’s expansion of Medicaid to adults with incomes up to 200% of the FPL); 
Carol Backstrom, Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., Project No. 11-W-00039/5, Minnesota 
PMAP+ Section 1115 Waiver Renewal Request 1 (2013), https://perma.cc/UST3-QFVC 
(requesting approval to expand “to adults with children, 19- and 20-year[-]olds, and 
adults without children at incomes between 133% and 200% of the federal poverty 
level”); Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., to Lucinda E. Jesson, Comm’r, Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs. 1 
(Dec. 20, 2013), https://perma.cc/HJN7-2EBA (granting Minnesota’s request); Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., No. 11-W-00194/1, Global Commitment to Health  
Section 1115 Demonstration: Waiver Authority (2012), https://perma.cc/LWZ8-E2DU 
(granting Vermont permission to expand financial eligibility for certain services). 
 218. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
 219. See generally State Medicaid & CHIP Profiles, MEDICAID.GOV, https://perma.cc/HF2M 
-Y7PZ (archived Apr. 23, 2018) (documenting each state’s SPAs and waivers). SPAs are 
subject to less scrutiny than section 1115 demonstration waiver applications because 
they are merely a description of how the state is meeting the mandatory elements of 
Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (establishing requirements for state plans); State Plan, 
MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/PF6K-2638 
(archived Apr. 29, 2018) (providing background information on state plans and the SPA 
process). The Medicaid expansion was drafted in the ACA as a mandatory element. See 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 271 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)). 
 220. Governor Brewer signed legislation expanding Arizona’s Medicaid program on  
June 17, 2013 after calling a surprise emergency legislative session designed to force 
Medicaid expansion. See Mary K. Reinhart, Brewer Signs Into Law Arizona’s Medicaid 
Program, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (June 18, 2013, 12:36 AM), https://perma.cc/55MZ-HB64. 
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Governor Steve Beshear,221 and North Dakota Governor Jack Dalrymple222 
pushed—and in some cases explicitly defied and circumvented—their 
legislatures to achieve Medicaid expansion. We detail those intrastate 
dynamics in Part IV.B below. 
At the same time, some states recognized that NFIB gave them leverage 
that the ACA as drafted did not originally contemplate. They began exploring 
what kinds of concessions they could extract in a world of now-optional 
Medicaid expansion that would look beyond a traditional, “cooperative,” SPA 
approach.223 The annual meeting of the National Governors Association held 
just one month after NFIB was crucial to this exploration; after state-to-state 
conversations at that meeting, holdout states started to investigate expansion 
options in earnest.224  
HHS fed this interest. Although the HHS Secretary initially provided lean 
guidance after NFIB,225 within a few months HHS informed states that they 
could opt in at any time without being penalized or locked in.226 That meant 
states could opt in or opt out of expansion on a timeline and in a manner 
different from that initially envisioned by the ACA.227 
 
 221. See Caroline Humer, Kentucky Governor Announces Medicaid Expansion Under Obamacare, 
REUTERS (May 9, 2013, 4:05 PM), https://perma.cc/9N7F-XDXN. 
 222. See Jeffrey Young, North Dakota Medicaid Expansion Favored by Republican Governor, 
HUFFPOST (updated Mar. 17, 2013), https://perma.cc/8XDR-ZTTY (reporting that 
Governor Dalrymple submitted a Medicaid expansion bill to the state legislature); see 
also Nick Smith, Lawmakers Pan Medicaid Expansion, BISMARCK TRIB. (Apr. 12, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/97KH-5WUL (reporting that the bill passed and discussing some state 
legislators’ opposition). 
 223. See Letter from Dan Crippen, Nat’l Governors Ass’n, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (July 2, 2012), https://perma.cc/SE3A-LUFT; see also 
RGA Letter on Medicaid and Exchanges to President Obama, REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS ASS’N 
(July 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/G3N3-XVGL. 
 224. See Michael Cooper, Many Governors Are Still Unsure About Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 14, 2012, 10:07 AM), https://perma.cc/BPX4-CDYZ; Lisa Lambert, At 
Annual Meeting, U.S. Governors Come Out Swinging over Medicaid, REUTERS (July 14, 
2012), https://perma.cc/8H3V-WFXR; see also Interview with Former Governor, supra 
note 213. 
 225. See Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to 
Governor (July 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/72HV-XQ3F. 
 226. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid 12 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/GV5E-JP55. 
 227. States that expand partially, such as by expanding only up to 100% of the FPL, are not 
eligible for the supermatch. See id. at 12. 
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3. Waivers, concessions, and the third wave 
HHS’s expressed flexibility stimulated the third wave, which was led by 
Arkansas, the first state to obtain a section 1115 demonstration waiver in 
September 2013 to implement Medicaid expansion.228 The Arkansas waiver 
included a pioneering concession that allowed Arkansas to move toward 
privatizing the Medicaid market by funneling the newly eligible Medicaid 
population into private insurance available through the exchange rather than 
enrolling beneficiaries in traditional Medicaid.229 Thus, this demonstration 
project made Arkansas Medicaid expansion beneficiaries the first to be 
enrolled in private coverage using federally funded premium assistance for 
purchasing private insurance with benchmark coverage in the exchange.230  
Arkansas publicized its negotiations with HHS, generating intense 
curiosity among other states exploring expansion.231 Some states strategically 
started to wait out other states’ waiver negotiations, feeling that they could 
benefit from piggybacking on early moving states’ efforts and get even more, 
as evidenced by the progression of states opting in to expansion. One high-level 
former federal official we interviewed noted that states perceived the Obama 
Administration as so eager to expand Medicaid that every state wanted to be 
 
 228. See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Andy Allison, Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. 1 
(Sept. 27, 2013), https://perma.cc/MYJ9-LRPY (approving the waiver for three years).  
 229. See id. For more details about Arkansas’s waiver program, see Tracy Garber & Sara R. 
Collins, The Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion: Alternative State Approaches, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND: TO THE POINT (Mar. 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/WQ5U 
-MZV3. 
 230. Premium assistance waivers were obtainable before the ACA, but the few that existed 
had low enrollment because no private insurance was actually available to low-income 
workers. See Teresa A. Coughlin & Stephen Zuckerman, State Responses to New Flexibility 
in Medicaid, 86 MILBANK Q. 209, 227-28 (2008) (discussing the minimal uptake for 
premium assistance waivers during the George W. Bush Administration); Sara 
Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Perspective, Using Medicaid to Buy Private Health 
Insurance—The Great New Experiment?, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 7, 8 (2013) (noting that 
employer-sponsored insurance was the only private insurance that could be purchased 
with premium assistance before the ACA and that such insurance was not accessible for 
most low-income workers). The ACA’s exchanges made purchasing private insurance 
with premium assistance a realistic option for low-income populations by broadening 
the availability of small group and individual insurance and by offering financial 
assistance through premium tax credits. See Rosenbaum & Sommers, supra, at 8. 
Further, new rules such as the prohibition on excluding people with preexisting 
conditions, see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 1201(2)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (2016)), and the 
establishment of adjusted community rating, id. sec. 1201(4), § 2701, 124 Stat. at 155-56 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg), opened coverage to previously uninsurable 
populations. 
 231. See Robert Pear, States Urged to Expand Medicaid with Private Insurance, N.Y. TIMES  
(Mar. 21, 2013), https://perma.cc/FD8X-T2SE. 
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“last in line” to negotiate a waiver so that it could benefit from prior states’ 
successes and concessions won from the federal government.232 The succession 
of waivers following Arkansas’s bears that out and shows that the strategy was 
effective. 
Iowa announced its interest in a waiver around the time that Arkansas 
announced its deal with HHS.233 Iowa appeared to have benefited from 
Arkansas’s application by seeking to negotiate even more concessions, which 
HHS granted through two waivers. Beyond applying for a waiver for premium 
assistance (which applied to individuals earning more than 100% of the FPL), 
Iowa proposed enforceable premium payments for individuals earning more 
than 100% of the FPL (allowing it to deny coverage for failure to pay 
premiums), healthy behavior rewards (which could offset premium payments), 
a one-year waiver of the requirement to provide nonemergency transportation 
services, and copayments for nonemergency use of emergency departments.234 
HHS approved each of these new features.235 
Soon thereafter, in September 2013, Michigan initiated expansion waiver 
negotiations (before Arkansas’s waiver was formalized).236 Michigan did not 
seek a premium assistance waiver but, like Iowa, it sought and received 
concessions for cost sharing and healthy behavior incentives.237 In addition, 
Michigan wanted to create health savings accounts for enrollees’ cost sharing 
 
 232. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5, supra  
note 190. 
 233. Iowa announced its intent to negotiate a waiver on February 26, 2013, see Rod Boshart, 
Branstad to Seek Federal IowaCare Waiver, SIOUX CITY J. (Feb. 26, 2013), https://perma.cc 
/AZ7T-WVHN, the same day Arkansas announced that it had reached an agreement 
with HHS, see David Ramsey, Update: Medicaid Game-Changer, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG 
(Feb. 26, 2013), https://perma.cc/GZ69-LWQ8 (reporting that HHS gave oral approval 
for Arkansas’s proposal on February 22, 2013). Iowa announced the details of its 
proposal on March 4, 2013. See Mike Wiser, Branstad Releases Medicaid Expansion 
Alternative, SIOUX CITY J. (Mar. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/85S6-UM4T. 
 234. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Expansion in Iowa (2015), 
https://perma.cc/7DJW-TDJK.  
 235. See id. Until 2014, Iowa required people earning 101-138% of the FPL to enroll in a 
Marketplace Qualified Health Plan in its exchange, but low insurer participation led 
the state to make this type of enrollment optional. See id. 
 236. See Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder Signs Historic Medicaid Plan Into Law: 
This Is About “Family” Not “Politics,” MLIVE.COM (updated Sept. 16, 2013, 2:51 PM), 
https://perma.cc/5NK3-V9YG (reporting that Michigan’s governor signed legislation 
allowing him to proceed with negotiating waivers). 
 237. See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Stephen Fitton, Dir., Mich. Med. Servs. Admin. 1 
(Dec. 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/S53V-BR7G (approving Michigan’s waiver request 
and SPA for Medicaid expansion, including cost sharing for beneficiaries earning more 
than the FPL). 
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requirements,238 which Arkansas later proposed in an amendment to its 
original section 1115 waiver.239 HHS approved Michigan’s waiver application a 
few weeks after Iowa’s.240 
Following Arkansas, Iowa, and Michigan, Pennsylvania’s governor at the 
time, Tom Corbett, held protracted negotiations with HHS.241 These were high 
profile, in part because the waiver application included contentious elements 
such as enforceable cost sharing and, more controversially, work search 
requirements, which were not approved by the Obama Administration.242 
Pennsylvania’s original proposal called for Arkansas-style premium assistance, 
but in the end Pennsylvania chose—like Iowa—to use Medicaid managed care 
networks for the newly eligible population.243 (Under a new governor, Tom 
Wolf, Pennsylvania reversed course and abandoned its expansion waiver, 
opting instead for the kind of straightforward expansion envisioned by the 
ACA.)244 
Additional states soon followed. Tennessee and South Dakota proposed 
partial expansion through premium assistance waivers.245 The ACA did not 
 
 238. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., No. 11-W-00245/5, Healthy Michigan  
Section 1115 Demonstration: Special Terms and Conditions 13-16 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/S53V-BR7G. 
 239. See Michelle Andrews, Arkansas Weighs Plan to Make Some Medicaid Enrollees Fund 
Savings Accounts, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/K64S-5S4L.  
 240. Michigan’s waiver was approved December 30, 2013. See Letter from Marilyn 
Tavenner to Stephen Fitton, supra note 237, at 1. Iowa’s was approved December 10, 
2013. See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Jennifer Vermeer, Medicaid Dir., State of Iowa 
1 (Dec. 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/J6VJ-GXGC (noting that Iowa’s waiver was 
originally approved December 10, 2013 and approving amendments to that waiver). 
 241. See Greg Sargent, Another Big Boost for Obamacare, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (Aug. 28, 
2014), https://perma.cc/8DFV-WF48 (noting that “months of jockeying between 
Corbett and the federal government” occurred before approval of Pennsylvania’s plan). 
 242. See id. 
 243. See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Beverly Mackereth, Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare 
1-2 (Aug. 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/UP7V-FLD5 (approving the program and noting 
that it would use managed care networks); see also Virgil Dickson, Pennsylvania to 
Expand Medicaid, but with Strings Attached, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 29, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/6RMP-89B6 (discussing the terms of the waiver Pennsylvania 
negotiated with HHS); The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 234 (noting 
Iowa’s move to Medicaid managed care networks after insurers dropped out). 
 244. See John George, Wolf Begins Dismantling Corbett’s Healthy PA Plan, PHILA. BUS. J. 
(updated Feb. 10, 2015, 3:46 PM EST), https://perma.cc/9KAH-DQG4. 
 245. See Dana Ferguson, Daugaard Encourages Medicaid Expansion, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux 
Falls, S.D.) (updated Dec. 8, 2015, 9:23 PM), https://perma.cc/8WR2-E36D; David 
Montgomery, Feds Reject Daugaard’s Partial Medicaid Plan, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls, 
S.D.) (Mar. 5, 2014, 12:09 AM CT), https://perma.cc/X9ZF-C24J; Andy Sher, Tennessee 
GOP Skeptical of TennCare Expansion, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Dec. 12, 2012), 
footnote continued on next page 
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allow partial expansion—that is, expansion that does not include everyone 
earning up to 138% of the FPL—so Tennessee’s and South Dakota’s proposals 
were rejected by the Obama Administration but led to additional discussions.246 
In sum, the third wave not only introduced premium assistance waivers 
and other red-state features into Medicaid expansion but also showcased HHS’s 
highly pragmatic approach to getting as many states to expand Medicaid 
eligibility as possible. Convincing a state to opt in, even with a waiver that 
deviated from the ACA as originally envisioned, was a critical step toward 
achieving the statute’s goal of near-universal coverage.  
HHS also saw that it could more effectively get states to adopt the ACA’s 
policy through individualized state-by-state negotiations, rather than viewing 
the resisting states as a monolithic group. Our interviewees credited HHS 
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius’s background as the former governor of Kansas for 
her taking this highly effective approach, going state by state, even as it meant 
that HHS was in a near-constant state of negotiation.247 
4. Renegotiated deals, political change, and the fourth wave 
The fourth wave began with the ACA’s January 1, 2014 implementation 
date and has progressed at a more gradual pace than the first three waves. 
Notably, Medicaid was not implemented by all states immediately after its 
passage in 1965 either. Although many states embraced Medicaid’s promise of 
generous federal funding, others nearly missed the 1970 deadline for 
participation; Arizona did not implement Medicaid until 1982.248 This pattern 
of gradual—but ultimately widespread—uptake has been replicated to a degree 
in the ACA’s implementation, although the change in presidential administra-
tion disrupted implementation momentum and guiderails. 
During the late Obama Administration years (2014-2016), New Hampshire, 
Indiana, Alaska, Montana, and Louisiana expanded Medicaid, each choosing 
different mechanisms of expansion and pulling different levers of policy and 
 
https://perma.cc/B5FJ-UGLH (noting interest in expanding only for those with 
incomes up to the FPL); see also Alex Tolbert, How Is New TN Medicaid Expansion Plan 
Different?, TENNESSEAN (July 17, 2016, 8:02 AM CT), https://perma.cc/B92F-TZ2X 
(reporting on Tennessee’s 2015 and 2016 efforts to negotiate expansion, including 
through a premium assistance waiver). 
 246. See Montgomery, supra note 245 (reporting that the Obama Administration rejected 
South Dakota’s proposed partial expansion); see also Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., supra note 226, at 12 (“[HHS] will not consider partial expansions for populations 
eligible for the 100 percent matching rate in 2014 through 2016.”).  
 247. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, supra  
note 213; Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213. 
 248. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 61; Erik Eckholm, Late Starter in Medicaid, 
Arizona Shows the Way, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 1991), https://perma.cc/LQ2P-853R. 
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power. For example, New Hampshire began expansion through its existing 
Medicaid program in the summer of 2014 but received a waiver in March 2015 
that phased in Arkansas-style premium assistance through 2016 and beyond.249 
In other words, New Hampshire began with a traditional Medicaid expansion 
through an SPA and later switched to follow the lead of Arkansas. Alaska and 
Louisiana both expanded through traditional SPAs, discussed more below. 
The thought leader of the first part of the fourth wave was Indiana. 
Perhaps the most aggressively negotiated expansion to occur during the Obama 
Administration, Indiana’s section 1115 waiver built on its existing Healthy 
Indiana Plan (HIP) Medicaid waiver as well as prior expansion states’ waivers, 
and it sought more concessions than prior states had requested.250 Approved in 
January 2015, HIP 2.0 included elements from other states’ waivers such as 
variation in benefit packages (Michigan and Pennsylvania), wellness incentives 
(Iowa and Michigan), nonemergency transportation payment exclusion (Iowa 
and Pennsylvania), and premium assistance for beneficiaries to purchase 
employer-sponsored insurance (Iowa).251 HIP 2.0 also contained elements that 
were new to post-ACA section 1115 waivers, such as a complex cost sharing 
scheme that—for the first time ever—allowed Medicaid enrollees earning more 
than 100% of the FPL to be locked out of coverage for six months if they could 
not pay premiums; mandatory use of health savings accounts to pay for cost 
sharing; nonretroactive enrollment for certain beneficiaries; and graduated 
cost sharing for nonemergency use of emergency departments.252 Work 
requirements were part of the original proposal but were publicly rejected by 
the Obama Administration.253  
Notably, then-Governor Mike Pence (now Vice President of the United 
States) pursued HIP 2.0 with the aid of then-consultant Seema Verma (now 
 
 249. See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Nicholas A. Toumpas, Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. 1 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://perma.cc/KV9Z-KBDQ; see also Todd 
Bookman, Hassan Holds Medicaid Expansion Kick-Off Event, N.H. PUB. RADIO (June 30, 
2014), https://perma.cc/49VR-EL84 (reporting the initial expansion). 
 250. See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Joseph Moser, Medicaid Dir., Ind. Family & Soc. 
Servs. Admin. 1-3 (Jan. 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/9U6V-3BAF (approving Indiana’s 
HIP 2.0 waiver application).  
 251. See id. 
 252. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., No 11-W-00296/5, Waiver List: Healthy 
Indiana Plan (HIP) 2.0, at 1-3 (2015), https://perma.cc/9U6V-3BAF; see also Abby 
Goodnough, Indiana Will Allow Entry to Medicaid for a Price, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/2GRQ-MF35. 
 253. See Phil Galewitz, Kentucky and Feds Near Possible Collision on Altering Medicaid 
Expansion, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/W4LH-GMBM 
(recounting that Indiana’s plan was approved “only after [the state] gave up on 
requiring Medicaid recipients to hold jobs”). 
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Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)), who 
was also paid to design section 1115 waivers for Iowa, Kentucky, Ohio, and 
Tennessee.254 (We see multistate consultants playing the same role in the 
horizontal dynamics of insurance exchange implementation, as detailed in  
Part V below.) Verma’s participation surely facilitated the horizontal learning 
so prominent in the third and fourth waves of the Medicaid expansion, and 
HIP 2.0 quickly became a model for other states, including some that had 
already opted in and that sought modified or new waivers through the end of 
the Obama Administration and into the Trump Administration.255 New 
Hampshire’s new Arkansas-style premium assistance waiver included some 
Indiana-style elements such as preventing retroactive coverage for newly 
eligible enrollees.256 Montana also mimicked parts of Indiana’s successful 
negotiations, gaining approval for up to ninety-day disenrollment upon 
nonpayment of premiums for beneficiaries earning more than 100% of the 
FPL.257 
The fourth wave also added a novel phenomenon: existing opt-in states 
reconsidering already-implemented SPAs or renegotiating existing waivers 
after witnessing new concessions being granted by HHS. Perhaps most notable 
among the existing opt-in states, Kentucky elected Republican Governor Matt 
Bevin in November 2015 after he campaigned on eliminating Kentucky’s 
widely heralded implementation of the ACA, which included Medicaid 
expansion through a traditional SPA.258 Kentucky proposed a section 1115 
 
 254. See Seema Verma, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://perma.cc/59XL-YUQV 
(archived Apr. 23, 2018). 
 255. Verma’s CMS expects states to learn from one another. For example, CMS issued 
guidance promoting the streamlining of section 1115 waivers. See Brian Neale, Ctr. for 
Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Section 1115 Demonstra-
tion Process Improvements 3 (2017), https://perma.cc/E827-SK8N (“CMS will develop 
parameters for expedited approval of certain waiver authorities under  
demonstrations . . . that are substantially similar to those approved in other states . . . .”). 
Language in CMS’s approval letter for Kentucky’s demonstration project that includes 
work requirements is also telling. See Letter from Brian Neale, Deputy Adm’r, Ctr. for 
Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Adam Meier, Deputy 
Chief of Staff, Office of Governor Matthew Bevin, State of Ky. 1 (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/X57W-NQMV (“Your substantial work will help inform future state 
demonstrations seeking to draw on Kentucky’s novel approaches to Medicaid  
reform . . . .”). 
 256. See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt to Nicholas A. Toumpas, supra note 249, at 1. 
 257. See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Mary E. Dalton, State Medicaid Dir., Mont. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs. 1 (Nov. 2, 2015), https://perma.cc/7CLR-H3XE.  
 258. See Nora Kelly, Can Kentucky’s New Governor Undo Obamacare?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/GBC5-U225 (noting that Governor Bevin pledged to dismantle 
Kentucky’s insurance exchange and alter its Medicaid expansion); see also The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Found., Proposed Changes to Medicaid Expansion in Kentucky 2 (2017), 
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waiver in the summer of 2016 that contained many of the same elements as the 
Indiana HIP 2.0 waiver but sought even more concessions.259 Like Indiana’s, 
Pennsylvania’s, and those of other states before it, Kentucky’s waiver proposal 
included work requirements for the population Governor Bevin called the 
“able-bodied,” which the Obama Administration consistently refused to 
allow.260 
CMS approved Kentucky’s waiver application—including the work 
requirements—shortly before this Article went to print,261 signaling how the 
Trump Administration will proceed with fourth-wave renegotiations and new 
waiver applications. In addition to Kentucky, other states such as Arizona, 
Arkansas, Michigan, and Ohio have been attempting to renegotiate their 
expansions, seeking to win the same concessions other states received and, in 
most cases, pushing for even more.262 
 
https://perma.cc/K9LQ-BYYC (noting the move from traditional expansion to waiver 
expansion). 
 259. See Kentucky HEALTH Waiver Application 7-14 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/34C9-HREH; 
see also Joseph Gerth, Matt Bevin Calls for Unity at Inauguration, COURIER-J. (Louisville, 
Ky.) (updated Dec. 8, 2015, 6:38 PM ET), https://perma.cc/YQ74-PESB (reporting that 
Governor Bevin said in his inaugural address that “he would model Kentucky’s 
Medicaid policies after” Indiana’s). 
 260. See Ryland Barton, Federal Government Starting to Question Bevin’s Medicaid Proposal,  
89.3 WFPL (Louisville, Ky.) (July 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/44XR-LC5K. In July 2017, 
Kentucky submitted an amendment to its application that made the work require-
ments more stringent by effectively shortening the clock for work requirements to 
kick in when enrollees churn out of and back into the program. See Kentucky 
HEALTH Operational Modification Request 3-6 (2017), https://perma.cc/T83G 
-A5WM; see also Deborah Yetter, Bevin Revises Medicaid Plan, Seeks to Reduce Kentucky’s 
Rolls by Another 9,000 People, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.) (updated July 8, 2017, 10:58 AM 
ET), https://perma.cc/9E88-B5ZZ (explaining the amended waiver application in plain 
English). This amendment was part of the approved section 1115 waiver. See Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Nos. 11-W-00306/4 & 21-W-00067/4, KY HEALTH 
Section 1115 Demonstration 33 (2018), https://perma.cc/JV3Q-SRXL. 
 261. See Letter from Demetrios L. Kouzoukas to Stephen P. Miller, supra note 128, at 1-2.  
 262. Arizona pursued many of the concessions other states received in their waivers, 
including wellness incentives, exclusion of nonemergency medical transportation, 
varied benefit packages, and enforceable premiums and copayments with lockout 
periods. See Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., Arizona’s Application for a New 
Section 1115 Demonstration: Section I—Program Description 2-6 (n.d.), 
https://perma.cc/PSF4-6RFB. 
  Arkansas added cost sharing and limited nonemergency medical transportation by 
requiring prior approval, but its proposed work requirements and asset tests were 
rejected. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Expansion in Arkansas 1 
(2015), https://perma.cc/JZ9L-5Y3Z; see also David Ramsey, Governor Seeks New 
Concessions from CMS to Maintain Arkansas’ Medicaid Expansion, KAISER HEALTH NEWS 
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q89V-WJWL. 
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Work requirements may be where the transition to the Trump Admin-
istration will make the most difference in the Medicaid expansion context. 
Former federal officials told us that in trying to make the ACA work during 
the end of the Obama Administration, HHS found new ways to compromise.263 
Yet one place where President Obama’s HHS consistently drew the line was 
work requirements.264 However, the new CMS Administrator Verma—who, as 
discussed above, crafted waiver applications with work requirements while 
working as a consultant—and then-HHS Secretary Tom Price issued a letter in 
March 2017 emphasizing their desire to protect “the most vulnerable 
populations” and stating that “[t]he best way to improve the long-term health 
of low-income Americans is to empower them with skills and employment.”265 
The letter continued: “It is our intent to use existing Section 1115 demonstra-
tion authority to review and approve meritorious innovations that build on 
the human dignity that comes with training, employment and independ-
ence.”266 Thus, the fourth wave is developing to include additional concessions 
that will motivate red states to opt in, and it appears that Kentucky’s waiver 
 
  Michigan too sought new concessions. See Virgil Dickson, GOP-Led Medicaid Expansion 
States Test Limits of CMS Flexibility on Waivers, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 7, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/T2D6-3Y69. 
  Ohio requested a waiver allowing it to require premium payments for all income 
levels; that request was denied along with other proposed features such as lockouts that 
would have “exclude[d] individuals from coverage indefinitely until they pa[id] all 
arrears.” See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to John McCarthy, Medicaid 
Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Medicaid 1 (Sept. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/EAU6-N78H. 
  For a summary of states’ waiver requests, see MaryBeth Musumeci et al., The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Found., Section 1115 Medicaid Expansion Waivers: A Look at Key 
Themes and State Specific Waiver Provisions (2017), https://perma.cc/Q8ZL-R26W 
(comparing requests and flagging questionable application features such as work 
requirements and partial expansion). For additional resources tracking recent 
developments, see Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Which States Have Approved and Pending 
Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc 
/W43Q-L8YG; and Musumeci et al., supra note 197. 
  Third-wave demonstration waivers expire within five years, see Waivers, MEDICAID & 
CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/T85C-KVLL (archived  
Apr. 24, 2018), creating potential for further negotiation and adaptation as those 
waivers are reapproved, amended, or dropped. 
 263. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, supra  
note 213. 
 264. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5, supra  
note 190; Interview with Health Policy Nonprofit Officers 1 (a Former State Official) 
and 2 (Aug. 1, 2016) (on file with authors). 
 265. See Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, and Seema Verma, CMS Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., to Governor 1-2 (Mar. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/5Q6Q-3B79. 
 266. Id. at 2. 
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could be the switch that flips other states in the post-Obama realm of ACA 
implementation,267 if it survives legal challenges.268 
As this Article went to print, Indiana, Arkansas, and New Hampshire had 
work requirements approved by CMS in rapid succession.269 Other states are 
exploring section 1115 waivers that would include work requirements, cost 
sharing, and other novel limitations on Medicaid coverage and benefits.270 
But as we have emphasized, movement in Medicaid goes both ways. In a 
mirror image to Kentucky’s 2015 election, Democrat John Bel Edwards 
rejected prior Republican Governor Bobby Jindal’s nonexpansion politics and 
expanded Medicaid eligibility in Louisiana.271 His desire to enroll uninsured 
individuals as quickly as possible with a lean administrative staff led Louisiana 
to be first to take advantage of a rapid enrollment mechanism that allows states 
to use eligibility data for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP), the program commonly known as food stamps, to reach out to 
Medicaid-eligible individuals for enrollment.272 By exercising this option, 
Louisiana swiftly added more than 300,000 new beneficiaries;273 Louisiana thus 
 
 267. See Nicole Huberfeld, Perspective, Can Work Be Required in the Medicaid Program?, 378 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 788, 790 (Feb. 7, 2018) (predicting that new Medicaid expansions will 
be shaped by CMS’s new policies permitting work requirements). 
 268. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Stewart v. 
Hargan, No. 1:18-cv-00152 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2018), 2018 WL 525491. 
 269. Indiana’s waiver application was approved three weeks after Kentucky’s. See Letter 
from Demetrios Kouzoukas, Principal Deputy Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Allison Taylor, Medicaid Dir., Ind. 
Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. 1-2 (Feb. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/R8W2-536U. For 
Arkansas’s and New Hampshire’s work requirements, respectively, see Letter from 
Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., to Cindy Gillespie, Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. 1-2 (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/G57C-Y8P4; and Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Henry D. Lipman, 
Medicaid Dir., N.H. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 1-2 (May 7, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/S3XE-PYLQ. 
 270. See Musumeci et al., supra note 197. 
 271. See Elizabeth Crisp, Louisiana Road to Medicaid Expansion Long, Winding but Finally Here, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.) (July 5, 2016, 4:17 PM), https://perma.cc/E3ED-92MT. 
 272. See Kevin Litten, Louisiana to Use Food Stamp Data for Medicaid Expansion, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) (updated May 6, 2016, 2:53 PM), https://perma.cc/3GM2-
CL2S. HHS had encouraged this approach. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for 
Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to State Health Official 
and State Medicaid Dir. 1-2, 4-5 (May 17, 2013), https://perma.cc/H7VR-PEFE. 
 273. See Elizabeth Crisp, Medicaid Expansion Enrollment Tops 300K in Louisiana, ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge, La.) (Sept. 19, 2016, 11:55 AM), https://perma.cc/7NXY-6NN3; Letter 
from Vikki Wachino, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., to State Health Official and State Medicaid Dir. 3 (Aug. 31, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/23Z5-7JMC (noting that CMS will allow targeted enrollment 
through SNAP). 
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offered a model for states that may experience political switches that lead to 
opting in with a desire to onboard newly eligible beneficiaries quickly, even in 
a post-Obama Administration environment. 
One former governor told us that the topic of successful strategies for 
expansion is a popular one at governors’ closed-door gatherings, especially at 
the National Governors Association.274 This is horizontal interaction to be 
sure, but it is not states acting in concert or using combined leverage to move 
HHS. Rather, states have experienced horizontal learning, leading to a sort of 
sibling rivalry, seeking what others acquired plus a little more. 
The Medicaid implementation story illustrates our point that this is not a 
zero-sum game. Some states “won” concessions through individualized 
demonstration waivers. The Obama Administration arguably “lost” by 
conceding on the principle of universality in negotiations, allowing states to 
reintroduce exclusionary measures like lockout for failure to pay premiums. 
But President Obama’s HHS “won” by bringing state after state into the ACA. 
States that have not yet negotiated their way to expansion have arguably “lost” 
because their uninsurance rates are higher on average than those in states that 
expanded.275 Consider Kentucky, which originally adopted an ACA-based 
Medicaid expansion but then sought an exclusionary demonstration waiver.276 
Is Kentucky cooperative? Is it more sovereign to implement Medicaid 
expansion through an SPA or through a negotiated waiver? Each reserves 
power and allows choices for the state, and each involves federal standards the 
state must observe. Who has won?  
Even if we could answer such questions, wins and losses do not necessarily 
teach anything about healthcare federalism. It is uncertain whether these 
negotiations have been beneficial for health outcomes, or more beneficial than 
total nationalization would have been. It seems clearer, however, that these 
negotiations increased state power and control within the ACA’s framework 
and that these dynamics are continuing into the Trump Administration’s 
implementation of the ACA. 
B. Federalism Attributes: States as Individual Republics; Local Variation 
and Control 
It is ironic that federalism scholars often discuss “the states” as if they were 
a monolithic bloc, as one of the underpinnings of classic federalism theory is to 
recognize each state as a sovereign government—and thus distinguishable from 
 
 274. Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213. 
 275. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Key Facts About the Uninsured Population  
app. A at 8 (2017), https://perma.cc/33L8-3JR3; see also id. at 1-3 (discussing continued 
obstacles to coverage in states that have not expanded Medicaid). 
 276. See supra notes 221, 258-61 and accompanying text. 
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the next state. The Medicaid expansion highlights these differences and 
reinforces the important influence that intrastate politics—and the expression 
of state sovereignty that comes with it—has on state interaction with federal 
law. Medicaid expansion involved fifty-two different negotiating sovereigns—
each state (plus the District of Columbia) individually and the federal 
government. It also involved politically fraught intrastate decisionmaking that 
both underscores the important differences among state governors, 
legislatures, and administrative agencies in state policymaking and undermines 
accounts of modern federalism as dominated by partisanship. 
1. Intrastate differences as a countervailing force to partisanship 
Not all states have the same legal or constitutional structure. These 
acknowledged differences affect how a state might go about implementing, or 
even deciding to implement, a federal program.277  
One of our interviewees emphasized that “the lack of knowledge of how 
states function is rampant in Congress” and that Congress does not think about 
preexisting state regulatory structures when drafting.278 States had different 
laws regulating insurance and Medicaid going into the ACA, which affected the 
implementation choices they made.279  
Internal state actors also diverge from one another in significant ways. In 
the Medicaid context, budget considerations, influential healthcare 
stakeholders (especially hospitals), and the needs of low-income and rural 
citizens turned some red-state governors into Medicaid supporters, even when 
they faced resistance from legislators in their own party. For example, 
Republican Governor Brewer announced that Arizona would expand, then 
faced opposition from legislators; she then called a surprise legislative session 
and refused to end it until expansion legislation passed.280 Similar (though less 
extreme) circumstances arose in North Dakota and Ohio, each of which also 
had a Republican governor supporting expansion over vociferous Republican 
legislative protests, but in which expansion ultimately occurred.281  
 
 277. Cf., e.g., SHELLY TEN NAPEL ET AL., STATE HEALTH REFORM ASSISTANCE NETWORK, 
MANAGING STATE-LEVEL ACA IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH INTERAGENCY 
COLLABORATION 4-9 (2012), https://perma.cc/5B8L-ARK4 (encouraging state actors 
that have historically had different goals in state policymaking to work together to 
implement the ACA). 
 278. See Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213. 
 279. See Interview with Health Policy Nonprofit Officers 1 (a Former State Official) and 2, 
supra note 264; see also Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare 
Officials 2, 3, and 4, supra note 29. 
 280. See Reinhart, supra note 220. 
 281. See Smith, supra note 222; Young, supra note 222; Dan Zak, Spurning the Party Line, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/RB8P-4GE7. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270 
What Is Federalism in Healthcare For? 
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018) 
1748 
 
Some governors tried working around legislatures altogether. For in-
stance, Kentucky Governor Beshear (a Democrat) implemented Medicaid 
expansion using a longstanding Kentucky law that commanded Medicaid 
funds to be maximized.282 He commissioned reports supporting his position, 
which then enabled him to instruct the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and 
Family Services to expand Medicaid pursuant to state law.283 A lawsuit argued 
that he could not expand in this manner—administratively and without 
legislative action—but state courts sided with the governor, allowing 
expansion to proceed.284 Similarly, Ohio Governor John Kasich (a Republican) 
asked the state Controlling Board (a commission that facilitates use of federal 
funds outside the legislative budgeting process) to approve the use of available 
federal funds for Medicaid expansion.285 This maneuver bypassed the 
legislature, which had refused to pass a budget that included expansion.286 In 
2017, the legislature enacted a requirement that the state’s Department of 
Medicaid seek reapproval by the Controlling Board every six months so as to 
limit this kind of workaround.287  
In Alaska, Governor Bill Walker (an independent) rejected the anti-
expansion policy of Governor Sean Parnell (a Republican) and expanded 
through an existing state Medicaid law that automatically accepts federal 
eligibility categories labeled as mandatory.288 The Alaska Legislative Council 
challenged Governor Walker’s action to expand Medicaid, claiming that NFIB 
 
 282. See Sheila Lynch-Afryl, Kentucky Court Rejects Constitutional Challenges to Medicaid 
Expansion, Insurance Exchanges, HEALTH L. DAILY (Sept. 5, 2013), https://perma.cc/N9G5 
-CJUA; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.520(3) (West 2018) (“[I]t is the policy of the 
Commonwealth to take advantage of all federal funds that may be available for medical 
assistance.”). 
 283. See Press Release, State of Ky., Gov. Beshear Expands Health Coverage to over 300,000 
Kentuckians (May 9, 2013), https://perma.cc/P5XY-KMAQ. 
 284. See Lynch-Afryl, supra note 282; The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., An Overview of 
Actions Taken by State Lawmakers Regarding Medicaid Expansion 4-5 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/JQX8-8XV9. 
 285. See David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 796-97 (2017) 
(detailing the history of Medicaid expansion in Ohio). 
 286. See id. 
 287. See Andy Chow, Despite Complaints, Medicaid Expansion Funding Approved by Ohio Panel, 
WOSU RADIO (Columbus, Ohio) (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/UT4U-5ELL; Andy 
Chow, House Budget Proposes a Tighter Grip on Medicaid Expansion Funds, WKSU (Kent, 
Ohio) (May 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/6PGG-KWUW. 
 288. See Craig Tuten, Legislature’s Medicaid Expansion Lawsuit Against State Dismissed, ALASKA 
COMMONS (Mar. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/UCY4-HQ93 (discussing Governor 
Walker’s expansion strategy); Reid Wilson, Alaska Says No to Medicaid Expansion, 
WASH. POST: GOVBEAT (Nov. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/L335-T4KJ (reporting that 
Governor Parnell refused to expand Medicaid); see also ALASKA STAT. § 47.07.020(a) 
(2017) (“All residents of the state for whom the Social Security Act requires Medicaid 
coverage are eligible to receive medical assistance . . . .”). 
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had converted the expansion into a Medicaid option that could be implement-
ed only through affirmative legislative changes.289 A state court held that 
Alaska could sign on to the expansion over legislative objection.290 The 
Legislative Council lost steam and did not appeal the decision.291 
In other states, governors commissioned studies of expansion, which have 
supported ongoing intrastate negotiations regarding Medicaid expansion.292 
Movement toward expansion has continued, even after the Trump 
Administration took office.293  
On the other hand, some governors who fought expansion were deeply 
opposed by their legislatures. For example, in Maine, Governor Paul LePage 
vetoed Medicaid expansion five times, leading to a 2017 ballot initiative that 
made Maine the first state to expand by referendum.294 And some governors 
have supported expansion but have been unable to work around their 
legislatures, such as North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper, a Democrat who 
attempted to reverse his Republican predecessor’s decision to opt out of 
 
 289. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-5, 
Alaska Legislative Council v. Walker, No. 3AN-15-09208 CI, 2016 WL 4073651 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2016), 2016 WL 1257541; see also Tuten, supra note 288 (discussing the 
litigation). 
 290. See Alaska Legislative Council, 2016 WL 4073651, at *9 (holding that “existing law 
required the Governor to provide Medicaid to the expansion group”). 
 291. See Tegan Hanlon, Legislative Council Drops Medicaid Lawsuit Against Gov. Walker, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (updated June 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/7CFY-P2X4. 
Thanks to Mark Regan for assistance in making the points in this paragraph. 
 292. See, e.g., Luke Ramseth, Utah Governor Signs Medicaid Expansion Bill. Now, Utah Waits to 
See If the Feds Will Approve It, SALT LAKE TRIB. (updated Mar. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc 
/ZDU7-44RS (reporting Utah’s approval of expansion); Press Release, Utah Dep’t of 
Health, Medicaid Expansion Options Community Workgroup to Hold First Meeting 
(Apr. 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/4VW9-WVJ4; Utah Governor: Don’t Rush to Judgment 
on Medicaid Expansion, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2013, 5:02 PM), https://perma.cc 
/PMR8-7DWK (reporting on the Utah governor’s commission); see also, e.g., Press 
Release, Office of the Governor of Idaho, Governor Appoints Working Groups to 
Study Obamacare Questions (July 13, 2012), https://perma.cc/BZS6-4PHE; Gary Rayno, 
Governor’s Commission Recommends Expanding State’s Medicaid Program, N.H. HOSP. ASS’N, 
https://perma.cc/96XN-BGY9 (archived May 16, 2018). 
 293. See, e.g., Rose Hoban, In First Budget, Cooper Pushes for Medicaid Expansion, N.C. HEALTH 
NEWS (Mar. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/4TGK-AZHX (reporting that North Carolina 
Governor Roy Cooper “remain[ed] at loggerheads” with legislators over his efforts to 
expand Medicaid); Bruce Japsen, More States to Expand Medicaid Now That Obamacare 
Remains Law, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2017, 9:19 AM), https://perma.cc/Q28J-QBGW 
(reporting Kansas’s and North Carolina’s continued efforts to expand). 
 294. See Patrick Whittle, Maine OKs Medicaid Expansion in First-of-Its-Kind Referendum, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/J4GC-U9NU. 
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Medicaid expansion,295 and Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, a Democrat who 
was thwarted by a Republican-dominated legislature.296 
Of course, some governors and their legislatures have aligned. For exam-
ple, Texas Governor Rick Perry submitted a letter to HHS Secretary Sebelius 
just days after NFIB, publicly proclaiming that Texas opted out of both the 
Medicaid expansion and the exchanges.297 The Texas legislature supported that 
letter with legislation preventing compliance.298  
We surmise that the reason governors have diverged so much from 
legislatures of their own party has to do with governors’ traditional 
accountability for state budgets and their longer time horizons.299 Governors 
are also likely to feel the heat from industry—such as the ire of the hospitals 
that suffered in nonexpansion states—in more focused fashion than any single 
legislator.300 It may be easier for legislators to take stands purely for political 
reasons.301 Governors, on the other hand, must work with Medicaid 
commissioners and (sometimes elected) state insurance commissioners, get 
blamed for budget crises, answer to industry, and see benefits in shifting 
healthcare costs to the federal government while simultaneously creating more 
in-state medical sector jobs.302 
 
 295. See Anne Blythe, NC Legislators Drop Lawsuit Challenging Cooper’s Attempt to Expand 
Medicaid Under Obamacare, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (updated July 20, 2017, 
6:21 PM), https://perma.cc/PU4T-RF4X; David Ranii & Lynn Bonner, Gov. Roy Cooper 
Wants to Expand Medicaid; Republicans Vow to Fight, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) 
(updated Jan. 5, 2017, 3:36 PM), https://perma.cc/7D8C-VKK2; Dan Way, McCrory 
Announces Limited Medicaid Expansion, CAROLINA J. (Apr. 12, 2016, 12:37 AM), 
https://perma.cc/3QQW-E8FL. 
 296. See Kyle Cheney, Missouri Nixes Medicaid Expansion, POLITICO (May 8, 2013, 5:19 AM 
EDT), https://perma.cc/G4BV-C37P. The newly elected Republican governor opposed 
expansion in early 2017. See Austin Huguelet, Despite Failure of GOP Health Care Bill, 
Greitens Remains Opposed to Medicaid Expansion, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 28, 
2017), https://perma.cc/8JA6-2JEC. 
 297. See Letter from Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. (July 9, 2012) (on file with authors). 
 298. See James Jeffrey, Texas Bill Thwarts Medicaid Expansion Here, AUSTIN BUS. J. (May 28, 
2013, 7:32 AM CDT), https://perma.cc/G23R-5FTM; see also Act of June 14, 2013,  
ch. 1310, § 6.09, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3409, 3446. 
 299. See Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213. 
 300. See, e.g., Alexander Hertel-Fernandez et al., Business Associations, Conservative Networks, 
and the Ongoing Republican War over Medicaid Expansion, 41 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
239, 244 (2016) (noting that hospitals have pressed states to expand Medicaid); Bruce 
Japsen, Pressure on Governors to Expand Medicaid Under ObamaCare, FORBES (Mar. 8, 
2014, 10:01 AM), https://perma.cc/3SR4-2WZX (describing pressure on governors). 
 301. See, e.g., Hertel-Fernandez et al., supra note 300, at 259-61 (offering the example of 
Missouri legislators’ rejection of expansion). 
 302. Cf. id. at 250 (“Governors are pivotal state officials and have long played a central role 
in Medicaid policy making.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270 
What Is Federalism in Healthcare For? 
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018) 
1751 
 
One former governor we interviewed put it this way: “The governor 
represents the entire state . . . [and] has to advance a statewide vision to move 
the state forward, whereas the legislature tends to be a more reactionary type 
body, drawing from small districts.”303 Indeed, as the most recent Republican 
efforts to repeal the ACA drew to a close, we saw this dynamic in play once 
again. Bipartisan groups of governors allied to protest the repeal legislation.304 
Some recent federalism scholarship puts a heavy emphasis on partisan 
politics as the primary domain in which modern federalism issues play out. 
That narrative is a nationalist narrative to some extent, as inter- and intrastate 
differences matter less to it than national party affiliation. But as Rick Hills has 
observed, the ACA’s implementation calls this assumption into question.305 For 
instance, Jessica Bulman-Pozen argues that states are a proving ground in 
which national parties test their policies and claims that the resistance to the 
ACA’s implementation was “perfectly partisan.”306 David Schleicher likewise 
predicts, as Hills puts it, that state politicians will “march[] in lockstep with 
their national counterparts.”307 Schleicher also notes, however, that federalism 
theory that emphasizes partisanship may be less relevant when it comes to 
governors.308 Our findings substantiate that claim. Schleicher further suggests 
that state democracy itself—a key federalism attribute—is strengthened by 
these acts of differentiation from the national party.309 
The ACA story, to be sure, illustrates a key role for partisanship, but in 
many ways the partisanship has been superficial. Our account uncovers an 
intrastate dynamic that undermines the lockstep partisan account of state-
federal interaction as the only, or even dominant, game in town. 
 
 303. Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213. 
 304. See Letter from John Hickenlooper, Governor of Colo., et al., to Mitch McConnell, 
Majority Leader, and Charles E. Schumer, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/6W6Q-DEUL. 
 305. See Rick Hills, Governors and the Failure of ACA Repeal: Federalism as Safeguard Against 
National Partisan Politics, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 28, 2017, 11:46 AM), https://perma.cc 
/KPU2-XLGM. 
 306. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1081, 1098 (2014) 
(arguing that both political resistance and litigation against the ACA reflected 
partisanship). 
 307. See Hills, supra note 305; see also Schleicher, supra note 285, at 765 (“Elections where 
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 308. See Schleicher, supra note 285, at 797-98. 
 309. See id. at 771. 
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2. Autonomy and local variation 
Furthering the point about individual states acting as their own differenti-
ated sovereigns, no state or federal official we interviewed told us that any 
states acted jointly in negotiations with HHS.310 The Medicaid expansion did 
not play out as a battle between the national government and “the states” as a 
collective. Instead, the Obama Administration was a serial negotiator, inking 
distinct deals with individual states, all of which watched the others and then 
negotiated in their own interests.311  
One influential critique of modern federalism theory—Malcolm Feeley and 
Edward Rubin’s argument that schemes like the ACA’s offer mere decentraliza-
tion, not federalism—argues that two key criteria for federalism, even within a 
cooperative program, are at least “partial autonomy” and identity with the 
state.312 The leverage the states exerted in the ACA’s implementation and the 
extent to which they were able to shape their programs so individually seems 
to fit within the Feeley-Rubin model of federalism. To us, it is notable in this 
vein that state Medicaid programs typically adopt a state-centered identity. 
They have names like HIP 2.0, TennCare, and Husky Health, rather than 
Indiana Medicaid, Tennessee Medicaid, or Connecticut Medicaid.313 
With respect to the kind of variety federalist regimes are expected to 
demonstrate, these individual state negotiations produced enormous policy and 
legal diversity. Table 1 below offers a snapshot of the wide range of possible 
state decisions regarding Medicaid expansion. These decisions include not just 
whether to expand Medicaid but also how as a matter of law, when, and with 
which negotiated modifications to the ACA’s structure. The breadth of 
variations illustrates a classic federalism value in action—local decisionmak-
ing—but with the modern twist of occurring within a national baseline 
established by federal law. At the same time, variability across states in 
Medicaid access conflicts with a common health policy goal of equality—the 
 
 310. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, supra  
note 213; Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, 
and 4, supra note 29; Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare 
Official 5, supra note 190; Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213; Interview 
with State Policy Organization Officers 1, 2, 3, and 4, supra note 213. 
 311. One scholar of Canadian federalism wrote: “A common observation is that federal-
provincial relations resemble international diplomacy, and often Ottawa’s only option 
is to negotiate separate bilateral deals with individual provinces.” JONATHAN A. 
RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 263 
(2006). 
 312. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 16. 
 313. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4, 
supra note 29; see also, e.g., HUSKY HEALTH CONN., https://perma.cc/FF9M-4XJ6 
(archived Apr. 30, 2018); TennCare Medicaid, DIVISION TENNCARE, https://perma.cc 
/36J9-CPVS (archived Apr. 30, 2018); supra text accompanying notes 250-51. 
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very goal the ACA’s universal Medicaid expansion was designed to address.314 
A preference for variety and state choices tends to undermine moral aims like 
this one in a federalist regime; but of course, this point is not unique to 
healthcare. 
 
 314. See Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Essay, An Empirical Perspective on Medicaid as 
Social Insurance, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 556 (2015) (exploring Medicaid expansion as 
social justice); supra Part III.A. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270 
What Is Federalism in Healthcare For? 




State Decisions Regarding Medicaid Expansion 












Ala.     FFM ✔ 
Alaska ✔ SPA†   FFM ✔ 
Ariz. ✔ *   FFM ✔ 
Ark. ✔ Waiver First prem. assist.; later work reqs.  SBM-FP  
Cal. ✔ SPA  ✔ SBM  
Colo. ✔ SPA  ✔ SBM ✔ 
Conn. ✔ SPA  ✔ SBM  
Del. ✔ SPA   SPM  
D.C. ✔ Waiver Beyond ACA ✔ SBM  
Fla.     FFM ✔ 
Ga.     FFM ✔ 
Haw. ✔ SPA   FFM  
Idaho     SBM ✔ 
Ill. ✔ SPA   SPM  
Ind. ✔ Waiver Prem. assist.; later work requirements  FFM ✔ 
Iowa ✔ Waiver Premium assistance  SPM ✔⌁ 
Kan.     FFM-PM ✔ 
Ky. ✔ Both† First work requirements  SBM-FP  
La. ✔ SPA†   FFM ✔ 
Me. ◊ ◊   FFM-PM ✔ 
Md. ✔ SPA   SBM  
Mass. ✔ Waiver Universal coverage ∞ SBM  
Mich. ✔ Waiver   SPM ✔ 
Minn. ✔ Waiver Beyond ACA ✔ SBM  
Miss.     FFM ✔ 
Mo.     FFM  
Mont. ✔ Waiver   FFM-PM  
Neb.     FFM-PM ✔ 
Nev. ✔ SPA   SBM-FP ✔ 
N.H. ✔ * Prem. assist.; later work requirements  SPM  
N.J. ✔ SPA  ✔ FFM  
N.M. ✔ SPA   SBM-FP  
N.Y. ✔ Waiver Beyond ACA  SBM  
N.C.     FFM  
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N.D. ✔ SPA   FFM ✔ 
Ohio ✔ SPA†   FFM-PM ✔ 
Okla.    ** FFM  
Or. ✔ SPA   SBM-FP  
Pa. ✔ *   FFM ✔ 
R.I. ✔ SPA   SBM  
S.C.     FFM ✔ 
S.D.     FFM-PM ✔ 
Tenn.     FFM  
Tex.     FFM ✔ 
Utah     FFM ✔ 
Vt. ✔ Waiver Beyond ACA  SBM  
Va.     FFM-PM  
Wash. ✔ SPA  ✔ SBM ✔⌁ 
W. Va. ✔ SPA   SPM  
Wis.    ** FFM ✔ 
Wyo.     FFM ✔ 
FFM = federally facilitated marketplace; SBM = state-based marketplace; SPM = state 
partnership marketplace; SBM-FP = state-based marketplace on the federal platform; 
FFM-PM = federally facilitated marketplace with state plan management. 
† Expansion initiated by executive action. 
* Arizona began with expansion by SPA and obtained a waiver in 2016. New 
Hampshire started with an SPA but submitted an application for a waiver at 
the same time; its application was approved. Pennsylvania set aside its ap-
proved waiver after a gubernatorial election, instead expanding by SPA. 
** Oklahoma has a state-funded program that helps to pay for the coverage of 
individuals earning up to 100% of the FPL and that relies in part on federal funds 
that were supposed to end with Medicaid expansion in 2013 but have been re-
newed on an annual basis due to Oklahoma’s inability to expand. Wisconsin has a 
pre-ACA waiver that covers nonelderly adults up to 100% of the FPL; no super-
match applies, but BadgerCare offers more coverage than nonparticipating states. 
◊ Maine’s electorate voted to expand Medicaid by ballot initiative in 2017, but 
the governor has objected, leading to neither an SPA nor a waiver for expan-
sion at the time this Article went to print. 
∞ Massachusetts created universal insurance coverage in 2006 that was a model 
for the ACA, but MassHealth put the childless nonelderly adult population in 
subsidized private insurance because Medicaid did not match coverage for this 
population until the ACA was enacted. 
✔⌁ State attorney general and governor took opposite positions. 
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Table 1 shows that states have explored a variety of legal structures for 
implementing federalist policies. As discussed above, many first- and second-
wave states complied with the ACA by using SPAs, the traditional mechanism 
for a state to indicate to HHS its strategy for complying with federal Medicaid 
law.315 But as also discussed above, states have sought section 1115 demonstra-
tion waivers too, both to offer more than the ACA requires and to pursue 
variables that push on the baseline of universal coverage enacted in the 
ACA.316 In states that have not yet expanded, negotiations are ongoing both 
intrastate and intergovernmentally with HHS, and another snapshot one year 
in the future would likely offer further variations. 
To build on this narrative, Table 2 below offers a different snapshot, 
illustrating the variety of policy choices states have made after expanding 
Medicaid eligibility. For example, states have used section 1115 waivers to 
expand eligibility above the ACA’s baseline; change the method of implementa-
tion, such as by providing benefits in the form of premium assistance; or adopt 
cost sharing, premiums, healthy behavior or wellness incentives, or work 
requirements. The states that have slowly opted in by negotiating their way to 
expansion have enjoyed the most policy discretion, seen in the chart by the 
numerous policy variations adopted by third- and fourth-wave expansion 
states. As discussed in Part IV.A above, each new section 1115 waiver involves 
more variation from the federal baseline, and fourth-wave states are leveraging 
the option not to expand eligibility that NFIB created and that HHS might not 
have been eager to grant if not for the Court’s interference. Table 2 accounts 
for expansion waivers and submitted waiver applications but not informal 
negotiations. 
 
 315. See supra Parts IV.A.1-.2. 
 316. See supra Part IV.A. 
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Alaska         
Ariz.   Pending ✔  ✔   
Ark.  ✔ ✔ ✔    ✔ 
Cal.         
Colo.         
Conn.         
Del.         
D.C. ✔        
Haw.         
Ill.         
Ind.   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Iowa  ✔*  ✔  ✔ ✔  
Ky.   ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
La.         
Md.         
Mass.       Pending  
Mich.  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔ 
Minn. ✔        
Mont.    ✔ ✔    
Nev.         
N.H.  ✔ ✔      
N.J.         
N.M.    Pending Pending ✔   
N.Y. ✔        
N.D.         
Ohio   Pending      
Or.         
Pa.    ⌁  ⌁ ⌁  
R.I.         
Vt. ✔        
Wash.         
W. Va.         
States have waivers and pending waiver applications for existing Medicaid 
programs that echo the policies reflected in the waivers they seek for Medicaid 
expansion under the ACA, but nonexpansion waivers are beyond the scope of this 
Article, so we focus on expansion population waivers only. 
* Iowa initially had approval for premium assistance; later, HHS approved an 
amendment to its waiver to enroll the newly eligible population in Medicaid 
managed care. 
⌁ Pennsylvania began expansion by negotiating a section 1115 waiver but then 
switched to ACA-consistent expansion through an SPA. 
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V. Insurance Exchange Implementation 
Occurring alongside the Medicaid expansion and revealing similar themes, 
the implementation of the ACA’s exchanges produced its own surprising array 
of options and federalism-related features. This Part describes the ways that 
exchange implementation was likely dynamic, adaptive, and marked by 
horizontal relationships and intrastate politics. We focus on these themes 
rather than on chronological progression because there were less visible waves 
of implementation in this context and instead a more fluid environment in 
which structures changed and evolved. 
The exchange implementation story also turns many traditional federal-
ism assumptions on their heads—or at least sideways. Traditional federalism 
characteristics like autonomy, sovereignty, cooperation, experimentation, and 
variation show up in unexpected ways in the context of the state-federal 
interchange over the exchanges. For instance, it is difficult to predict how 
cooperative, disobedient, autonomous, or experimental a state has been merely 
from that state’s choice whether to implement its own exchange. 
We also saw a recurrent desire in this context for some middle ground 
between traditional federalist and nationalist stances. Congress tends to draft 
statutes as nationalist or federalist in terms of architecture—with one or fifty 
options. But under the ACA, states worked with HHS to devise hybrid state-
federal exchange structures that were not envisioned by the ACA’s drafters but 
that allowed states to retain control with significant federal support. Some 
states preferred instead to model their exchanges on other states’, with a 
general consensus emerging that while some variation of exchange structure 
may be useful, fifty different exchanges were too many. Some of these state 
moves were under the radar for political reasons and thus raise transparency 
concerns; hybrid structures obfuscated state cooperation with the national 
government while still allowing states to be in de facto control. 
To that end, as in the Medicaid context, the exchange implementation also 
undermines the account, popular both in the media and among some 
federalism scholars, that partisanship above all else drove intergovernmental 
relations under the ACA. Simultaneous with the public political resistance and 
in direct tension with it, many red states actually worked quietly with the 
federal government to devise the best policies for their states. In many cases, 
these moves were precipitated by similar kinds of divergences among 
intrastate actors that we highlighted in the Medicaid account, for example, 
with state insurance commissioners bucking governors of their own party to 
cooperate. 
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A. Cooperation, Resistance, and Autonomy in Dynamic Exchange 
Implementation 
Like the Medicaid expansion, the exchange implementation rolled out 
with a first wave, but the states’ exchange stances since then have been much 
more fluid and unpredictable. All of the states except Alaska applied for and 
received the initial, no-strings-attached exchange planning grants made 
available in the fall of 2010, shortly after the ACA was enacted.317 Approxi-
mately three-fifths of the states also jumped in within months of the statute’s 
enactment to exercise their option to operate their own transitional high-risk 
pools for those with preexisting conditions.318 In February 2011, HHS also 
awarded “early innovator” grants to six states—Kansas, Maryland, New York, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wisconsin—and to a consortium of New England 
states—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont—all of 
which declared interest in developing exchange information technology that 
could be adapted and implemented by other states.319 These states emerged 
early out of an apparent desire to position themselves as thought leaders. By 
mid-2013, forty-six states had received $3.6 billion in planning, implementa-
tion, and early innovator grants.320  
But politics quickly turned the tide firmly against working with HHS after 
the initial grant phase. The NFIB litigation both sowed uncertainty about the 
ACA’s future—making states more reluctant to jump out in front and establish 
exchanges that might ultimately be struck down—and turned opposition to the 
statute into a Republican loyalty litmus test. Soon, Kansas, Oklahoma, and 
Wisconsin returned their early innovator grants, other states returned their 
exchange planning grants, and most red states declined to establish their own 
exchanges at all.321 
This resistance was unexpected. The most federalism-oriented states 
were expected to exercise their federally offered right of first refusal to 
 
 317. See ANNIE L. MACH & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43066, FEDERAL 
FUNDING FOR HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 2 & n.6 (2014); Establishing Health 
Insurance Marketplaces: An Overview of State Efforts, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (updated  
Mar. 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/K4RX-MCME. 
 318. See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: The Web Portal and Early Retiree 
Reinsurance, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 6, 2010), https://perma.cc/6MUU-ECWR. 
 319. See MACH & REDHEAD, supra note 317, at 2-3, 4 tbl.I. 
 320. See Establishing Health Insurance Marketplaces, supra note 317. 
 321. See MACH & REDHEAD, supra note 317, at 2-3; Sarah Kliff, It’s Official: The Feds Will Run 
Most Obamacare Exchanges, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Feb. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc 
/FC89-A3AS. Nevertheless, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia applied for 
and received Level 1 exchange establishment grants, which provided funds for states to 
take steps toward establishing a state-based exchange without needing to meet the 
specific exchange structure and governance requirements for a Level 2 grant. See MACH 
& REDHEAD, supra note 317, at 2. 
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implement the federal program at the state level, as we see in other similarly 
structured schemes. It was expected that states would want the ability to 
tailor their own programs to their particular needs and that states would 
view the federal statute as encroaching less on state domains if states 
controlled implementation.322 This was a key point in the original Medicaid 
statute’s implementation and in those of predecessor programs.323 It was also 
emphasized by Republicans early in the ACA’s implementation. One 
prominent Republican said that letting the federal government operate a 
state’s insurance exchange would be a “Trojan horse” paving the way for a 
full-scale federal takeover.324 But the hot politics of the ACA trumped 
traditional federalism perspectives and reversed the usual course. Notably, 
states would have had this policy autonomy even without NFIB; the Court’s 
holding had nothing to do with insurance exchanges. NFIB’s effect with 
respect to the exchanges was on the choices states made rather than on the 
existence of choice in the first place. 
The paradoxical outcome was that the most anti-ACA states were the 
same states inviting the federal government to take over their insurance 
markets. The intention was to be seen as doing nothing to cooperate with 
“Obamacare.”325 The result has been a much more robust role for the federal 
government in running state insurance markets than Congress and many 
states ever expected.326  
There were surprises, too, even within the (typically blue) states that 
rushed to implement their own exchanges. As in our Medicaid account—indeed 
more so—extensive back-and-forth movement between state and federal 
structures emerged in the exchanges. Some states have moved back and forth 
between running their own exchanges and using federally operated exchanges. 
Oregon, which created its own exchange, defaulted to the federal exchange 
platform because of intractable technical issues.327 In the reverse direction, as 
further detailed below, some Republican states like Kansas worked out deals 
behind the scenes that effectively put their exchanges under state control, 
 
 322. Cf. Gluck, supra note 1, at 572-74 (describing how allowing states to implement federal 
programs may be more “politically palatable” in areas of traditional state control). 
 323. See Huberfeld, supra note 58, at 441-45. 
 324. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Yes to State Exchanges, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 6, 2012, 5:00 PM), 
https://perma.cc/FZQ4-TQHE. 
 325. See Interview with Former Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4, supra  
note 29 (“Obamacare is a bad word.”); Interview with State Policy Organization Officers 
1, 2, 3, and 4, supra note 213.  
 326. See supra Part III. 
 327. See Jeff Manning, Cover Oregon: $248 Million State Exchange to Be Jettisoned in Favor of 
Federal System, OREGONIAN (updated Apr. 25, 2014, 11:30 PM), https://perma.cc/C9MB 
-4XNV. 
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moving from red to blue in practice, even though they are still formally labeled 
federal exchanges for purposes of political cover (and simplicity of reporting 
and paperwork).328 Kentucky rhetorically opposed the ACA at the national 
political level but still adopted a highly successful state exchange under 
Governor Beshear—with the state-identified name Kynect.329 His successor 
dismantled Kynect in opposition to the ACA—not because it was failing; it was 
a “model” exchange by all accounts.330 
These details bring to the surface questions about how useful it is, as 
federalism scholars are wont to do, to focus on cooperation, and even 
sovereignty, in complex state-federal schemes. For example, Texas used a 
federal exchange in protest against the ACA. Was Oregon more “cooperative” 
and Texas more “sovereign” merely because the latter resisted, the former 
didn’t, yet both wound up with the same structure? Was Kentucky or Kansas 
more “autonomous”? Both have been calling their own shots, but only 
Kentucky ever had its own exchange.  
This kind of analysis also raises the very difficult question about how we 
could have a theory of federalism that turns on mere motivation. Taking the 
example above, Texas is only more federalist because of its attitude. Constitution-
alists would shudder at the thought that federalism could be so malleable or 
subjective. Consider, for example, two states—New Mexico and Texas—both of 
which have exchanges operated by the federal government and so as a formal 
matter look identical from a structural federalism perspective. But each state’s 
control is very different across its exchange. As Table 3 below illustrates, New 
Mexico relies on the federal exchange platform but actually operates many 
aspects of its own exchange, including conducting plan management and 
consumer assistance; setting its own geographic rating areas, reinsurance, and 
risk adjustment formulas; and running rate reviews and medical loss ratio 
 
 328. See Christine H. Monahan, Safeguarding State Interests in Health Insurance Exchange 
Establishment, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 375, 424 (2015) (“In February 2013, the Kansas Insurance 
Commissioner sent a letter to the director of [the Center for Consumer Information 
and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO)] explaining that while there was ‘no political support 
for a partnership arrangement,’ the state would like approval to perform plan 
management functions (such as certifying that health plans met state and federal 
statutory and regulatory requirements) on behalf of the federally run exchange.” 
(quoting Letter from Sandy Praeger, Comm’r of Ins., Kan. Ins. Dep’t, to Gary Cohen, 
Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight 1 (Feb. 15, 2013), https://perma.cc/KE6E 
-ZJFQ)). 
 329. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, What Did Mitch McConnell Mean When He Suggested the Kentucky 
State Exchange Was “Unconnected” to Obamacare?, WASH. POST (May 29, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/T29B-FDZ6; see also Editorial, Say Again, Senator, ACA Unkynected?, 
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (updated July 18, 2014, 9:52 PM), https://perma.cc/6X54 
-X4DA. 
 330. See Amber Phillips, Kentucky, Once an Obamacare Exchange Success Story, Now Moves to 
Shut It Down, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Jan. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/KHA5-ZWBP. 
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compliance. Texas has declined to operate an exchange, enforce any reform 
provisions like medical loss ratio compliance, or set its own geographic rating 
areas. Now who looks more federalist and autonomous? Is it sufficient to put all 
these categories aside and say that states got to make their own choices and that is 
enough for federalism? 
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Ala. FFM ✔   ✔ 
Alaska FFM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Ariz. FFM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Ark. SBM-FP ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Cal. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Colo. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Conn. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Del. SPM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
D.C. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Fla. FFM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Ga. FFM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Haw. FFM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Idaho SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Ill. SPM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Ind. FFM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Iowa SPM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Kan. FFM-PM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Ky. SBM-FP ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
La. FFM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Me. FFM-PM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Md. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Mass. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Mich. SPM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Minn. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Miss. FFM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Mo. FFM  ✔  ✔ 
 
 331. Data in this table were drawn from the following sources: Compliance and Enforcement, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/UVT4-4WEA (archived 
Apr. 23, 2018); Market Rating Reforms, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://perma.cc/J2F9-QUB5 (last updated Apr. 20, 2018); State Effective Rate Review 
Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/N7KU-8P9Z (last 
updated Mar. 17, 2017); State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND., https://perma.cc/V5N8-PXMP (archived Apr. 23, 2018); and State Requests for 
MLR Adjustment, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/K5XP 
-Q36K (archived Apr. 23, 2018). 
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Mont. FFM-PM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Neb. FFM-PM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Nev. SBM-FP ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
N.H. SPM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
N.J. FFM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
N.M. SBM-FP ✔   ✔ 
N.Y. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
N.C. FFM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
N.D. FFM ✔  ✔ ✔ 
Ohio FFM-PM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Okla. FFM   ✔  
Or. SBM-FP ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Pa. FFM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
R.I. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
S.C. FFM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
S.D. FFM-PM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Tenn. FFM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Tex. FFM   ✔  
Utah FFM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Vt. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Va. FFM-PM ✔   ✔ 
Wash. SBM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
W. Va. SPM ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Wis. FFM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Wyo. FFM     
FFM = federally facilitated marketplace; SBM = state-based marketplace; SPM = state 
partnership marketplace; SBM-FP = state-based marketplace on the federal platform; 
FFM-PM = federally facilitated marketplace with state plan management. 
 
We return to the subjects of autonomy and sovereignty in Part VI below. 
But the state and federal officials we interviewed consistently emphasized that 
states had “enormous autonomy” in developing their exchanges if they wished 
to participate—regardless whether the exchange structure was state or 
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federal.332 Indeed, states that have engaged with implementation have retained 
much more control over their insurance markets’ policy design than those that 
have resisted any role.  
As Table 3 illustrates, the structure has been less important than the state’s 
own involvement. States that ran their own exchanges did not necessarily 
exert more control over exchange policy than did states defaulting to the 
federal model. The key to policy control was participation and engagement 
within the federal statutory scheme regardless whether it was formally 
structured as state or federally implemented. For example, Kansas and Maine 
defaulted to federal exchanges but opted to maintain significant control over 
their health insurance markets. Both states conduct plan management, enforce 
compliance with reform provisions, sought adjustments to medical loss ratios, 
and conduct rate reviews. 
*     *     * 
The change of administration has added an important wrinkle to our 
account. Until recently, the experience of the exchanges was mostly 
interchangeable regardless of structural platform. But in 2017, some noticeable 
differences emerged between state- and federally operated exchanges. Whereas 
under the Obama Administration, states with federal exchanges received as 
much, if not more, federal support as states with their own exchanges, the 
Trump Administration has moved to strangle the exchanges as part of its 
larger effort to destabilize the ACA.333 Federally operated exchanges are more 
susceptible to these hostile efforts simply because the federal government has 
more control over them.  
One salient example occurred in the context of open enrollment, the key 
period during which individuals must sign up for insurance. Whereas states 
with their own exchanges retain control over enrollment periods and 
advertising efforts, the Trump Administration slashed funding, canceled 
 
 332. See Interview with Health Policy Nonprofit Officers 1 (a Former State Official) and 2, 
supra note 264; see also Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare 
Official 1, supra note 213. 
 333. See Exec. Order No. 13,813, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (Oct. 12, 2017) (directing agencies to 
explore options to pull healthy individuals off of the exchanges); Market Stabilization, 
82 Fed. Reg. 18,346, 18,381 (Apr. 18, 2017) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 155.410(e) (2017)) 
(ending the open enrollment period on December 15, 2017, rather than January 31, 
2018); Abbe Gluck, President Trump Admits He’s Trying to Kill Obamacare. That’s Illegal., 
VOX (Oct. 17, 2017, 1:40 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/Q2P7-EQAE (detailing the Trump 
Administration’s efforts to stifle open enrollment, cut advertising and navigator 
funding, and cut off payments to the insurance industry); Shelby Gonzales, Trump 
Administration Slashing Funding for Marketplace Enrollment Assistance and Outreach, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS (Sept. 1, 2017, 1:30 PM), 
https://perma.cc/C8UY-3RZV (discussing the Trump Administration’s decision to cut 
funding for consumer outreach and navigator programs). 
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outreach events, and cut the 2017 enrollment period in half for those states on 
the federal exchange.334 The irony of course is that it is the red states that are 
suffering most—that have lost the most autonomy—because they refused to 
implement the statute in the first place. 
In a further irony, this dynamic made state Republican officials some of 
the most important advocates for sustaining the ACA in 2017. A bipartisan 
governors’ letter was a pivotal turning point in one of the failed attempts to 
repeal the ACA in the summer of 2017.335 Republican governors took to the 
media in the fall of 2017 to protest the Administration’s moves to cut funding 
to insurers and destabilize the exchanges.336 
But another twist was underway at the time this Article went to print. Idaho, 
one of the few red states that chose to run its own exchange,337 used that freedom 
in 2017 to try to create a parallel marketplace to allow for lower-cost, less-
regulated off-exchange plans.338 The Trump Administration refused to allow 
that move339 but followed by proposing its own series of reforms, available to 
states with all kinds of exchanges, that would allow any state to move more 
people out of ACA plans and into different types of less-regulated plans.340 
Critics argue that these proposals, if finalized, will destabilize the Act.341 
 
 334. See, e.g., Timothy Jost, CMS Cuts ACA Advertising by 90 Percent amid Other Cuts to Enrollment 
Outreach, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/7XER-6LYL (reporting 90% 
cuts in advertising and 40% cuts in funding to insurance navigator programs). 
 335. See Letter from John Hickenlooper et al. to Mitch McConnell and Charles E. Schumer, supra 
note 304; see also Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, Governors from Both Parties Denounce 
Senate Obamacare Repeal Bill, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/P529-CPXH. 
 336. See, e.g., Jeff Stein, “It’s Going to Hurt Everybody”: Nevada’s GOP Governor Rips Trump over 
ACA Sabotage, VOX (Oct. 13, 2017, 2:40 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/EVG6-T4M9.  
 337. See About, IDAHO INS. MARKETPLACE, https://perma.cc/BN4M-LRB8 (archived Apr. 23, 2018); 
see also Louise Norris, Idaho and the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG  
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/5YRT-DBPD (reporting that Idaho has not expanded 
Medicaid but that an effort to expand via ballot initiative is underway).  
 338. See Press Release, Office of the Governor of Idaho, Governor Directs Development of 
Guidelines for More Affordable Health Coverage (Jan. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/Z7N9-ZXZC. 
 339. See Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., to C.L. “Butch” Otter, Governor of Idaho, and Dean L. Cameron, 
Dir., State of Idaho Dep’t of Ins. 1-2 (Mar. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/2G48-NJCG. 
 340. See, e.g., Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance, 83 Fed. Reg. 7437, 7438, 7445-47 
(proposed Feb. 21, 2018) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 and 45 C.F.R.) 
(expanding the possible duration of short-term, off-exchange plans from three to up to 
twelve months); Definition of “Employer” Under Section 3(5) of ERISA—Association 
Health Plans, 83 Fed. Reg. 614, 615, 634-36 (proposed Jan. 5, 2018) (to be codified at 29 
C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-3, -5) (expanding the definition of “employer” to allow more plans to 
qualify as association health plans that need not comply with all ACA requirements). 
 341. See Dylan Scott, Trump’s New Plan to Poke Holes in the Obamacare Markets, Explained, VOX 
(Feb. 20, 2018, 10:10 AM EST), https://perma.cc/2WC7-M9HD (explaining these 
proposals and their risks). 
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On the one hand, then, the choice between a state-led and federal structure 
may be more significant than it initially appeared. With an administration 
pitted against the statute, states that do not go out on their own are suddenly 
less stable—and indeed less autonomous—than they were just months earlier, 
simply because a hostile caretaker is now in control. But on the other hand, the 
Administration is treating all states alike—regardless of exchange structure—
when it comes to its new offers of flexibility of design. Again, national does not 
mean uniform, even when the federal government is running the exchange. 
To some federalism scholars, the rapidity with which the context of state 
autonomy keeps shifting may further the point that federalism was never 
there in the first place. They may argue that it is too contingent to be truly 
federalist—a criticism they might level at all forms of intrastatutory 
federalism. But a statute drafted differently could have given more protection 
from interference to federal-exchange states. We can draw from constitutional 
law for the sovereignty values we may wish to further but then recognize that 
those are being effectuated through Congress’s policy choices in statutory 
design. That may make them more or less stable depending on how the statute 
defines the parameters of the state-federal relationship.  
B. Under-the-Radar Adaptation and Engagement: Hybrid Federalism and 
the “Secret Boyfriend Model” 
Extraordinary adaptivity also emerged in exchange implementation. 
Creative solutions developed in large part from the tension between the 
political pressure on state officials to publicly “resist” the ACA342 and the 
practical view many of those same officials held that it was not in the long-
term interests of the states—their sovereign interests—to cede full control of 
their insurance markets to the federal government. 
Congress’s initial structural allocation turned out to be more of a starting 
point than the endpoint in terms of the exchange designs that emerged. New 
structures developed in part because Congress’s initial allocation was far too 
simplistic: Congress assumed that state choices would be of the either-or 
variety—state or federal. They turned out to be far more complex.  
1. Split exchanges 
Some states adapted through a kind of compromise—a purple-state 
solution of sorts—choosing to run their own state exchanges in part but 
 
 342. See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based 
Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 113-18, 161-68 (2010) (describ-
ing the political pressures to resist implementation of the ACA and the value in state 
officials’ publicly opposing the law). 
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relying on the federal government for another part. For instance, Mississippi 
and Utah ran their own state-based exchanges for small businesses but carved 
out the individual insurance exchanges for the federal government to run.343 
This move was mostly political. The ACA’s highly controversial individual 
mandate was the focal point of political resistance and was closely associated 
with the individual market and its exchange. As a result, states like Utah 
refused to take any action that could be seen as supportive of the mandate, even 
as those states implemented other parts of the ACA and ceded power to the 
federal government in politically resisting the law.344 
2. Hybrid exchanges: federalism born of necessity, federalism in 
secret 
A more complex category of exchanges—and a salient example of pragmat-
ic administration—comes in the context of the so-called hybrid exchanges, 
which blend state and federal management functions and come in many 
different forms. The hybrid exchange was a model developed by HHS in a 
guidance document early in the ACA’s implementation, with the goal of 
attracting more states to engage.345 One high-level federal interviewee told us 
that it had become clear that many states did not want the binary choice 
Congress had laid out; they wanted to be able to rely on the federal government 
for as much as they individually needed but still wanted policy control.346 
 
 343. See Jeff Amy, Mississippi to Create Small Business Health Insurance Exchange, INS. J. (Sept. 9, 
2013), https://perma.cc/FM5R-ZZDE; Louise Norris, Utah Health Insurance Marketplace: 
History and News of the State’s Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/GPC9-73GG (noting that Utah had been running its own small 
business exchange but is now moving to the federal platform). 
 344. Ironically, Utah was (along with Massachusetts) the state most often invoked as a 
“model” for the ACA’s state-based exchanges during the statute’s drafting process before 
politics drove its compromise solution. Utah, which had established an “open” 
exchange (essentially letting all insurers in without screening) prior to the ACA, was 
held up as an example of a state that had conducted a different kind of exchange 
experiment than Massachusetts in discussions of how capacious the states’ options 
were in exchange design. See Gregg Girvan, Consumer Power: Five Lessons from Utah’s 
Health Care Reform, BACKGROUNDER 2 (2010), https://perma.cc/KVH4-467U (“State 
lawmakers who want to maintain the independence of their state’s health care system 
and fiscal future in the wake of the new federal law should consider Utah’s recent 
experience with health care reform.”); Robert Pear, Health Care Overhaul Depends on 
States’ Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2010), https://perma.cc/34L2-KYAB (“Massachu-
setts and Utah provide a glimpse of the future, and they offer radically different models 
for other states.”). 
 345. See Memorandum from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Affordable Insurance Exchanges Guidance: Guidance on the State 
Partnership Exchange 1 (Jan. 3, 2013), https://perma.cc/FZN6-6TD8. 
 346. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4, 
supra note 29. 
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Another official told us that some states wanted more control but needed 
political cover—a way to keep up appearances that the federal government was 
still in charge so as not to appear in betrayal of the red-state resistance.347 
The hybrids were thus a type of blended entity born of necessity. Reacting 
to the changed landscape after NFIB and concerned that fewer states than 
expected were running their own exchanges, HHS helped design federally run 
exchanges that were heavily supported by the federal government but still 
directed on the policy front by states.348 Seven states took up this hybrid 
possibility: Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, and 
West Virginia.349 Those states were given a choice under the hybrid model of 
whether to conduct their own plan management activities, consumer 
assistance, outreach, and education.350 The federal government took on any 
remaining supportive and administrative responsibilities.351 
To our view, these hybrid exchanges may be the ultimate instantiation of 
cooperative federalism: a regime in which the federal government does what it 
does best, offering administrative support and maximizing the advantages of 
centralization and economies of scale, while giving states a platform to design 
and run their own programs. Arkansas switched to a state-based exchange for 
2017, and the hybrid model provided the means for that transition to more 
state control.352 But the idea of “cooperating” with the federal government in 
this way was still politically taboo for many state actors. One puerile problem 
was that the hybrid exchanges were called “partnership” exchanges, and some 
states did not want to appear to be in “partnership” with the Obama 
Administration.353  
 
 347. See id.; see also Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, 
supra note 213. 
 348. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4, 
supra note 29. 
 349. See Letters, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/A4GU-VN7D 
(archived Apr. 23, 2018) (compiling approval letters for states’ exchanges, including 
seven that applied to adopt a partnership model).  
 350. See Memorandum from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, supra note 345, at 1. 
 351. See id. at 17-18. 
 352. See Louise Norris, Arkansas Health Insurance Marketplace: History and News of the State’s 
Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Mar. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/EAP9-CXMT (“For 
the first three years of exchange implementation, Arkansas had a partnership exchange 
for individuals, but as of 2017 . . . , [it has] a state-based exchange using the federal 
enrollment platform . . . .”). 
 353. See Monahan, supra note 328, at 423-24; Interview with Former Federal Executive 
Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4, supra note 29; Interview with State Policy 
Organization Officers 1, 2, 3, and 4, supra note 213; cf. Leonard, supra note 342, at 162 
(“[R]hetorical federalism acknowledges that federalism arguments have political 
salience aside from earnest concerns about the federal structure.”). 
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Another problem was the intrastate political arena. Some insurance 
commissioners and other lower-level state officials wanted to retain control 
over state insurance markets, even as governors and legislatures refused to run 
their own exchanges out of public resistance.354 For example, another seven 
states—Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, and 
Virginia—did not opt in to the hybrid model for these political reasons, but 
they did not want full-scale federal exchanges either.355 As a result, these states 
actually took on significant exchange management functions, but they needed 
to keep these decisions relatively secret.  
Sometimes state moves were so discreet that it appeared that one arm of 
the government was trying to hide its actions from another. Take Kansas as an 
example.356 Its state insurance department designed a plan for a hybrid 
exchange, desiring to retain control over its insurance markets rather than 
cede that power to the federal government.357 However, under HHS’s hybrid 
exchange guidance, the governor was required to sign off on a state’s hybrid 
exchange “blueprint.”358 Kansas’s governor refused to “partner” with the 
Obama Administration, even as the insurance commissioner pressured for that 
result.359  
In response, HHS adapted again. Less than one week later, HHS announced 
a new hybrid option, this time called state “plan management.”360 Plan 
management exchanges do not require formal gubernatorial approval but 
rather require only informal communications between the federal government 
and state insurance commissioners, thereby allowing state commissioners to 
get around resistant state capitols.361  
Thus, in these seven states, the state commissioners, sometimes at odds 
with the political interests of their own governors, were making decisions and 
quietly running important aspects of their exchanges even as governors 
 
 354. David K. Jones et al., Pascal’s Wager: Health Insurance Exchanges, Obamacare, and the 
Republican Dilemma, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 97, 114, 121, 125 (2014) (detailing 
conflicts between insurance commissioners and governors in three states). 
 355. See Monahan, supra note 328, at 415-16. 
 356. This narrative largely is drawn from Christine Monahan’s work. See id. at 415-16, 423-
24. 
 357. See id. 
 358. See Blueprint for Approval of Affordable State-Based and State Partnership Insurance 
Exchanges—Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (May 16, 
2012), https://perma.cc/6ZLS-E6GE (noting that a state pursuing a partnership 
exchange must submit an “Exchange Blueprint” containing an “Exchange Model 
Declaration Letter” from the governor). 
 359. See Monahan, supra note 328, at 423-24. 
 360. See id. 
 361. See id. 
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continued to publicly pledge their steadfast resistance to cooperating with the 
administration of the ACA. While there are a few states in which the insurance 
department has refused to implement the ACA, most state insurance 
departments are actively engaged, even in states with federally facilitated 
exchanges.362  
These models raise transparency and accountability concerns, which we 
discuss further in Part VI below. One of our federal official interviewees 
colorfully dubbed these interactions the “secret boyfriend model”: states that 
wanted the assistance the federal government offered but were afraid to admit 
it to the public or even to other parts of state government.363 HHS even helped 
these states market their supposedly uncooperative exchange efforts to provide 
political cover.364  
Another type of hybrid emerged to help states that tried to establish their 
own marketplaces but failed. Known as “State-Based Marketplace-Federal 
Platform” exchanges, these are exchanges in which the states make all of the 
policy decisions but rely on the federal government’s HealthCare.gov IT 
platform.365 Five states currently have this kind of exchange, including Oregon 
and New Mexico, which both had tried to operate fully state-based exchanges 
but failed for technical reasons.366 In 2015, this option allowed Arkansas to 
transition from a federal exchange to assuming full policy control over its 
marketplace without having to assume the risk of setting up a new technical 
platform.367 Hawaii, in contrast, transitioned in 2016 from this model to a full 
federal exchange.368  
 
 362. Only four states have refused to enforce compliance with insurance reform provisions. 
See supra Table 3. 
 363. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3 and, 4, 
supra note 29 (statement of Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 3). 
 364. See id. 
 365. See State-Based Exchanges, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc 
/92WD-RVMS (last updated Sept. 15, 2017); State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 
2018, supra note 331. For further discussion of this model, see Christopher Koller, 
Supported State-Based Marketplaces: The Point of Convergence?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 11, 
2015), https://perma.cc/C8UD-7WUM. 
 366. See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, supra note 331 (listing states by 
exchange type); see also Rosalie Rayburn, Plans for State-Run Health Exchange Dropped, 
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Apr. 8, 2015, 2:26 PM), https://perma.cc/C5WE-6NDC; Gosia 
Wozniacka, Oregon Dropping Online Health Exchange for U.S. Site, BELLINGHAM HERALD 
(Bellingham, Wash.) (updated Apr. 26, 2014, 12:07 AM), https://perma.cc/X4NQ-2C6K. 
 367. See State Marketplace Profiles: Arkansas, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/E52Q-N55Z.  
 368. See Louise Norris, Hawaii Health Insurance Marketplace: History and News of the State’s 
Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Mar. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/6KHQ-97WL. 
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In short, HHS developed a wide continuum of structural options along the 
spectrum from state to federal to engage as many states as possible in 
implementation. In most cases the key to state autonomy was the level of 
engagement, not the formal structure. 
C. Horizontal Federalism in Exchange Implementation: More 
Cooperation than Competition 
The ACA included in its insurance reforms a formal mechanism for state-
to-state cooperation: States could establish “regional” exchanges, combining 
insurance pools and regulations into a single market.369 As it turns out, the 
ACA’s stated vision of horizontal federalism did not materialize—no states 
established regional exchanges.370 But other forms of horizontal federalism 
developed on the ground, including robust state networks and an important 
role for quasi-official state organizations in coordinating implementation. 
Several thought-leader states also emerged and played important roles in 
disseminating information and experience to later-moving states. 
1. Interstate cooperation 
Interstate cooperation has been a dominant feature of exchange implemen-
tation. This is different from the Medicaid story, which has been more 
competitive across states.371 Some of this cooperation was facilitated by formal 
networks states used to share information and coordinate efforts. These 
include the networks of “early innovator” states—states that took the lead in 
implementation and so served as a model for others.372 Other interstate 
networks were supported by federal entities as well as quasi-governmental 
organizations, including the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance 
Oversight (CCIIO);373 the Health Care Reform Regulatory Alternatives 
Working Group of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners;374 
the State Health Exchange Leadership Network of the National Academy for 
 
 369. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(f)(1), 124 
Stat. 119, 179 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2016)). 
 370. See Sarah Dash et al., Health Insurance Exchanges and State Decisions 2 (2013), 
https://perma.cc/VK28-U484. 
 371. See supra Part IV. 
 372. See States Leading the Way on Implementation: HHS Awards “Early Innovator” Grants to 
Seven States, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/3EK8-BNWD 
(archived Apr. 23, 2018). 
 373. See id. (describing a CCIIO grant to “a multi-state consortium led by the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School”).  
 374. See Health Care Reform Regulatory Alternatives (B) Working Group, NAT’L ASS’N INS. 
COMMISSIONERS, https://perma.cc/GJ3G-YU4H (archived Apr. 23, 2018). 
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State Health Policy;375 the National Governors Association; and the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).376 The ACA empowered and 
formalized some of these horizontal networks. The most salient example is 
that the ACA explicitly directed HHS to involve the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners in implementation.377 
Informal networks also emerged to trade information and coordinate 
efforts. These included technical assistance networks facilitated by the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation,378 the network of states that cooperated in the 
Enroll UX 2014 project to design user interfaces,379 informal networks of 
exchange officials who hired the same consultants and contractors,380 the 
informal network of states working in opposition to the ACA supported by the 
American Legislative Exchange Council,381 and unofficial relationships that 
emerged out of formal networks, conferences, and workshops. One former 
federal official we interviewed recalled helping to organize regular meetings 
between state officials, so-called “learning collaboratives” facilitated by HHS, to 
enable state success in implementing exchanges and to share information 
between states for troubleshooting.382 
Unlike in the Medicaid context, in creating exchanges, states did band 
together to exert leverage on the federal government for collective goals. For 
example, Christine Monahan has described how an informal group of states 
defaulting to federal exchanges cooperated to retain plan management 
functions: “Their collective advocacy ultimately resulted in the creation of the 
‘marketplace plan management option’ by which states could conduct plan 
management on behalf of the federally run exchange . . . .”383 Similarly, a group 
 
 375. See State Health Exchange Leadership Network, NAT’L ACAD. FOR ST. HEALTH POL’Y, 
https://perma.cc/3RR9-ESRP (archived Apr. 23, 2018).  
 376. See Interview with Health Policy Nonprofit Officers 1 (a Former State Official) and 2, 
supra note 264 (detailing the support for state coordination from federal and other 
entities). 
 377. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1311(c)(1)(F), 
1321(a)(2), 1333(a), 1341(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 174, 186, 206-07, 209 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Monahan, supra note 328, at 409-14 (describing 
some of the efforts of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners). 
 378. See, e.g., About Us, ST. NETWORK, https://perma.cc/9FYT-J5FB (archived Apr. 23, 2018).  
 379. See Who’s Involved, ENROLL UX 2014, https://perma.cc/U3A2-AYDK (archived Apr. 23, 
2018). 
 380. See infra notes 391-92 and accompanying text. 
 381. See, e.g., Christie Herrera, Health Care Freedom Makes a Big Impact in 2012, AM. LEGIS. 
EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Mar. 26, 2012), https://perma.cc/2P3U-VLGE (describing state 
efforts growing out of the organization’s initiative). 
 382. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5, supra  
note 190. 
 383. Monahan, supra note 328, at 415-16.  
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of partnership exchange states coordinated efforts to persuade the CCIIO not to 
require them to enter into formal memoranda of understanding, thereby 
avoiding a potential political problem for state officials.384 While our sense 
from the interviews is that the advocacy was also coming from the other 
direction—from HHS and the White House—this is nevertheless a good 
example of how informal horizontal networks can be an effective method of 
federalism negotiation.  
State networking efforts like these have received some recent attention in 
the new federalism literature. For example, political scientist John Nugent has 
argued that these organizations are critical players in “safeguarding 
federalism”—in the form of helping states leverage and interact with the 
federal government—in the context of a national scheme with key potential 
state roles.385 Our study lends support to that account. 
2. Thought-leader states 
Another dimension of horizontal federalism in the exchange context was 
visible in the emergence of thought-leader states. These states served as policy 
entrepreneurs and increased efficiency for states that were further behind in 
implementation. As in the Medicaid context, thought-leader states in ACA 
exchange implementation emerged organically; unlike in some statutes, leader 
states were not designated in advance in the ACA.386 
Connecticut provides an example in its efforts to market its successful 
exchange platform to other states. As one of Connecticut’s entrepreneurial 
exchange officials put it: “We realized that we had invented a better  
mousetrap . . . . We could package our services and expertise and make them 
available to other states, promoting collaboration and avoiding a duplication of 
effort.”387 The Connecticut exchange director, Kevin Counihan, even sought to 
market the state’s successful exchange platform to other states.388 He promoted 
 
 384. Id. at 415. 
 385. See JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR 
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 31 (2009). 
 386. A classic example is the Clean Air Act, in which Congress designated California as the 
leader state and offered states the option to adopt federal pollution standards or the 
higher standards California had developed. See Gluck, supra note 43, at 1756 & n.23; see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2) (2016). 
 387. Robert Pear, Connecticut Plans to Market Health Exchange Expertise, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 
2014), https://perma.cc/4MJP-SDNL (quoting Robert E. Scalettar, member of the board 
of Access Health CT). 
 388. See Jeff Cohen, Connecticut Looks to Sell Its Obamacare Exchange to Other States, NPR  
(Feb. 28, 2014, 3:31 AM ET), https://perma.cc/V9YN-HDXR.  
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Connecticut’s system as giving other states “the benefits of a state-based 
marketplace without the headaches of building or staffing it.”389 
At least four other states—including Maryland and Minnesota—used other 
states’ exchange platforms as their own.390 In most cases, the sister-state-model 
option was an alternative to inviting the federal government to operate a 
federal exchange in the wake of a state’s technical failures in operating its own. 
Even states that maintained their own exchanges following initial difficulties 
leveraged other states’ experiences by using the same consulting firms that had 
successfully shepherded other states through similar transitions. Deloitte for 
instance was hired by Maryland and Minnesota following its successful 
oversight of exchange rollouts in Connecticut, Kentucky, Rhode Island, and 
Washington.391 Vermont, on the heels of a botched attempted rollout using the 
same contractor as the federal exchange, hired the same consultant, Optum, 
that helped Massachusetts recover from a similar hiccup.392 
 
 389. Pear, supra note 387 (quoting Kevin Counihan, CEO of Access Health CT). 
 390. See Jenna Johnson, Maryland Looks to Connecticut for Health Exchange Answers, WASH. 
POST (May 31, 2014), https://perma.cc/987K-56C5; MNsure Chooses Deloitte as Lead 
Vendor, CBS MINN. (Apr. 16, 2014, 12:50 PM), https://perma.cc/F3PC-HD32. 
 391. See Johnson, supra note 390; MNsure Chooses Deloitte as Lead Vendor, supra note 390; 
Christine Vestal & Michael Ollove, Why Some State Health Exchanges Worked, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/Y7VK-577S. 
 392. Lynnley Browning, Thanks for Nothing: Obamacare Website Bunglers Fired, NEWSWEEK 
(Aug. 6, 2014, 10:09 AM), https://perma.cc/MT26-JR8P.  
  hCentive operates exchanges in Massachusetts, New York, and Colorado. See Dan 
Mangan, The “Policy Geek” Picked to Save Massachusetts’ Obamacare Exchange, CNBC  
(May 8, 2014, 4:14 PM ET), https://perma.cc/EMY9-99C6. Massachusetts hired 
hCentive after a failed rollout by CGI, the original contractor for HealthCare.gov, 
explicitly citing hCentive’s record of success in other states. See Felice J. Freyer, Mass. 
Sticking with Its Health Insurance Website, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc 
/8QN5-3SCC; Mangan, supra; see also Lydia DePillis, Meet CGI Federal, the Company 
Behind the Botched Launch of HealthCare.gov, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Oct. 16, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/8J4M-5V6W. 
  Following difficulties with CGI, Vermont hired Optum, citing the fact that Optum 
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supra. Optum owns a 24% stake in hCentive. See Mangan, supra. 
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3. A middle ground between one and fifty options 
In this story of states modeling on and borrowing from one another, we 
see a parallel to our account of the hybrid exchanges. In both instances, there is 
recognition that a middle ground between fifty separate models and a single 
national model might be ideal as a matter of structural allocation. The ACA is 
not the first example of this. For instance, in the corporate law context, a few 
states’ statutes have emerged as the basis for most states’ choices; there are not 
fifty different options, and each state does not reinvent the wheel.393 Likewise, 
this middle ground in the ACA emerged organically, rather than as a result of 
the ACA’s intentional design by Congress. States themselves may be adapting, 
but Congress still appears to be operating with outmoded design options. It 
continues to use the old either-or model of structural allocation in drafting. 
A middle ground may capture efficiencies and economies of scale and may 
advance uniformity in ways inferior to a full national exchange but superior to 
fifty different ones. So understood, this horizontal movement, like the 
emergence of hybrids, might point toward a federalism sweet spot. As Access 
CT’s CEO commented about the various exchange models: “We do not need 
fifty of these things, but we might need eight.”394  
D. Intrastate Differences, Redux 
As we emphasized in the Medicaid discussion, one cannot understand the 
ACA’s implementation without discarding the fiction that the states are a 
monolithic bloc. Divergences in state law and divergences among the internal 
state actors—in other words attributes of the state sovereign apparatuses—are 
critical to how federal-law implementation occurs on the ground. This is 
another response to those who would argue that what we saw was mere 
management or decentralization.395  
Beginning with the law, states went into the ACA with different preexist-
ing insurance laws.396 Some states already had generous insurance mandates—
requirements that insurers cover specified services.397 A few states already had 
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Year 7 exhibit 2, 7-8 (2015), https://perma.cc/D5CA-V8YJ. 
 397. See, e.g., Pre-ACA State Mandated Benefits in the Individual Health Insurance Market: 
Mandated Coverage in Mental Health, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/DT5L 
-ZHEF (archived Apr. 24, 2018); Pre-ACA State Maternity Coverage Mandates: Individual 
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community rating requirements—meaning insurers could not price according 
to health risk by especially wide margins.398 New York had a particularly 
stringent community rating requirement that it continued even after the ACA 
was passed with a looser one.399 There is some evidence that having those 
preexisting legal structures influenced states to run their own exchanges rather 
than defaulting to the federal platform.400 
Some states also passed laws to give their insurance commissioners power 
to buck federal requirements.401 President Obama’s famous “if you like your 
health plan, you can keep it” statement destabilized many exchanges by 
allowing healthy customers, expected to join the new insurance pools, to 
remain outside them.402 States that bucked the President and decided not to 
allow individuals to keep their old plans had healthier exchange markets in the 
end, according to at least one study.403 
Looking next to differences among internal state actors, as with Medicaid, 
we saw governors’ interests diverging from those of their legislatures. Some 
states, including Michigan and New Jersey, were unable to create their own 
exchanges because of the objections of one of the elected branches necessary to 
pass the required implementing legislation.404 Executives in three states—
Kentucky, New York, and Rhode Island—made an end-run around recalcitrant 
legislatures by creating state-based exchanges through purely executive 
 
and Small Group Markets, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/T7WZ-92ZN 
(archived Apr. 24, 2018). 
 398. See Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue in the Individual Health 
Insurance Market, EXPERT VOICES 1 (2011), https://perma.cc/LL5R-N76B (describing 
community rating and state policies before the ACA). 
 399. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3231 (McKinney 2018) (mandating one-to-one community rating); 
Obama’s New York Model: How the State Destroyed Its Insurance Market Using ObamaCare 
Rules, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2013, 7:28 PM ET), https://perma.cc/X6GF-Q838. 
 400. Compare Individual Market Rate Restrictions (Not Applicable to HIPAA Eligible Individuals), 
KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/XPM4-F4LD (archived Apr. 24, 2018) (showing 
limits on rating by state), with State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, supra  
note 331 (showing marketplace type by state). A simpler explanation might be that 
these states were largely Democratic and so were sympathetic toward the ACA from 
the start. 
 401. See Richard Cauchi, State Laws and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/VB9L-YKUQ. 
 402. See Robb Mandelbaum, How Holdover Health Plans Help Some Businesses but Hurt 
Obamacare, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://perma.cc/HSG9-A6AQ. 
 403. See Kevin Lucia et al., The Extended “Fix” for Canceled Health Insurance Policies: Latest State 
Action, COMMONWEALTH FUND: TO THE POINT (Nov. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/F8N5 
-Q4GE; cf. West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 827 
F.3d 81, 82, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting for lack of standing a state challenge to the 
transitional policy permitting certain insurers to temporarily continue policies that 
did not comply with the ACA), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1614 (2017). 
 404. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 204, at 23, 31. 
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authority.405 Four of the seven states that adopted the hybrid partnership 
exchange model also used purely executive authority to adopt their 
exchanges.406 In at least one state, the fact that a partnership exchange could be 
launched by the executive without legislative action was the very reason it was 
used.407 
We also saw conflicts between insurance commissioners eager to retain 
control of state insurance policy and governors in the same states resistant to 
engage with the exchanges or appear cooperative with the ACA. These 
intrastate struggles played out differently in each state—precisely because each 
state is a unique local democracy. Not all of these efforts were successful. 
Mississippi’s elected insurance commissioner, for instance, applied to HHS—
unsuccessfully—for approval to create a state-based exchange, without the 
approval of either the governor or the legislature.408 But many workarounds 
that did emerge succeeded largely because of cooperation between state and 
federal insurance officials. 
E. “Picket Fence Federalism” 
Federalism scholars will undoubtedly see in some of these stories—
especially in the case of the hybrid exchanges—the concept of “picket fence 
federalism.” That term is used to describe when administrators across 
governments working in the same policy area more closely identify with one 
another in furtherance of shared goals than they do with other members of 
their own government.409  
The formal and informal networks that we have already described among 
implementers facilitated these picket fence relationships between state 
insurance experts and their federal counterparts. Another contributing factor 
was that many key Obama Administration officials were former insurance 
 
 405. See id. at 18, 33, 40; see also Kelly, supra note 258; Kevin J. Mooney, Gov. Chafee’s Use of 
Executive Orders Is Viewed as Anti-democratic, CURRENT (Aug. 14, 2012), https://perma.cc 
/P3SS-7C6V; Casey Seiler, Cuomo Uses Clout to Sidestep GOP on “Obamacare,” TIMES 
UNION (Albany, N.Y.) (updated Apr. 12, 2012, 10:10 PM), https://perma.cc/98T9 
-NWHZ. 
 406. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 204, at 5, 9, 16, 23. 
 407. See State Marketplace Profiles: Michigan, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (updated Nov. 26, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/XYG2-83PY. 
 408. See Jeffrey Hess, HHS Denies Mississippi’s Bid to Run Its Own Exchange, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (updated Feb. 8, 2013, 10:15 AM), https://perma.cc/LGD6-7ZFS (reporting that 
an HHS spokesman said that “[w]ith the Governor’s refusal to work with us or the 
insurance commissioner, there is no way to coordinate strategy with other agencies 
that he’s in charge of”). 
 409. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2001). 
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commissioners or had held similar roles in various states. These included HHS 
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Kansas);410 Joel Ario, the first director of the 
Office of Health Insurance Exchanges (Oregon and Pennsylvania);411 Teresa 
Miller, an acting director of the State Exchanges Group, the Oversight Group, 
and the Insurance Programs Group (Oregon and Pennsylvania);412 CCIIO 
Director Steve Larsen (Maryland);413 Jay Angoff, the director of HHS’s Office 
of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (which became the CCIIO) 
(Missouri);414 and Kevin Counihan, the first CEO of HealthCare.gov 
(Connecticut).415 States also engaged directly with the federal government in 
the ACA implementation process. States actively participated in the notice and 
comment rulemaking process and, even more frequently, weighed in through 
informal channels.416 All forty-nine states that received any kind of exchange 
grant were assigned a designated officer who served as the state’s point person 
at HHS and was available to interact “on a daily or weekly basis.”417 State 
insurance departments were in regular contact with the CCIIO regarding 
technical implementation issues.418 Consistent with their historical roles as the 
“intergovernmental lobby,”419 the National Governors Association and the 
NCSL also actively engaged with federal officials regarding exchange 
implementation.420 The State Health Exchange Leadership Network also 
engaged vertically, albeit on a less formal basis than the others.421 
 
 410. See Peter Baker & Robert Pear, Kansas Governor Seen as Top Choice in Health Post, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2009), https://perma.cc/9R9L-ZWMP. 
 411. See Joel Ario, COMMONWEALTH FUND, https://perma.cc/KTR8-LC2M (archived Apr. 24, 
2018). 
 412. See Pennsylvania Selects Commissioner Miller to Lead Department of Human Services, INS. J. 
(Aug. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/P5ZU-MA7Y. 
 413. See Sara Hansard, CCIIO Director Steve Larsen Leaving for UnitedHealth Unit Optum in Mid-
July, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 20, 2012), https://perma.cc/GMM9-8SU2.  
 414. See Christopher Weaver, HHS Insurance Oversight Office to Become Part of Medicare 
Agency, NPR (Jan. 5, 2011, 5:08 PM ET), https://perma.cc/ERN3-CYQA; Executive 
Profile: Jay Angoff, BLOOMBERG, https://perma.cc/22FC-W38C (archived Apr. 24, 2018).  
 415. See Dan Diamond, Kevin Counihan, the New “Obamacare CEO,” Faces Four Key Challenges, 
FORBES (Aug. 26, 2014, 12:25 PM), https://perma.cc/HMT3-TK8W. 
 416. See Monahan, supra note 328, at 398-409, 400 tbl.3 (listing the frequency with which 
each state submitted a comment). 
 417. See id. at 403-04. 
 418. See Email from Brian Webb, Assistant Dir., Life & Health Policy & Legislation, Nat’l 
Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, to authors (May. 17, 2018) (on file with authors) (confirming that 
state regulators have always had and continue to have “regular contact with 
CMS/CCIIO staff on a variety of implementation issues”). 
 419. NUGENT, supra note 385, at 31. 
 420. See Monahan, supra note 328, at 409-14. 
 421. See id. at 414-15. State legislatures did not have formal institutional connections to HHS, 
making direct vertical connections with legislatures harder to document and assess, but 
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F. Deconstructing “Federalism” Attributes 
The traditional federalism account contends that certain attributes—
autonomy, sovereignty, local policy variation, and experimentation—are most 
attainable for states separate from federal law. That account also argues that 
federalism’s attributes produce particular democracy benefits, including 
accountability and checks against the federal government. Modern federalism 
scholars diminish the importance of some attributes, such as sovereignty, and 
find others in centralization rather than separation. Our account pushes back 
against both perspectives. 
We already have discussed how autonomy and sovereignty in the ACA did 
indeed emerge. But they emerged without any separation—and indeed in many 
instances independently of the formal state-or-federal exchange design. This 
does not mean that these attributes will necessarily emerge from all federal 
statutes that include states as implementers; rather, it simply means that they 
can if Congress designs a statute to do so. 
Local accountability is another federalism value that is muddled by the 
exchange story. State involvement—especially when it comes to hybrids and 
“secret boyfriends”—obfuscates that democracy value. We return to this point 
in Part VI below. Here, we pause to discuss policy variation and experimenta-
tion. 
Variation and experimentation are two of the most commonly touted 
federalism attributes, yet they seem much less linked to federalism structures 
than most accounts assume. The variation-in-exchange-implementation story 
has two intersecting vectors. On the one hand, the ACA homogenized 
insurance law and policy to an important extent. Before the statute was passed, 
wide inequities and variation existed across states in the number of uninsured 
people and the generosity of insurance plans.422 After the ACA, inequities 
decreased in virtually every state, although some interstate differences 
remained.423 The ACA also established national network adequacy standards 
for the first time.424 Prior to the ACA, almost all states had at least some 
measures in place to ensure network adequacy, but states varied widely in their 
 
the potential for such connections exists given how state officials move from one 
branch to another somewhat fluidly. 
 422. See CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., AMERICA’S UNDERINSURED: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK AT 
HEALTH INSURANCE AFFORDABILITY PRIOR TO THE NEW COVERAGE EXPANSIONS, at ix-x, 
3-5 (2014), https://perma.cc/923N-SV95 (reporting wide variations between states in 
the number of individuals with access to adequate insurance); The Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Found., supra note 275, app. A at 8 (reporting uninsurance rates). 
 423. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 275, app. A at 8. 
 424. See JANE B. WISHNER & JEREMY MARKS, URBAN INST., ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH 
NETWORK ADEQUACY STANDARDS: LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES 4 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/W6BJ-FJFP. 
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approaches.425 The ACA required the HHS Secretary to ensure that plans 
offered on marketplaces had “a sufficient choice of providers . . . and provide[d] 
information to enrollees and prospective enrollees on the availability of in-
network and out-of-network providers.”426 
On the other hand, we still see significant variation across exchange 
models, but those differences do not stem from the choice between state and 
federal exchanges. The ACA explicitly leaves to state discretion many of the 
important details regarding the structure and operation of the exchanges, and 
regulations promulgated under the ACA expand that discretion.427 As Table 3 
above illustrates, state discretion under the ACA created the possibility of vast 
differences in insurance markets even within exchange types. For example, 
some states used their authority to conduct rate review to deviate significantly 
from the federal rating standards, limiting insurers’ ability to impose 
surcharges for tobacco use or increase premiums based on age.428 Other states 
 
 425. See Justin Giovannelli et al., Regulation of Health Plan Provider Networks 3 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/6JGQ-X9M5. 
 426. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(c)(1)(B), 124 
Stat. 119, 174 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(1)(B) (2016)). 
 427. Most importantly, the regulations gave states a choice of the health insurance policy 
that would serve as the benchmark plan to determine the essential health benefits that 
must be offered by plans in the individual and small group markets. See Standards 
Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 
12,834, 12,866 (Feb. 25, 2013) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. § 156.100 (2017)); see also 
Essential Health Benefit (EHB) Benchmark Plans, 2017, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
https://perma.cc/AWK2-EMHS (archived May 16, 2018).  
  For federal-exchange states, CMS did impose quantitative standards, but the standards 
varied further by county composition. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & OVERSIGHT, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2017 LETTER TO ISSUERS IN THE FEDERALLY-
FACILITATED MARKETPLACES 23-24, 24 tbl.2.1 (2016), https://perma.cc/292Y-7NLA 
(setting time and distance maximums for different types of providers, such as primary 
care physicians).  
  Federal-exchange states conducting plan management were allowed to accept the 
federal standard or implement their own, subject to the time and distance caps. For 
example, in a “large” county, a network would have to cover a primary care physician 
at most 10 minutes or 5 miles away from 90% of enrollees. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER 
INFO. & OVERSIGHT, supra, at 24 & tbl.2.1. In a “rural” county, a network would have to 
include a primary care physician at most 40 minutes or 30 miles away for 90% of 
enrollees. See id.; see also Timothy Jost, CMS Releases Final 2017 Letter to Issuers in the 
Federally Facilitated Marketplaces, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (updated Mar. 3, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/R9PY-UEQM. 
  CMS proposed, but ultimately declined to adopt, quantitative standards for plans in all 
states regardless of exchange type. See HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters 
for 2017, 81 Fed. Reg. 12,204, 12,205 (Mar. 8, 2016). 
 428. See Justin Giovannelli et al., Implementing the Affordable Care Act: State Approaches 
to Premium Rate Reforms in the Individual Health Insurance Market 2-7 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/BV68-84SL; supra Table 3. 
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prohibited insurers on their marketplaces from providing coverage for 
abortions.429 
As is evident, there has been enormous variety—even within a particular 
category of exchange model—in how the exchanges look depending on states’ 
levels of involvement. Critically, although the federal government is 
nominally operating exchanges in about three dozen states, not all states’ 
federally run exchanges look the same—precisely because the federal 
government was eager to give states input even within the federal model, 
whether through a hybrid structure or just through a federal exchange in 
which the state had a voice in directing policy. 
In total, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia are making plan 
management decisions, including eighteen states using the federal IT platform 
(the six partnership states, seven plan management states, and five states with 
state-based exchanges using HealthCare.gov’s technology).430 In forty-seven 
states and the District of Columbia, the state insurance departments are 
managing health plan rate reviews.431 Seventeen states and Guam sought 
adjustments to the federal medical loss ratio.432 Forty-six states oversee 
compliance with the ACA’s market reform standards.433 The majority of states 
have chosen to set their own geographic rating areas, including fifteen states 
with federally run exchanges, seven plan management states, six partnership 
states, four states with state-based exchanges on the federal IT platform, and all 
eleven states (plus the District of Columbia) with fully state-run exchanges.434 
For those federalism theorists who embrace federalism for policy variety, 
these details should give pause. They offer examples of locally driven 
experimentation that comes through a national program with a flexible, state-
centered component. Pure separation of state and federal is not necessary—
indeed, perhaps not even ideal—for the states to fulfill their role as policy 
“laboratories.” States may not even be necessary! At the same time, the 
nationalism in the exchange design did have something of a smoothing effect at 
 
 429. See Alina Salganicoff et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Coverage for Abortion 
Services and the ACA 4 & fig.1 (2014), https://perma.cc/TS8U-WJWN. 
 430. See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, supra note 331. 
 431. See State Effective Rate Review Programs, supra note 331. Only Oklahoma, Texas, and 
Wyoming do not have effective state-run rate review programs. See id. 
 432. See State Requests for MLR Adjustment, supra note 331. Nine of the states seeking 
adjustment had federally run exchanges, two were plan management states, four were 
partnership states, and two ran federally supported state-based marketplaces. See State 
Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, supra note 331. 
 433. See Compliance and Enforcement, supra note 331. Only Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and 
Wyoming “have notified CMS that they do not have the authority to enforce or are 
not otherwise enforcing the Affordable Care Act market reform provisions.” Id. 
 434. See Market Rating Reforms, supra note 331; State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, 
supra note 331. 
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least on the equity front, in the sense that it set a floor that lessened some of the 
basic differences in coverage in the individual insurance markets across 
states.435 In other words, even where there has been policy autonomy, it has 
not been complete. 
*     *     * 
Another form of market variation could come in the form of waivers. The 
ACA includes a provision—section 1332—that allows a state to seek a waiver 
from the statute’s insurance requirements if the state can propose a program 
that would provide essentially the same coverage at the same cost.436 The 
statute did not permit waivers until 2017, so details about them were not 
included in our study. We might expect to see aggressive use of this provision 
under the Trump Administration.  
Early information on waivers is mixed. In 2017, the Trump Administra-
tion approved waivers for Alaska, Minnesota, and Oregon, allowing those 
states to take on the healthcare costs of certain higher-cost individuals, taking 
them out of the market’s risk pools and thereby lowering premiums overall.437 
Ohio, Maine, and Wisconsin now have similar proposals pending, with more 
states getting in line with draft proposals.438 At the same time, states have 
expressed frustration with the slow pace of review by CMS.439 The 
Administration recently also did not act on waiver proposals from two red 
states—Iowa and Oklahoma—that included many conservative reforms.440 
 
 435. See Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
https://perma.cc/WHG4-PK6Z (archived Apr. 24, 2018) (to locate, select “View the live 
page,” then select “Trend Graph,” and then select all locations and the “Uninsured” 
distribution) (showing a trend toward less variation in uninsurance rates across states). 
 436. See generally Heather Howard & Galen Benshoof, Health Affairs Blog Post, 1332 Waivers 
and the Future of State Health Reform, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 237 (2015) 
(explaining the waiver program and its potential).  
 437. See Richard Cauchi, State Roles Using 1332 Health Waivers, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/8774-2K3H (summarizing state requests for  
section 1332 waivers and their goals). On December 30, 2016, when Obama was still 
President, Hawaii received a waiver related to the ACA’s requirement that it operate a 
small business insurance marketplace. See id. 
 438. See The ACA’s Innovation Waiver Program: A State-by-State Look, COMMONWEALTH FUND 
(May 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/XVN5-4F9U; Heather Howard, More States Looking to 
Section 1332 Waivers, ST. HEALTH & VALUE STRATEGIES (May 10, 2018), https://perma.cc 
/5WNH-C882. 
 439. See Susannah Luthi, Senate Republicans in Talks with Verma to Expedite States’ 1332 
Waivers, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/8DJQ-ERE9. 
 440. See id.; see also Timothy Jost, ACA Round-Up: 1332 Waiver News from Iowa and Minnesota; 
Big Blow to Graham Cassidy, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (updated Sept. 24, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/TJ8G-KBRA; Leslie Small, Waiver Weirdness: What the Oklahoma and 
Iowa Cases Could Mean for Other States Seeking ACA Exemptions, FIERCEHEALTHCARE  
(Oct. 10, 2017, 12:52 PM), https://perma.cc/ZUA6-UYL9. 
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Some media reports suggested that the Administration, hostile to the law, did 
not want to approve any programs that would strengthen healthcare markets in 
those states.441 In other words, this may mark a 180-degree turn from the 
Medicaid strategy of the Obama Administration, which was generous in 
granting waivers the Administration perceived as suboptimal from a policy 
perspective to further the long-term goal of entrenching the law in as many 
states as possible. 
VI. Federalism Values, Old and New 
Detailing the ACA’s federalism features in implementation is easier than 
evaluating the umbrella concept of “federalism” as a whole in the statute or 
devising legal doctrine to effectuate the kind of federalism we describe. Indeed, 
one takeaway from our study of the ACA’s implementation is that approaching 
federalism as a single package may be an impossible task, not only because 
many of the attributes we associate with federalism may not be unique to 
federalist structural arrangements but also because, even when it comes to 
what we expect from federalism, the concept stands in for so much.  
Federalism at times seems advanced as an end in itself—aimed at generat-
ing the structural and democracy benefits believed to derive from multiple 
layers of government. But federalism also is a tool used by Congress for 
improving policy—a means to an end. In the context of the ACA, that end is 
good health policy, a concept that is itself ill defined. If federalist structural 
arrangements only deliver on some of the things we expect—whether 
autonomy, good healthcare outcomes, experimentation, and so on—is it really 
federalism? Do courts have a role in protecting it? What, again, is healthcare 
federalism for? 
A. Federalism and Democracy Goals 
If one views federalism as concerned only with keeping the federal 
government out of the picture, our study has little to offer. So does healthcare 
in general. As our historical account in Part II above details, the federal 
government has never been an outsider to healthcare law. The ACA is just a 
more extreme version of what came before.  
The big question concerns how to think about sovereignty and autonomy 
when are we not talking about separate spheres of power. We might say that 
the ACA enhanced state sovereignty because the alternative—excluding states 
from any role in the federal scheme—would have dramatically reduced state 
control over healthcare. But couching an absolute concept like sovereignty in 
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relative terms is conceptually challenging. It is easier, and maybe more apt, to 
talk about control. The ACA did offer states policy control—power that was 
enhanced by the ability to leverage the possibility of opting out to extract 
concessions from the federal government. 
Another way to think about questions of sovereignty and autonomy is to 
ask whether the ACA’s implementation helped to strengthen or to diminish 
state local democracy. State governments are their own democracies and make 
their own state law—and that is indeed a hallmark of being sovereign. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, the ACA did not necessarily diminish this aspect of state 
sovereignty. The ACA preempts some areas of health law traditionally 
considered reserved for states, so by that measure, state sovereignty is lost. But 
the statute itself also has generated an enormous amount of new state law. We 
found hundreds of state laws and state administrative acts issued in Medicaid 
and exchange implementation alone.442 Like any major federal law that relies 
on state implementation, the ACA depends on the healthy functioning of the 
state sovereign lawmaking apparatus.443 As one of us has argued, this very fact—
the fact that major national schemes rely on functioning state legal and 
legislative regimes—also gives these aspects of state sovereign governance 
enduring relevance, even in an era dominated by national law.444 Had Congress 
designed the ACA with no role for the states, we would not have had any of 
these intrastate government debates or this volume of state lawmaking on 
health policy. Health policy would be mostly federal all the way down, as in 
Medicare. 
Accountability is another central democracy value and one often men-
tioned in the context of federalism. Conservative members of the Court, 
including the dissenters in NFIB and going back at least to Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion in New York v. United States, have expressed concern that cooperative 
federalism schemes obfuscate accountability, leading voters to blame states for 
what are actually federal policies.445  
 
 442. For a helpful catalog of the vast amounts of state legislative and regulatory action 
taken by the end of 2013, see KATIE KEITH & KEVIN W. LUCIA, IMPLEMENTING THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: THE STATE OF THE STATES (2014), https://perma.cc/6BFM 
-9M9M. 
 443. For elaboration of this point, see Gluck, supra note 23, at 1999. 
 444. See id. at 2000, 2007. 
 445. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 678 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“When Congress compels the States to do its bidding, 
it blurs the lines of political accountability.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
168-69 (1992) (expressing concern that if the federal government could commandeer 
states to carry out federal regulatory schemes, then state politicians might bear the 
brunt of unpopular policies because voters might be ignorant as to whether policy 
choices were made by the state or the federal government). 
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On the one hand, the ACA’s story substantiates this concern. The federal 
government certainly tried to punt some decisions to the states. One example 
comes in the form of the ACA’s essential health benefits—the baseline benefit 
package the statute guarantees for all exchange plans. Although the ACA itself 
directs federal agencies to determine which benefits should be counted as 
essential, this decision proved so controversial that HHS outsourced it to the 
states.446 A similar example comes from the more recent Republican repeal 
proposals. Those bills nominally would have left the ACA’s essential health 
benefits and other generous insurance reforms in place—because they are 
politically popular—while at the same time inserting waiver provisions 
allowing the states to remove them.447 
But our findings also flip some of these accountability concerns on their 
heads. The kind of hybrid federalism structures that HHS pursued to facilitate 
implementation of the ACA—including the “secret boyfriend model”—helped 
state politicians blur responsibility. These structures gave the state actors cover 
to participate in a scheme that they viewed as valuable but politically risky. 
When the ACA was later successful, some state electorates were largely 
unaware that their state was benefiting from cooperating with the federal 
administrative scheme.448 Since the 2016 presidential election, we have seen 
evidence that the citizenry is deeply confused about the implications of 
repealing the ACA, what it accomplished, whether it even exists, and who is 
accountable for what.449 
 
 446. See Sabrina Corlette et al., Urban Inst., Cross-Cutting Issues: Moving to High Quality, 
Adequate Coverage; State Implementation of New Essential Health Benefits Require-
ments 3-5 (2013), https://perma.cc/3WDS-6KE5 (“[T]he ACA calls for the [HHS] 
Secretary . . . to define a set of essential health benefits to be offered by all new fully 
insured individual and small-group health plans, beginning January 1, 2014. . . . Rather 
than define a uniform, national set of essential health benefits, HHS provided that each 
state could choose a benchmark plan on which to base [its] EHB package.”). 
 447. See Compare Proposals to Replace the Affordable Care Act, supra note 3. 
 448. See, e.g., Kyle Dropp & Brendan Nyhan, One-Third Don’t Know Obamacare and Affordable 
Care Act Are the Same, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/UV9Q-KCM4 
(reporting that a survey found that “only 61 percent of adults knew that many people 
would lose coverage through Medicaid or subsidies for private health insurance if the 
A.C.A. were repealed and no replacement enacted”). But see Sarah Kliff, Why Obamacare 
Enrollees Voted for Trump, VOX (Dec. 13, 2016, 8:10 AM EST), https://perma.cc/TXV4 
-GDA6 (questioning whether Kentuckians in fact failed to understand what benefits 
came from the ACA). 
 449. See, e.g., Dropp & Nyhan, supra note 448 (“35 percent of respondents said either they 
thought Obamacare and the Affordable Care Act were different policies (17 percent) or 
didn’t know if they were the same or different (18 percent). . . . When respondents were 
asked what would happen if Obamacare were repealed, even more people were 
stumped.”); Ilya Somin, Public Ignorance About Obamacare, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 1, 
2013, 1:27 PM), https://perma.cc/ZS9S-ZCBR (“42% of Americans are unaware that the 
Affordable Care Act is still the law of the land.”). 
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The democracy value of accountability was in this context traded off for 
policy ends—entrenchment and expansion of the statute. That story itself 
instantiates the multitude of values we tend to group under the single 
federalism umbrella. The states’ under-the-radar moves allowed the ACA to be 
implemented in states where resistance might have otherwise prevented it. 
The remaining number of uninsured would be higher but for this adaptive 
federalism. Maybe that makes this aspect of the story a more nationalist one, 
but federalism enabled it. 
B. Federalism and Policy Goals 
The political and judicial arenas tend to give more attention to federalism 
for federalism’s own sake—for the political and constitutional values it 
advances—than for policy goals. That theme has certainly been dominant in 
the ACA’s implementation. But this has not always been the case. The 
Federalist Papers themselves contain a well-known statement in the other 
direction, putting “the public good” above “the sovereignty of the States” in the 
event the two were to conflict.450 So understood, federalism is a means to an 
end, not the end in itself.451  
But even this narrower slice of federalism as means still stands in for many 
things. One way to think about federalism as a tool for policy is that it 
generates a particular kind of policy solution. As discussed above, local 
variation and experimentation are the kinds of policy values typically 
associated with federalism. But a different way to think about federalism as a 
tool for policy is that federalism may generate the best specific policy outcomes 
on a particular substantive question. In the context of the ACA’s drafting, there 
were indeed numerous suggestions that health policy is better when it is closer 
to the people as justifications for the statute’s state-led structure. 
 
 450. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“It is too 
early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare 
of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of 
government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of 
this object. Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice 
would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public 
happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of 
the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good 
citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter.”). 
 451. Compare, e.g., Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism, supra note 5, at 1039 (“Gluck sees state 
power as an ‘end worth achieving itself.’ . . . I understand both decentralization and 
centralization to be means to an end.” (quoting Abbe R. Gluck, Nationalism as the New 
Federalism (and Federalism as the New Nationalism): A Complementary Account (and Some 
Challenges) to the Nationalist School, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1045, 1050 (2015))), with Gluck, 
supra, at 1046-47 (critiquing Gerken’s view of federalism as a means to ends unrelated to 
federalism). 
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Both categories of federalism as means are more complicated than may 
initially appear. With respect to state-centered administration to generate 
variation and experimentation, we already have illustrated in detail how these 
features sometimes emerged independently of the structural arrangements in 
the ACA (for example, state versus federal exchanges). In other words, these 
core federalism attributes do not actually seem unique to a traditional federalist 
arrangement. 
With respect to federalism as a tool for particular health policy outcomes, 
that too remains unclear, in large part because, on the health policy side, 
outcome goals have not been specifically defined. Access, cost, and quality are 
just some of many potential outcome metrics commonly used—and fought 
over—in health policy circles. We pause here to offer a brief and oversimplified 
snapshot of the kinds of policy analyses that could be undertaken if one had a 
clearly articulated system goal. 
1. ACA federalism and Medicaid outcomes 
It is almost certain that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as drafted—which 
would have mandated a nationwide expansion—would have increased access to 
care simply by covering more than 3 million more lives than were covered 
after the Supreme Court in NFIB gave states a choice.452 But that figure is not 
the only salient outcome measure for what the state-led model that NFIB 
created actually delivered, as it does not take into account other factors that are 
constants in any health policy conversation, such as cost and quality of care.  
Empirical studies of the ACA’s implementation have begun to document 
that especially in Medicaid expansion states, those who have become insured 
through the ACA have better access to care.453 Studies also show that access 
does not occur at the expense of individuals who were already insured—they 
are not being crowded out, as some feared would occur.454 Medicaid 
beneficiaries experience better access to care and better health,455 better ability 
 
 452. See Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, Who Would Have Health Insurance if Medicaid 
Expansion Weren’t Optional, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014), https://perma.cc/2MZW-N5BF. 
 453. See, e.g., Stacey McMorrow et al., Medicaid Expansion Increased Coverage, Improved 
Affordability, and Reduced Psychological Distress for Low-Income Parents, 36 HEALTH AFF. 
808, 812 (2017) (finding “significant increases in access and use among low-income 
parents in expansion states,” as well as “strong improvements in almost every 
affordability measure examined for parents in expansion states”). 
 454. See, e.g., Salam Abdus & Steven C. Hill, Growing Insurance Coverage Did Not Reduce Access 
to Care for the Continuously Insured, 36 HEALTH AFF. 791, 797 (2017) (“We found no 
consistent evidence that increases in insurance coverage rates . . . were associated with 
worsened access to care . . . .”). 
 455. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Changes in Utilization and Health Among Low-Income 
Adults After Medicaid Expansion or Expanded Private Insurance, 176 JAMA INTERNAL 
footnote continued on next page 
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to take medications consistently,456 and less trouble paying medical bills.457 
Medicaid coverage is better than uninsurance458 (which sounds like a low 
baseline, but the notion that it would not be was a tenacious trope around the 
time the ACA was being drafted), for example, in that it increases the 
probability that a patient will present earlier with an illness or injury, which 
contributes to better management of a medical issue.459 
With respect to the cost of healthcare, Medicaid expansion costs both 
states and the federal government more than pre-ACA Medicaid.460 Yet studies 
show that those states that expanded Medicaid eligibility are better off 
 
MED. 1501, 1507-08 (2016) (“After 2 years of coverage expansion in Kentucky and 
Arkansas, compared with Texas’s nonexpansion, there were major improvements in 
access to primary care and medications, affordability of care, utilization of preventive 
services, care for chronic conditions, and self-reported quality of care and health.”). 
 456. See Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Health Insurance Coverage and Health—What the Recent 
Evidence Tells Us, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 586, 588 (2017).  
 457. See DELOITTE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY: MEDICAID EXPANSION REPORT, 2014, at 
35-36 (2015), https://perma.cc/3RSK-E485; The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., What’s 
at Stake in the Future of the Kentucky Medicaid Expansion? 2 (2016), https://perma.cc 
/964T-LXCA; see also Antonisse et al., supra note 215, at 1. 
 458. See Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First 
Year 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17190, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/UQL2-STG2 (“Using a randomized controlled experiment design, we 
examined the approximately one year impact of extending access to Medicaid among a 
low-income, uninsured adult population. We found evidence of increases in hospital, 
outpatient, and drug utilization, increases in compliance with recommended preven-
tive care, and declines in exposure to substantial out-of-pocket medical expenses and 
medical debts. There is also evidence of improvement of self-reported mental and 
physical health measures, perceived access to and quality of care, and overall wellbe-
ing.”); see also, e.g., Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Three-Year Impacts of the Affordable Care 
Act: Improved Medical Care and Health Among Low-Income Adults, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1119, 
1124-25, 1125 exhibit 3 (2017) (“Our four years of data indicate that the ACA’s coverage 
expansion to low-income adults was associated with significant improvements in 
access to primary care and medications, affordability of care, preventive visits, 
screening tests, and self-reported health.”). Amy Finkelstein and colleagues found no 
statistical difference in emergency room usage. See Finkelstein et al., supra, at 3. 
 459. See Andrew P. Loehrer et al., Association of the Affordable Care Act Medical Expansion with 
Access to and Quality of Care for Surgical Conditions, JAMA SURGERY E6 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/9KAY-ALPR (“In this study of surgical patients in 42 states (including 
Washington, DC), the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was associated with higher coverage 
rates, earlier presentation, and improved probability of optimal care for common and 
serious surgical conditions. Our data reinforce that insurance coverage is an important 
contributor to earlier presentation with less severe disease at the time of diagnosis.”). 
Research indicates, however, that the newly eligible may experience longer wait times 
for appointments with specialists than with primary care providers. See Sommers et al., 
supra note 458, at 1126. 
 460. See State and Federal Spending Under the ACA, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS 
COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/H74Z-NTFE (archived Apr. 24, 2018). 
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economically than states that have not.461 The costs of expansion largely are 
borne by the federal government, even when the supermatch phases down to 
90%, and states are able to offset costs (such as for uncompensated care) that 
were the state’s responsibility before Medicaid expansion.462 Insurance 
marketplace premiums are lower in states that expanded Medicaid.463 
Hospitals have had fewer uninsured patients requiring treatment in emergency 
departments,464 and one study reported that hospitals—especially rural 
hospitals—were less likely to close in expansion states.465 Evidence indicates 
that people do not leave employment due to Medicaid expansion, countering 
fears that Medicaid somehow causes joblessness (a different kind of economic 
effect).466  
Not much data is available yet to assess the economic impact of demonstra-
tion waivers in the ACA’s implementation.467 Section 1115 demonstration 
 
 461. See, e.g., Deborah Bachrach et al., State Health Reform Assistance Network, States 
Expanding Medicaid See Significant Budget Savings and Revenue Gains 1 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/L7Y3-EXN6 (“Data regarding Medicaid expansion in 11 states—
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Washington state, and West Virginia—and the District of Columbia 
confirm that states continue to realize savings and revenue gains as a result of 
expanding Medicaid.”); Stan Dorn et al., What Is the Result of States Not Expanding 
Medicaid? 1 (2014), https://perma.cc/NC9H-6CEC (“A review of state-level fiscal 
studies found comprehensive analyses from 16 diverse states. Each analysis concluded 
that expansion helps state budgets.”).  
 462. See Benjamin D. Sommers & Jonathan Gruber, Federal Funding Insulated State Budgets 
from Increased Spending Related to Medicaid Expansion, 36 HEALTH AFF. 938, 941-43 (2017) 
(studying the state-federal budgetary balance in Medicaid expansion states and 
concluding that costs were borne primarily by the federal government); see also State 
and Federal Spending Under the ACA, supra note 460. 
 463. See Aditi P. Sen & Thomas DeLeire, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Effect of 
Medicaid Expansion on Marketplace Premiums 2 (2016), https://perma.cc/8QQW 
-4Q9F (“We estimate that Marketplace premiums are about 7 percent lower in 
expansion states, controlling for differences across states . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
 464. See Antonisse et al., supra note 215, at 1, 5-7. 
 465. See Richard C. Lindrooth et al., Understanding the Relationship Between Medicaid 
Expansions and Hospital Closures, 37 HEALTH. AFF. 111, 117 (2018).  
 466. See Antonisse et al., supra note 215, at 11 (“Studies examining employment rates and 
other measures such as transitions from employment to non-employment, the rate of 
job switches, transitions from full- to part-time employment, labor force participation, 
and usual hours worked per week have not found significant effects of Medicaid 
expansion.”). 
 467. To fill the gap, the Kaiser Family Foundation conducted interviews and focus groups 
in Michigan and Indiana to learn about implementation of those states’ waivers. See 
MaryBeth Musumeci et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., An Early Look at 
Medicaid Expansion Waiver Implementation in Michigan and Indiana 3 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/F4Q9-G4WT (noting, among five key findings, some indication that 
administration of these states’ programs is costly and complex and that “[h]ealth 
accounts can be confusing for beneficiaries”).  
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waivers are supposed to be budget neutral to the federal government, but HHS 
gauges budget neutrality in a number of ways that facilitate rather than impede 
waiver approvals.468 In the Medicaid expansion context, negotiating a waiver 
takes time, and HHS’s evaluation and approval of a waiver usually takes 
anywhere from several months to more than a year.469 This extended 
negotiation and approval process is not cost-free; people who are uninsured 
have no consistent means of care and thus are more costly when they arrive in 
hospitals that must treat them under federal law, resulting in expensive and 
inefficient emergency care.470 In addition, demonstration waivers have specific 
timing and reporting that make immediate, quantifiable evaluation tricky; 
they were typically approved for five years and renewed for three, though 
some provisions had a one-year timeline.471  
Historically, waivers’ successes or failures were not evaluated until a state 
applied to renew or amend a waiver, and section 1115 waivers have a long 
history of implementation without supervision or reflection.472 The ACA 
modified the section 1115 waiver process to increase transparency.473 
Regulations now require states to report annually, regardless of the duration of 
the initial waiver approval.474 Indiana’s HIP 2.0 waiver has been criticized based 
on its first interim report, which indicated that enrollment was low due to the 
 
 468. See Waivers, supra note 262 (detailing each type of waiver and how states obtain 
waivers). 
 469. See id. 
 470. This is due to EMTALA, discussed briefly in Part II.A above, which requires hospitals 
that have emergency departments to treat or stabilize and transfer all individuals who 
present with an emergency condition regardless of their ability to pay. See 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1395dd(b) (2016); supra text accompanying note 108. 
 471. See About Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV, https://perma.cc/4T2G-ULNZ 
(archived Apr. 24, 2018). For examples of one-year section 1115 waivers and extensions, 
see Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Florida: 
Section 1115 Demonstration Fact Sheet 5 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/PX38-NBMF; and 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Iowa 
Wellness Plan Section 1115 Demonstration Fact Sheet 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/99VF 
-748U. CMS announced in late 2017 that it would adjust some waiver approval and 
renewal features, allowing for “fast track” approval of waiver provisions already 
approved in other states and allowing waiver approvals to last longer (ten years, in 
some instances). See Neale, supra note 255, at 3-4 (emphasis omitted). 
 472. See Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the Light: Using Section 1115 Medicaid 
Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 213, 214-15 (2015) (discussing “opaque” section 1115 waiver approval 
and renewal processes). ACA section 10201(i) created a more robust section 1115 waiver 
by adding notice and comment as well as reporting requirements to the application and 
renewal processes. See id. at 215; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10201(i), 124 Stat. 119, 922 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(d)). 
 473. See Watson, supra note 472, at 214-15. 
 474. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.428 (2017). 
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exclusionary measures in the state’s waiver.475 Although the waiver was in 
effect for only about one year, the commissioned study of its implementation 
showed that the state had trouble managing enrollee compliance with rules for 
premium payments, wellness programs, and other measures designed to 
decrease enrollment in Medicaid.476 Another example comes from Iowa, which 
applied for an extension of a one-year waiver that allowed charging for 
nonemergency medical transportation. The little evidence collected indicated 
that Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to care was decreased by this “experiment” 
(especially for individuals earning less than the FPL).477 Overall, many 
elements common in Medicaid expansion waivers are likely to be costlier for 
states to administer than traditional Medicaid.478  
As a different example, waiver provisions that are designed to prevent 
continuous enrollment will decrease costs to the state (and therefore also the 
federal government under Medicaid’s matching funding) but will curtail the 
extent of coverage. In part to reduce costs, states now are seeking to implement 
waivers that will drive the newly eligible population out of Medicaid. 
Consider, for example, Kentucky’s section 1115 waiver approved early in 2018, 
which is designed to decrease state Medicaid costs through work requirements, 
cost sharing, and other features. According to the state’s own evaluation, 
enrollment will drop by nearly 100,000.479  
 
 475. See, e.g., Letter from Am. Congress of Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al. to Thomas 
Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 2 (Mar. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc 
/FRX6-U2AV (“Findings in the HIP 2.0 interim evaluation report show [that Indiana’s] 
policies are affecting participation in the program and making it harder for people to 
obtain care . . . .”). 
 476. See THE LEWIN GRP., INC., INDIANA HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0: INTERIM EVALUATION 
REPORT 3, 20-21 (2016), https://perma.cc/3ZNW-Z237 (revealing that one-third of 
“conditionally enrolled” members—individuals who have applied and are eligible for 
Medicaid but have not yet started coverage—never complete enrollment because they 
fail to make the required premium payments and contributions to their Personal 
Wellness and Responsibility (POWER) accounts); see also id. at 3 (noting that only 66% 
of enrollees required to make contributions to their POWER accounts reported ever 
hearing of the POWER account). HHS required this interim evaluation as well as a final 
evaluation at the end of the three-year waiver. See id. at 1. 
 477. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., to Julie Lovelady, Interim Medicaid Dir., Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs. 1 
(Dec. 30, 2014), https://perma.cc/8MDH-8MBE. 
 478. See Melissa Burroughs, The High Administrative Costs of Common Medicaid Expansion 
Waiver Elements, FAMS. USA (Oct. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/Q77M-LF8N. 
 479. See Deborah Yetter, Bevin Unveils Plan to Reshape Medicaid in Ky., COURIER-J. (Louisville, 
Ky.) (updated June 22, 2016, 6:26 PM ET), https://perma.cc/XM92-QTFJ (reporting the 
waiver application’s indication that Medicaid enrollment will decline by nearly 86,000 
people by 2021); see also Jason Bailey, What’s in the Governor’s Proposed Medicaid Changes, 
KY. CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y: KY. POL’Y BLOG (June 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/HZ9U 
-KMZR. The waiver proposes a number of mechanisms that are likely to block, 
discourage, or cause sporadic enrollment; for example, beneficiaries who cannot pay 
footnote continued on next page 
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As discussed in Part IV above, some states have gone further than the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion, offering more generous coverage. Those efforts 
have the predictable effect of costing the federal government more money in 
matching payments.  
In sum, NFIB’s enhancement of state policy control over Medicaid expan-
sion unquestionably served the structural ends sometimes advanced by 
federalists, including state leverage and policy autonomy. So too for federalist 
policy ends like variation and experimentation—although section 1115 waivers 
would have been possible even within a full nationwide Medicaid expansion 
had NFIB never been decided. But it is far less clear that as a tool to improve 
health policy outcomes—along the most common metrics of access, cost, and 
quality—NFIB’s state-led structure of the Medicaid expansion was successful. 
But then, Congress never assumed that it would be, which is why Congress did 
not draft the Medicaid expansion that way in the first place. 
2. ACA federalism and exchange outcomes 
In contrast, Congress did assume that exchanges would benefit from a 
state-led structure. The data thus far are equivocal, and no firm conclusion can 
be drawn as to whether the structure of the exchanges, in terms of being state 
or federally run, made a difference.480 Most states lost insurers between 2014 
and 2018 regardless of exchange type,481 but some of these losses were due to 
 
premiums or who do not meet work requirements would be “locked out” for months. 
See Yetter, supra; see also Yetter, supra note 260; supra notes 258-61 and accompanying 
text. 
 480. See, e.g., Sabrina Guilbeault et al., Making the Grade: Evaluating the Performance of State 
Health Insurance Marketplaces, COLLABORATIVE (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/N6FH 
-ZCP3 (finding that federally run exchanges performed as well as or better than state-
based exchanges and hybrids); Marketplace Enrollment as a Share of Potential Marketplace 
Participation, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/BQ7H-WAEX (archived Apr. 24, 
2018) (compiling data on marketplace enrollment as a percentage of total eligible 
individuals, with a difference of less than two percentage points between federally 
facilitated and state-based exchanges and a difference of less than three percentage 
points among all kinds of exchanges, including hybrids). 
 481. Partnership-model states fared the best, increasing the average number of issuers slightly 
from 3.7 in 2014 to 4.3 in 2017, although the bulk of this increase is attributable to New 
Hampshire, which went from 1 to 4 issuers while four partnership-model states saw no 
change. See Number of Issuers Participating in the Individual Health Insurance Marketplaces, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/SF2H-C895 (archived Apr. 24, 2018) (listing the 
number of issuers by state, from which we calculated these averages). Other exchange 
types lost roughly one or fewer issuers over the three-year period on average. See id. 
Federally supported state-based marketplaces fared the worst, losing 1.2 insurers on 
average, a drop largely attributable to Oregon, which went from 11 to 6 issuers while 
three other states saw no change. See id.  
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others’ acts of political resistance482—including the shutting off of critical 
insurance stabilization funding by the Republican-controlled Congress.483  
Average premiums increased in forty-six states and the District of Colum-
bia from 2016 to 2017, more than doubling in one state, although premium tax 
credits have largely insulated consumers from the increases.484 On the other 
hand, approximately 16.9 million more Americans received healthcare 
coverage in the first two years of the ACA,485 and 11.8 million Americans 
received insurance through the exchanges in the most recent open enrollment 
period.486 
Data from a few years before the ACA’s passage also reveal wide variation 
among the number of uninsured people across states.487 The ACA has reduced 
that number in each state, but differences across states remain.488  
The data are even more equivocal as to whether state-based exchanges 
performed better across the typical variables of market penetration, premium 
levels, and number of insurers. States with federally run exchanges had lower 
enrollment relative to projections than did states with state-based marketplaces.489 
 
 482. See Bob Bryan, Insurance Companies Are Freaking Out About Trump’s Obamacare Threats, 
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2017, 9:28 AM), https://perma.cc/UZG2-7HG2; Olga Khazan, 
Why So Many Insurers Are Leaving Obamacare, ATLANTIC (May 11, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/3WMW-4K3G. 
 483. See Number of Issuers Participating in the Individual Health Insurance Marketplaces, supra 
note 481. 
 484. See Cynthia Cox et al., 2017 Premium Changes and Insurer Participation in the Affordable 
Care Act’s Health Insurance Marketplaces, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (updated Nov. 1, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/J29T-PS5Z. For example, the second most expensive silver plan in 
Phoenix, Arizona cost $300 more per month in 2017 than in 2016 for a 40-year-old 
nonsmoker earning $30,000 per year. See id. After tax subsidies, though, the price 
remained steady at $207 per month. See id. Preliminary data from the 2018 open 
enrollment period suggest that this trend will continue to hold true. See Rabah Kamal 
et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., An Early Look at 2018 Premium Changes and 
Insurer Participation on ACA Exchanges 2, 3 tbl.1 (2017), https://perma.cc/KHN2 
-M3XN. Some analysts view the rate increases in 2017 as a necessary market correction 
as the health profile of the pool of insured individuals became clear. See Ashley 
Semanskee & Larry Levitt, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Individual Insurance 
Market Performance in Mid 2017, at 5 (2017), https://perma.cc/33GE-PABP. 
 485. See Katherine G. Carman et al., Trends in Health Insurance Enrollment, 2013-15, 34 HEALTH 
AFF. 1044, 1044, 1046 (2015). 
 486. See Total Marketplace Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/VMP8-9FGF 
(archived Apr. 24, 2018). 
 487. See generally John Holahan, Variation in Health Insurance Coverage and Medical Expenditures: 
How Much Is Too Much?, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY, supra note 15, at 111.  
 488. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 275, at 2, 4; see also Health Insurance 
Coverage of the Total Population, supra note 435. 
 489. See Marketplaces Make Significant Progress in 2015, URB. INST. (updated Apr. 8, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/99KH-QZJG. 
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This trend reversed in 2015, and federally run exchanges had higher 
enrollment growth than state-based exchanges.490 The federal government has 
doled out billions of dollars in exchange development grants, but states that 
have received the most grants have not necessarily been the most successful.491 
In terms of both enrollment and cost, at least some data reveal that contrary to 
expectations, state-based exchanges did not outperform either federal or 
hybrid marketplaces.492 
C. Federalism, Regulation, and Law 
Our study also has implications for federalism’s doctrinal landscape.493 
First and foremost, we need to know what we are talking about to know what 
law is protecting or whether law can even protect it. Courts are generally ill 
suited to address one important segment of federalism questions: questions 
about policy, such as whether federalist structures produce better health 
outcomes. We doubt courts are even the appropriate place to address other 
federalism attributes, like autonomy, cooperation, experimentation, and 
variation, because they are so context-specific and dynamic. Frankly, based on 
our findings, we would eliminate those factors entirely as irrelevant to any 
deep analysis of federalism. 
Courts are far better at policing clear boundaries, which we do not have 
here, and at focusing on process, which we do. We can envision, for instance, 
courts intervening in cases to be sure that the policy control a statute gives to 
 
 490. See id. 
 491. See Robert B. Hackey & Erika L. May, Viewpoint, Measuring the Performance of Health 
Insurance Marketplaces, 314 JAMA 667, 667 (2015) (“Hawaii’s [state-based exchange], the 
nation’s most expensive marketplace in terms of per enrollee costs, received more than 
$205 million in federal funding, but as of February 2015 had only enrolled 12,625 
individuals . . . . In contrast, Florida accepted no federal funding for ACA planning and 
implementation, but its [federally facilitated marketplace] enrolled more subscribers 
than any other state in 2015 (1,596,296 individuals).”). 
 492. See id. at 668 (“This is a counter-intuitive outcome because [state-based exchanges] 
retained a larger role in regulating insurance premiums. In such states, insurance 
commissioners were expected to use their rate review powers to exert downward 
pressure on insurers’ premium requests.”). Evidence suggests that insurers in state-
based exchanges performed better financially than insurers in federal exchanges. See 
Mark A. Hall et al., Financial Performance of Health Insurers: State-Run Versus Federal-Run 
Exchanges, MED. CARE RES. & REV. 7 (2017), https://perma.cc/HGM5-W2JG. However, 
this effect may be attributable to states’ decisions on Medicaid expansion. See id. 
(“[S]tate-run exchange states . . . tended to be the ones that expanded Medicaid, and 
doing that takes some of the higher risk people out of the exchange market . . . .”). 
 493. The arguments in this Subpart benefited tremendously from the thoughts of one of our 
initial colleagues in researching the ACA, Dean Ted Ruger at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. 
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states remains with the states.494 Our study corroborates the focus of much of 
the new federalism literature on the role of vertical and interagency bargaining 
as the central feature of modern, intrastatutory federalism relationships.495 
The former federal officials we interviewed told us that their daily interactions 
with each state individually were all-consuming and complex.496 These 
vertical negotiations have been the core dynamic of the ACA’s implementation.  
We also saw that the federal government exerts power—but not hegemon-
ically. The dance between the federal government and each state is not a zero-
sum negotiation over policy optimization between a federal executive and state 
actors who might disagree on a single dimension. The federal government has 
at least two negotiating levers, regulatory policy and budget generosity, and it 
can switch between them (or use both) to implement its policy goals. 
Extending this two-lever bargaining dynamic is a temporal and vision 
mismatch between national and state policy ends. If the Obama Administration 
was typical, the federal executive operates on a longer time horizon than most 
state officials, a point confirmed by several of our interviewees.497 States likely 
care more about Medicaid implementation specifics given their primary role in 
delivering healthcare and the budgetary consequences they face every year. 
The federal executive tends to aim at a higher level of generality.  
These factors combine to give states a lot more leverage than most newer 
federalism scholars assume, and we doubt this observation is unique to the 
ACA. Much of the new scholarship has portrayed the states as victims in these 
negotiations, calling for new legal doctrines as a way to level the bargaining 
playing field between states and the federal government.498 Our findings cast 
 
 494. Cf. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (2001) 
(“[W]hat judicial review we have should be directed toward maintaining a vital system 
of political and institutional checks on federal power, not on policing some absolute 
sphere of state autonomy.”). 
 495. See, e.g., ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 350 (2011) (recognizing 
“the important interpretive roles by political actors in vertical federalism bargaining”); 
Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism, supra note 5, at 1010 (discussing states’ powers as 
those “of the servant” (quoting Heather K. Gerken, Commentary, Of Sovereigns and 
Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633, 2635 (2006))); Gluck, supra note 1, at 570 (discussing 
“important vertical and horizontal implementation networks” that arise in the context 
of the ACA); Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged Constitution of 
American Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012, at 215, 224-26 (emphasiz-
ing state leverage under the ACA). 
 496. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, supra  
note 213; Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5, supra 
note 190. 
 497. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, supra  
note 213; Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5, supra 
note 190; Interview with State Policy Organization Officers 1, 2, 3 and 4, supra note 213. 
 498. Cf., e.g., Ilya Somin, Federalism and the Roberts Court, 46 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 441, 442 
(2016) (praising the Roberts Court’s “strengthen[ing of] judicial enforcement of limits 
footnote continued on next page 
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doubt on whether the states need more protection or power at all. At least in 
the context of the ACA, states have proved themselves quite adept at 
leveraging available options to their benefit.499 We suspect that this leverage 
was due to more than just NFIB, although that decision undoubtedly helped. 
States still had the lever of refusing to establish their own exchanges. As we 
have seen, that was a powerful tool to bring HHS to the table to adapt. The 
Medicaid waiver provisions also were available before NFIB. 
Central to the negotiating power we observed are several features that 
appear not to be limited to the ACA: state choice to implement, a context in 
which the federal government does not wish to or lacks capacity to itself 
implement a program nationwide, and the executive branch’s commitment to 
the program’s success. Of course, other kinds of statutes exist too—including 
ones with less political salience—in which an administering agency might be 
able to step in more easily or be more willing to stake out firmer negotiating 
positions at the expense of entrenching the law. 
It also is notable that Congress and federal courts remain largely on the 
sidelines when it comes to these intergovernmental negotiations.500 We saw 
little of those institutions after Congress set the ACA in motion and the Court 
effectively amended it in NFIB. Part of the reason is that almost no legal 
doctrine applies to these new vertical interactions, and so courts have had little 
role to play.501 As noted, we can imagine doctrines that would recognize the 
federalism features within national statutory implementation and seek to 
effectuate them. We might, for instance, recognize rights for state implementers 
to challenge executive action that undermines a law’s effectiveness—at the 
moment, those kinds of challenges are exceedingly difficult to bring.502 We 
have mentioned one important legal advance that already has occurred, 
perhaps in recognition of the growing importance of bargaining relationships: 
the ACA’s amendment of the Medicaid section 1115 waiver process to bring 
more transparency to waiver negotiations.503 Waivers were notorious legal 
 
on federal power . . . for the purpose of leaving greater scope for state and local 
authority”). See generally Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24-73 
(2011). 
 499. See supra Parts IV.A, V.B.  
 500. Cf. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, at 954 (arguing that Congress has been sidelined 
because of polarization, not the lack of legal doctrine, and seeing an enhanced role for 
executive negotiations as a result). 
 501. See Gluck, supra note 23, at 1997-98 (“This push-pull of nation and state—both from 
inside the landscape of federal statutes—is more than just an interesting theoretical 
observation. It is a ‘law’ problem. When it comes to legal doctrines to deal with this 
new world of statutory federalism, ours is a sorry state of affairs.”). 
 502. The Take Care Clause provides a means of suing the executive but imposes an 
extraordinarily high hurdle. See Gluck, supra note 333; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 503. See Watson, supra note 472, at 215. 
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black boxes across all areas of law, and this new transparency has facilitated 
state copying in Medicaid.  
Another problem is that current legal doctrine does not recognize and so 
cannot capture the blended entities that modern federalism statutes like the 
ACA produce.504 These institutions are neither “state” nor “national.” Ask any 
health law scholar if an insurance exchange—whether state-run, federally run, 
or hybrid—is a state or federal entity, and a variety of conflicting answers will 
follow. These are mixed entities of the sort that—because they retain some 
features of state sovereignty and yet are the brainchildren of federal law—have 
puzzled constitutional and federal courts scholars when it comes to 
categorizing them as state or federal.505  
In years to come, courts will certainly be asked whether challenges to 
aspects of insurance exchange operation are federal or state law questions for 
purposes of jurisdiction and applicable law, just as courts have been asked—and 
have unevenly answered—such questions regarding state implementation of 
the Clean Air Act.506 Questions are also likely to arise concerning the extent to 
which Congress can direct state officials in the implementation of federal law. 
For instance, the ACA required state insurance commissioners to engage in rate 
review that some states did not already allow those officials to perform.507 
Courts have not answered whether federal law may authorize this otherwise 
ultra vires state-official behavior, or whether state law first must authorize 
state officials to act as federal law requires. The Court narrowly skirted this 
question in 2011—a Term before it skirted the difficult question of when 
individuals can challenge states for lax implementation of federal law.508  
 
 504. See generally Gluck, supra note 23 (detailing the lack of doctrine). 
 505. Cf. id. at 2007, 2027, 2033 (illustrating confusion about similar entities, such as the 
implementation tools of the Clean Air Act, a state-led federal statute). 
 506. See Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs Removal, and 
Complete Preemption, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1787-88 (2007) (discussing cases evincing 
confusion under the Clean Air Act).  
 507. See Premium Rate Reviews, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2010), https://perma.cc 
/875G-NRXZ (“Under federal law, states (usually insurance departments) will review 
rates and determine whether they are unreasonable. . . . [Only t]wenty-four states give 
the state insurance department or commissioner legal power of prior approval or 
disapproval of certain rate changes.”). 
 508. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255, 257-58 (2011); see also 
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 610, 616 (2012) (declining to 
decide “whether the Ninth Circuit properly recognized a Supremacy Clause action to 
enforce” a Medicaid provision against the states). The Court returned to a similar 
question in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015). In that case, 
the Court held that doctors could not sue state officials for underenforcing federal 
Medicaid laws. See id. at 1382, 1384-85, 1387. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270 
What Is Federalism in Healthcare For? 
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018) 
1799 
 
This blurring of state and national contributes to the conceptual difficul-
ties for federalism outlined above. It also undermines the assumptions made by 
federalism legal doctrines, which still rest on a separate spheres conception. 
D. Federalism and Healthcare 
Federalism as a tool of health policy in particular remains theoretically 
muddy. On the one hand, an attachment to retaining localism in healthcare 
persists and clearly relates to federalism. Nationalization of healthcare has been 
something Americans have strongly supported only when circumstances are 
dire for a particular group, such as when Medicare was enacted in 1965,509 or 
when populations Congress views as especially vulnerable—such as mothers 
and children in the case of Medicaid—need help.510 The tradition has been to 
place trust in state-run programs to control quality, bring down healthcare 
costs, enhance competition, and promote innovation—in other words, 
federalism has been assumed to be the means to improve policy outcomes.511  
It is well established that healthcare varies across geographic markets.512 
Some of this variation is driven by the kinds of differences typically discussed 
in federalism literature. Medicine historically has a very local culture, and 
provider practices may vary substantially even across communities within the 
same state.513 Even Medicare, the national health insurance program for the 
 
 509. See STARR, supra note 59, at 368-69; Robert J. Blendon & John M. Benson, Americans’ 
Views on Health Policy: A Fifty-Year Historical Perspective, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 
33, 34 (“Shortly before Medicare was enacted, 75 percent of the public said that the 
federal government should pass a law to provide medical care for seniors.”). 
 510. See, e.g., Lisa Shapiro, First Focus, The Children’s Health Insurance Program: Why 
CHIP Is Still the Best Deal for Kids 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/B6UD-GRL5 (“The 
American people overwhelmingly support CHIP’s continuation. In a May 2014 poll 
conducted by American Viewpoint, voters favored extending funding for CHIP by a 
74-14% margin, including 66-19% among Republicans.”). 
 511. See Holahan et al., supra note 15, at 6-7. 
 512. See, e.g., John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care 
Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1102, 1107 (1973). 
 513. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872 (Miss. 1985) (“Because of . . . differences in 
facilities, equipment, etc., what a physician may reasonably be expected to do in the 
treatment of a patient in rural Humphreys County or Greene County may vary from 
what a physician in Jackson may be able to do. A physician practicing in Noxubee 
County, for example, may hardly be faulted for failure to perform a CAT scan when 
the necessary facilities and equipment are not reasonably available.”), superseded in other 
part by statute, Act of Mar. 2, 1989, ch. 311, 1989 Miss. Laws 19 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the Mississippi Code), as recognized in Narkeeta Timber Co. v. 
Jenkins, 777 So. 2d 39 (Miss. 2000); James N. Weinstein et al., Trends and Geographic 
Variations in Major Surgery for Degenerative Diseases of the Hip, Knee, and Spine, 23 
HEALTH AFF. VAR-81, VAR-82 (2004) (“In a given region, local physicians tend to apply 
their rules of practice consistently, which results in the ‘surgical signature’ phenome-
footnote continued on next page 
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elderly and disabled, still relies on local coverage determinations.514 
Geographic variations in diseases and local health behaviors also drive 
differences.515  
Other differences are driven by inequality, including disparities when it 
comes to local resources and social determinants of health.516 Moral 
considerations may outweigh a preference for localism in these circumstances, 
depending on whether the policy goal of healthcare federalism is outcomes or 
structure. Those moral considerations were part of Congress’s motivation to 
nationalize the Medicaid expansion in drafting the ACA.517  
In this vein, a particularly fascinating outgrowth of the ACA from a 
healthcare federalism perspective is that the threat of its repeal has done more 
to advance a nationalized vision of healthcare than ever before. Calls for a fully 
national “single payer” system were politically impossible before the Trump 
Administration. But the threat to the ACA’s efforts to expand healthcare access 
has led many to place moral concerns above structural ones and has brought 
arguments for single payer healthcare into the mainstream.518  
But whichever side of the line one is on, our key point is that little evi-
dence supports the claim that any of the structural options is best. Little data 
exists showing that states acting alone actually achieve better health outcomes 
than do states working within federal guidelines. Even less evidence exists 
comparing outcomes when states work alone, when states work inside federal 
guidelines, and when the federal government acts alone. 
 
non: rates for specific surgical procedures that are idiosyncratic to a region, sometimes 
differing dramatically among neighboring regions.”). 
 514. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(f)(2)(B) (2016) (“For purposes of this section, the term ‘local 
coverage determination’ means a determination by a fiscal intermediary or a carrier 
under part A or part B, as applicable, respecting whether or not a particular item or 
service is covered on an intermediary- or carrier-wide basis under such parts, in 
accordance with [42 U.S.C.] § 1395y(a)(1)(A) . . . .”). 
 515. See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United 
States, 2001-2014, 315 JAMA 1750, 1756 (2016) (describing the importance of local trends 
in health behaviors in creating geographic differences in health outcomes). 
 516. See Harry J. Heiman & Samantha Artiga, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Beyond 
Health Care: The Role of Social Determinants in Promoting Health and Health Equity 2 
(2015), https://perma.cc/8X88-3K45; see also, e.g., Jennifer Weisent et al., Socioeconomic 
Determinants of Geographic Disparities in Campylobacteriosis Risk: A Comparison of Global 
and Local Modeling Approaches, INT’L J. HEALTH GEOGRAPHICS 2 (2012), https://perma.cc 
/BN4M-582G (describing the socioeconomic factors influencing rates of campylobac-
teriosis, a common cause of gastroenteritis). 
 517. See Remarks on Signing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 00196, at 3 (Mar. 23, 2010), https://perma.cc/DR5A-LNPY (“And 
we have now just enshrined . . . the core principle that everybody should have some 
basic security when it comes to their health care.”). 
 518. See Abbe Gluck, Obamacare as Superstatute, BALKINIZATION (July 29, 2017, 10:18 AM), 
https://perma.cc/25MX-658G. 
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The ACA is the ultimate compromise. It retains and strengthens the 
preexisting landscape of fragmented and structurally diverse healthcare 
programs. It straddles the systemic philosophical options, incorporating 
components of both individual responsibility and solidarity/universality into 
one statute. And when it comes to federalist structures, the statute embraces a 
federalist model with a nationalized baseline, even as the healthcare goals it 
aims to accomplish may be better suited to a fully nationalized structure, at 
least when it comes to Medicaid. But that is why we can say with more 
certainty that the ACA’s implementation structure serves state power than we 
can say that the implementation proves that federalism results in the best 
health policies.  
Some newer federalists might take a third way. Heather Gerken, for 
instance, might focus less on state power and more on how the ACA creates a 
structure that accommodates policy differences or leads to beneficial policy 
churn.519 Even so, saying that healthcare federalism is merely a vehicle to 
allow for a variety of policy solutions does not ring completely true to us, in 
large part because we have shown that we can have that policy churn without 
state-led programs at all. Moreover, even if healthcare federalism is mostly 
understood as a vehicle for policy diversity, that does not amount to a 
normative defense of it. Either that variety itself produces benefits—such as in 
the form of health outcomes—or it should be justified on different terms, 
whether in terms of democracy benefits from federalist structures or in terms 
of the benefits of such policy diversity even in the face of moral concerns about 
unequal access to healthcare across the country. 
None of this is to suggest that federalism is not real in healthcare. Our 
story makes the salience of the state role, including the importance of state 
sovereignty, clear. But federalism’s normative justifications require more 
serious clarification and evaluation. More empirical examination of benefits 
and drawbacks of different federalist structures across classic health policy 
metrics such as coverage, quality, and cost is needed. Additional data could 
provide information about whether federalism should be a key policy move. If it 
turns out that federalist structures do not make for better policy outcomes in a 
particular area, then we need to ask whether there is instead a normative 
justification for suboptimal policy choices in exchange for the other structural, 
political, or constitutional benefits we think healthcare federalism would offer 
as an end unto itself. 
 
 519. See Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism, supra note 5, at 1026. 
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The ACA’s implementation offers a window into modern American 
federalism—and modern American nationalism—in action. The implementa-
tion process baked into the statute’s structure, despite being flipped by NFIB 
and the ensuing political resistance, invites participation from a wide range of 
state and federal actors and extends that iterative process forward through 
time. The process is both vertical and horizontal as well as exceedingly 
adaptive, as state and federal actors respond not just to federal regulators but 
also to internal state dynamics, other states’ experiences, and complex policy 
goals. States move back and forth between different structural arrangements 
vis-à-vis the federal government, and negotiation with federal counterparts is a 
near constant.  
The story is not one of separate-spheres federalism. But neither is it one of 
states as subservient entities lacking sovereignty. Rather, the ACA’s structure 
has given the states a great deal of policy autonomy and leverage. It has relied 
on the gears of state sovereign democracy to work and so strengthens those 
democracies in the process. At the same time, the state-federal blur that the 
ACA produces has sometimes obfuscated accountability—notably by 
sometimes masking state cooperation with the federal program when it would 
be politically unpopular to engage. The features we detail have endured, 
including after the election and arrival of an administration hostile to the law.  
In work describing our study at an earlier stage, we labeled our findings 
“The New Health Care Federalism.”520 We have moved away from this label 
here, in part because we suspect our story is not unique to healthcare. The 
ACA’s scale simply makes the features we describe particularly salient.  
We also are not certain whether the features we identify mark differences 
in kind or in degree from what came before. States have negotiated with the 
federal government for decades; internal state politics have always mattered; 
Congress has used states as lead implementers of federal law for many years. 
But the ACA showcases these features in extreme fashion, and it deconstructs 
“federalism” in ways we have not seen before. This does not mean that no other 
statute does it; just that the ACA makes it impossible to ignore. 
Federalism scholars spend most of their time arguing for a particular 
structural arrangement based on prior goals and values. The ACA’s 
architecture challenges whether any of these goals and values are unique to 
federalism or any particular expression of it. It illustrates how federalism is a 
proxy for many ideas and challenges us to ask what we are really fighting over, 
or seeking, when we invoke the concept. Underneath it all is a modern system 
 
 520. Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 207. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270 
What Is Federalism in Healthcare For? 
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018) 
1803 
 
of governance that blends state and federal in ways legal doctrine has not 
recognized. 
And when it comes to healthcare, conceptual difficulties multiply, largely 
because first principles are wanting. Without settling on the overarching goals 
of a healthcare system in the first place, no one can determine whether the 
kinds of state-federal arrangements built into the ACA serve those goals. And 
without deciding whether structural separation of state and federal is an end in 
itself or a means to a policy end—or both—we cannot say much that is 
meaningful about it. As a result, we cannot determine whether federalism is 
serving its ostensible purposes, how strongly it is entrenched, or how 
vigorously it is worth defending. 
